Rational Avoidance of Accountability

Lauchs, Mark A. (2007) Rational Avoidance of Accountability. QUT Law and Justice Journal, 7(2), pp. 295-304.

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Abstract

This paper proposes that politicians have a rational need to disguise unavoidable corruption. Using public choice theory to logically establish that politicians must pass accountability legislation to be re-elected, but cannot avoid corrupt activity occuring on their watch. Thus their legislation must appear worthy but have no effect lest it uncover the corruption it was passed to disguise.

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140 since deposited on 03 Apr 2008
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ID Code: 13232
Item Type: Journal Article
Refereed: Yes
Additional Information: The contents of this journal can be freely accessed online via the journal's web page (see hypertext link).
Additional URLs:
Keywords: corruption, accountability, public choice theory
ISSN: 1445-6249
Divisions: Current > QUT Faculties and Divisions > Faculty of Law
Copyright Owner: Copyright 2007 QUT
Deposited On: 03 Apr 2008 00:00
Last Modified: 29 Feb 2012 13:38

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