The E-mail Game Revisited - Modeling Rough Inductive Reasoning
Dulleck, Uwe (2007) The E-mail Game Revisited - Modeling Rough Inductive Reasoning. International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 9(2), pp. 323-339.
I study the robustness of Rubinstein's (1989) E-Mail Game results by varying the information that players can utilize. The article follows one of Morris' (2002) reactions to the E-Mail game "that one should try to come up with a model of boundedly rational behavior that delivers predictions that are insensitive to whether there is common knowledge or a large number of levels of knowledge". Players in my model are presumed to use 'rough inductive reasoning' because they cannot utilize exact information.
The information structure in the E-Mail game is generalized and the conditions are characterized under which Rubinstein's results hold. I find that rough inductive reasoning generates a payoff dominant equilibrium where the expected payoffs change continuously (instead of discretely) in the probability of "faulty" communication.
Impact and interest:
Citation countsare sourced monthly fromand citation databases.
These databases contain citations from different subsets of available publications and different time periods and thus the citation count from each is usually different. Some works are not in either database and no count is displayed. Scopus includes citations from articles published in 1996 onwards, and Web of Science® generally from 1980 onwards.
Citations counts from theindexing service can be viewed at the linked Google Scholar™ search.
Full-text downloadsdisplays the total number of times this work’s files (e.g., a PDF) have been downloaded from QUT ePrints as well as the number of downloads in the previous 365 days. The count includes downloads for all files if a work has more than one.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Keywords:||Inductive reasoning, JEL, Classification, C72|
|Subjects:||Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > ECONOMICS (140000) > Economic Theory (140100) > Mathematical Economics (140103)|
Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > ECONOMICS (140000) > Economic Theory (140100) > Microeconomic Theory (140104)
|Divisions:||Current > QUT Faculties and Divisions > QUT Business School|
|Copyright Owner:||Copyright 2007 World Scientific Publishing|
|Copyright Statement:||Electronic version of an article published as [International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 9(2):pp. 323-339.] [http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S0219198907001424] © [copyright World Scientific Publishing Company]|
|Deposited On:||09 Oct 2008|
|Last Modified:||29 Feb 2012 23:34|
Repository Staff Only: item control page