Examining Indistinguishability-Based Proof Models for Key Establishment Protocols

Choo, Kim-Kwang R. and Boyd, Colin A. and Hitchcock, Yvonne (2005) Examining Indistinguishability-Based Proof Models for Key Establishment Protocols. In: Advances in Cryptology - Asiacrypt 2005, 4-8 Dec 2005, Chennai, India.

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DOI : 10.1007/11593447_32

Abstract

We examine various indistinguishability-based proof models for key establishment protocols, namely the Bellare & Rogaway (1993,1995), the Bellare, Pointcheval, & Rogaway (2000), and the Canetti & Krawczyk (2001) proof models. We then consider several variants of these proof models, identify several subtle differences between these variants and models, and compare the relative strengths of the notions of security between the models. For each of the pair of relations between the models (either an implication or a non-implication), we provide proofs or counter-examples to support the observed relations. We also reveal a drawback with the original formulation of the Bellare, Pointcheval, & Rogaway (2000) model, whereby the Corrupt query is not allowed. As a case study, we use the Abdalla & Pointcheval (2005) three-party password-based key exchange protocol (3PAKE), which carries a proof of security in the Bellare, Pointcheval, & Rogaway (2000) model. We reveal a previously unpublished flaw in the protocol, and demonstrate that this attack would not be captured in the model due to the omission of the Corrupt query.

ID Code:	2181
Item Type:	Conference Paper
Keywords :	Key Establishment Protocols, Provable Security, Bellare, Rogaway Model, Canetti, Krawczyk Model, Key Agreement Protocols, Indistinguishability, Based Proof Models
ISBN:	9783540306849
ISSN:	1611-3349
Subjects:	Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > INFORMATION AND COMPUTING SCIENCES (080000)
Divisions:	QUT Faculties and Divisions > Faculty of Science and Technology
Copyright Owner :	Copyright 2005 Springer
Copyright Statement :	This is the author-version of the work. Conference proceedings published, by Springer Verlag, will be available via SpringerLink. http://www.springer.de/comp/lncs/ Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Deposited On:	10 Oct 2005
Last Modified:	23 Jan 2009 04:48

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