Discourse analysis and the critical use of Foucault

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Abstract

Much has been written on Michel Foucault’s reluctance to clearly delineate a research method, particularly with respect to genealogy (Harwood, 2000; Meadmore, Hatcher, & McWilliam, 2000; Tamboukou, 1999). Foucault (1994: 288) himself disliked prescription stating, “I take care not to dictate how things should be” and wrote provocatively to disrupt equilibrium and certainty, so that “all those who speak for others or to others” no longer know what to do. It is doubtful, however, that Foucault ever intended for researchers to be stricken by that malaise to the point of being unwilling to make an intellectual commitment in outlining methodological possibilities. The aim of this paper is to develop what might be called a discursive analytic from Foucault’s work and related poststructural writings in order to provide this researcher with a clear doctoral itinerary but also to do others the courtesy of leaving a clearly identifiable trail.

Introduction

Discourse analysis is a flexible term. What one is doing is greatly dependent on the epistemological framework being drawn upon. It appears that many scholars using discourse analysis within a Foucauldian framework have adopted a ‘Foucauldianistic’ reticence to declare method, fearful perhaps of the charge of being prescriptive. There are those again who make references to ‘doing’ discourse analysis and because they loosely link their analysis to motifs of power and sporadically cite Foucault, there is an assumption that this too is ‘Foucauldian’ discourse analysis. In any case, it is quite difficult to find coherent descriptions of how one might go about discourse analysis using Foucault. Perhaps the difficulty in locating concise descriptions as to how to go about doing ‘Foucauldian’ discourse analysis is because there is no such thing?

In this paper, I discuss why this might be so and engage with the awkward tension that arises when one attempts to do poststructural work whilst still satisfying the conventions of academic writing and scholarship. Despite there being no model for discourse analysis qua Foucault, should one claim to be drawing on a Foucauldian framework there is a very real danger in one’s work being dismissed as un-Foucauldian - if one doesn’t get it right. But how can one get it wrong when there are supposedly no rules to follow? This is an interesting but precarious dilemma that has an exclusive/exclusionary effect (see O’Farrell, 2005). For this reason, some perceive Foucauldian theory as inaccessible and dangerous (O’Farrell, 2005), which deters some researchers particularly those in more practice-oriented fields from engaging with this form of analysis. My project here is to develop what might be called a discursive analytic; a methodological plan with which I can set about doing a form of poststructural discourse analysis that is informed by and consistent with the work of Michel Foucault. This is not a set of rules to follow but a journey and conversation I invite others to join.
**Different horses for different courses…**

Previously, Sandra Taylor (2004) has provided an analysis of education policy documents using Critical Discourse Analysis. Taylor argues (original emphasis, 2004: 436) that Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA),

is particularly appropriate for critical policy analysis because it allows a detailed investigation of the relationship of language to other social processes, and of how language works within power relations. CDA provides a framework for a systematic analysis – researchers can go beyond speculation and demonstrate how policy texts work.

In Taylor’s (2004) discussion, distinction is made between two approaches to discourse analysis. This is principally between Critical Discourse Analysis which draws inferences from structural and linguistic features in texts and discourse analysis informed by the work of Foucault. The difference between the former, which Taylor (2004: 435) describes as paying “close attention to the linguistic features of texts” and the latter, described as “those which do not”, is perhaps more complex than this (see discussion in Wetherall, 2001: 391-393). For a start, there are more than these two approaches to discourse analysis and other epistemological frameworks inform them (Wetherall, Taylor, & Yates, 2001). Perhaps the common thread between analyses in the latter group is not Foucault at all but instead a poststructural sensibility which is born of a “theorising that rests upon complexity, uncertainty and doubt and upon a reflexivity about its own production and its claims to knowledge about the social” (Ball, 1995: 269).

The difference between CDA and poststructural theoretical approaches (using Foucault, Derrida and Lyotard among others) to discourse analysis may be found in the characteristic eschewing of claims to objectivity and truth by those in the latter tradition; for, as Edwards and Nicoll (2001: 105) point out, “the claim to truth can itself be seen as a powerful rhetorical practice.” Additionally, Humes and Bryce (original emphasis, 2003: 180) speak to the poststructuralist respect for uncertainty and the influence of key thinkers such as Derrida when they argue that, “the search for clarity and simplicity of meaning is seen as illusory because there will always be other perspectives from which to interpret the material under review. To seek a definitive account is, thus, a misguided undertaking.” As such, discourse analysis informed by Foucauldian or other poststructural theory endeavours to avoid the substitution of one ‘truth’ for another, recognising that “there can be no universal truths or absolute ethical positions [and hence].. belief in social scientific investigation as a detached, historical, utopian, truth-seeking process becomes difficult to sustain” (Wetherall, 2001: 384).

Those with a poststructuralist bent argue that “the process of analysis is always interpretive, always contingent, always a version or a reading from some theoretical, epistemological or ethical standpoint” (Wetherall, 2001: 384). This does not equate to unsystematised speculation but instead reflects the characteristic reticence of those “doing” discourse analysis within a Foucauldian/poststructural framework to prescribe method or similarly make claims to truth through ‘scientific’, ‘objective’, ‘precise’ methodologies. This again is not restricted to Foucauldian work, as Edwards and Nicoll (emphasis added, 2001:
106) demonstrate this same caution in discussing methodological possibilities in rhetorical analysis:

The different elements may be combined in a variety of ways to produce different types of analysis that focus on a particular range of practices and issues. *They are not part of a method to be applied, but resources in an interpretive art.*

However, a perceived lack of precise methodological principles has lent weight to epistemological claims about the superior rigour of linguistically-based methodologies, such as CDA, over those informed by the work of Foucault and other *post*-theorists. Whilst poststructuralism has contested authorial authority and the validity of a fixed meaning (Hutcheon, 1988), this does not necessarily lead to what Said (1993: 312) calls the “tiresome playfulness of ‘postmodern’ criticism” or the nihilism (Nicholson, 1989) that the influence of Foucault and other *post*-thinkers is sometimes charged (Wetherall et al., 2001). Foucault’s theorisation of the constitutive and disciplinary properties of discursive practices within socio-political relations of power is a demonstration of the postmodern concern with *how* language works to not only produce meaning but also particular kinds of objects and subjects upon whom and through which particular relations of power are realised (Luke, 1999). Thus, text work through discourse analysis drawing on Foucault aspires to dissect, disrupt and render the familiar strange by interrogating, as Foucault (1980a: 237) describes, “the discourses of true and false... the correlative formation of domains and objects... the verifiable, falsifiable discourses that bear on them, and ... the effects in the real to which they are linked.”

Correspondingly, Stephen Ball (1995: 267) reminds us that “the point about theory is not that it is simply critical” and that theory in educational research should be “to engage in struggle, to reveal and undermine what is most invisible and insidious in prevailing practices.” Discourse analysis that draws on the work of Foucault is well placed to do this. In looking to the function of statements (Foucault, 1972) in discourses that work to (re)secure dominant relations of power (Nakayama & Krizek, 1995) and the correlative formation of domains and objects (Deleuze, 1988; Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982; Foucault, 1972), the ‘Foucauldian’ discourse analyst certainly shares the Critical Discourse Analyst’s concern as to the “relationship of language to other social processes, and of how language *works* within power relations” (Taylor, 2004: 436). Whilst these two approaches may offer different analyses, this simply confirms the assertion that “there will always be other perspectives from which to interpret the material under review” (Humes & Bryce, 2003: 180) and the kaleidoscopic nature of language and meaning; certainly not that one analyses is any more ‘true’ than the other.

However, Taylor’s assertion does point towards tensions that arise in education research when one attempts to engage in poststructural work, particularly in the current climate privileging ‘scientific’, ‘evidence-based’ paradigms (Lather, 2004; DEST, RQF, 2005). The problem becomes: how can one remain open to poststructural “undecidability” (Allan, 2004) without being accused of unsystematised speculation? If one does decide to “operationalise” (Gore, 1997: 216) Foucault or (for the masochists among us) Derrida; how does one do this...
without systematising the work of “the ‘anti-theorists’ of postmodernism” (Thomas, 1997: 80)? This predicament is very much becoming a damned if you do, damned if you don’t scenario - with a series of discomfiting effects. I will consider these briefly to contextualise the arguments forthcoming in this paper.

**The problems in “doing” discourse analysis using Foucault**

Whilst the following could well apply to the construction of any methodological tool in education research, in the main this discussion applies to what one is supposedly doing when using discourse analysis informed by the work of Foucault. First, in the effort to remain open to undecidability and resist the closure that systematisation inevitably brings, researchers drawing on the work of Foucault “strive to avoid the ‘positivist trap’ of essentialising the research ‘method’” (Harwood, 2000: 59). Whilst this may help prevent the intellectual strait-jacketing and circumscription of thought that Thomas (1997: 76) maintains results from the “hegemony of theory”, strangely enough the use of poststructural theory in education research has itself become “an instrument for reinforcing an existing set of practices and methods in education” (Thomas, 1997: 76).

Not declaring method functions no longer purely as a means to avoid the “positivist trap” (Harwood, 2000: 59) but, in some ways, has become a trap in itself. When discussing Foucault’s ambiguity in relation to how one might go about doing genealogy, Harwood (2000: 42) intuits this “as an intentional strategy, for if Foucault had prescribed specific methodology, he would have fallen foul of his own critique of truth and science.” If Foucault had ‘prescribed’ (as in systematised) a way in which one must go about doing genealogy in order for it to be authentic, then I agree that this would be hypocrisy of the highest form. This is different from being explicit about what one is doing though, and Foucault is very precise and specific (one could even say methodical) in, for example, The Archaeology of Knowledge or The Order of Things.

It seems that in an attempt to avoid prescription through ambiguity (Harwood, 2000), poststructural work becomes vulnerable to judgement against competing epistemological claims to methodological superiority. Does this mean in the current education research climate beset by questions of ‘quality’ and ‘rigour’ (DEST, RQF, 2005), that researchers of a post-persuasion must resign to playing education research according to the quasi-scientific rules of others? If I am to lay claim to doing discourse analysis, does this mean I must resort to prescriptive models so that it can be repeated, triangulated and generalised, in order for my work to be taken seriously and counted as quality research (DEST, RQF, 2005)? On the other hand, to avoid my work being considered unFoucauldian, must I be ambiguous?

Whilst I concur with Harwood (2000), I am nervous about the use of the term ambiguity. I understand the play on multiplicity of interpretation and open-endedness that ambiguity signifies however, the term ambiguous is itself ambiguous – it not only means “open to various interpretations” but also “of doubtful and uncertain nature; difficult to comprehend” and “lacking clearness or definiteness, obscure” (Macquarie Essential Dictionary, 1999: 23). Not only does this echo much of the criticism directed towards Foucauldian and poststructural
writing (Bookchin, 1995; West, 2004) but the potential for re-appropriation of this signifier to discipline those who champion its use is worrisome. Can I maintain a poststructural respect for uncertainty (Usher & Edwards, 1994) without appearing vague or, for the want of a better word, uncertain of what I am doing? I would also ask: must I be ambiguous in order to avoid prescription? Can I still be creative without being ambiguous or when being explicit? Perhaps in the end, what I must do is take caution to be explicit about what I am doing, without “trying to dictate what is to be done” (Foucault, 1980a: 236).

As I am using Foucault’s work to inform and enhance my own but wish to resist the application of Foucauldianistic type paradigms, I second Gary Thomas (1997: 87) when he calls for the use of “ad hocery” rather than conformity to theory-as-archive. As such, I revel in the idea of “methodological anarchy” (Thomas, 1997, p.76). Whilst this might sound irreconcilable to much of the discussion above (I am aware that the term ‘anarchy’ is possibly even more loaded than ‘ambiguity’), to reiterate (and be explicit) I concur with Harwood (2000: 58) when she seeks to “disturb the habit of making ‘method’ definitive” but am concerned that ambiguity can result in opacity. This may bring about the disciplinary effects discussed earlier, plus make it more difficult for new or early career researchers to work out how one might go about discourse analysis using Foucault. I do not interpret “methodological anarchy” to mean “anything goes” (Thomas, 1997: 85) in the relativistic sense but in the creative sense used by Feyerabend (1993 in Thomas, 1997), which is to use systems of thought as catalysts to move beyond the strait-jacketing confines of methodological rules (implicit or explicit) that serve to inhibit or constrain thought (Thomas, 1997: 85). In this, I seek intellectual freedom whilst remaining within and respecting the expectations of a community of scholarship. This requires, not that I dogmatically follow someone else’s model for doing discourse analysis but that I ground my work in careful scholarship and engage in a respectful conversation with Foucault; whilst looking to and building on the insights of others, all the while making what I am doing clear without prescribing a model that serves to discipline others.

Orientation

But here is an example of another possible orientation. In analysing a painting, one can reconstitute the latent discourse of the painter; one can try to recapture the murmur of his intentions [or] … set out to show a discursive practice that is embodied in techniques and effect… shot through with the positivis of a knowledge (savoir). It seems to me that one might also carry out an analysis of the same type on political knowledge. (Foucault, 1972: 214)

This paper derives from a doctoral study that interrogates the construction of otherness and differential treatment of children presenting with problematic behavior in schools. This work does not contribute to arguments that debate the ‘truth’ of ADHD or claim that ‘behavior disorderedness’ is purely a social construct. Instead, I take the position that it is not necessary to engage in “a battle ‘on behalf of the truth’” by debating “the philosophical presuppositions that may lie within” that truth nor the “epistemological foundations that may legitimate it” (Foucault, 1972: 205). Indeed, Foucault (1972: 205) maintains that to
“tackle the ideological function of a science in order to reveal and modify it”, one should “question it as a discursive formation” which involves mapping the system by which particular objects are formed and the “types of enunciations” implicated. This is taken to mean that instead of engaging in a battle of truth and fiction with the human sciences as to the existence of ADHD or ‘behavior disorderedness’, the objective is to consider not whether ADHD/behavior disorder is true but how its objects might become formed; that is, how is this particular difference articulated and brought to attention and what might be the “effects in the real” (Foucault, 1980a: 237).

Mapping Systems of Formation

When engaging with Foucault’s metaphor of a discursive/technological grid, James Scheurich (1997: 98, 107) discusses the construction and recognition of a problematic group occurring within what he describes as a “grid of social regularities.” Importantly, Scheurich describes this grid as “both epistemological and ontological; [for] it constitutes both who the problem group is and how the group is seen or known as a problem” (emphasis added, Scheurich, 1997: 107). Of interest in this paper is how particular children come to be described as a problem within the schooling context. Following Scheurich’s suggestion of epistemological actions, I investigate pedagogical discourses or discursive practices as enunciations (Foucault, 1972) that determine whom a problem group is (Scheurich, 1997). This is consistent with Foucault’s suggestion to tackle truth by questioning it as discursive formation. To do this I use discourse analysis to interrogate the productive power of psychopathologising pedagogical discourse and question how this may implicate schooling as “a system of formation” (Foucault, 1972: 205) of certain truth-objects. In order to facilitate an investigation of pedagogical discourses that construct recognizable (Butler, 1997a) ‘disordered’ objects through statements that define the behaviorally problematic school child, this paper focuses on the development of what might be called a discursive analytic; a methodological plan to approach the analysis of pedagogical discourses through the location of enunciations or statements that function with constitutive effects (Foucault, 1972). As discussed at length earlier, several descriptions of what constitutes discourse and discourse analysis abound. Consequently, it is necessary to explain my understanding of these which has developed through an interpretive reading of Foucault.

The Statement

Foucault privileges the ‘statement’ extracted from “the simple inscription of what is said” (Deleuze, 1988: 15). He describes the statement, not as a linguistic unit like the sentence, but as “a function” (Foucault, 1972: 98). The statement as ‘function’ can be theorised as a discursive junction-box in which words and things intersect and become invested with particular relations of power, resulting in an interpellative event (Althusser, 1971; Butler, 1990) in which one can “recognize and isolate an act of formulation” (Foucault, 1972: 93). According to Foucault (1972: 100), the statement is a “special mode of existence” which enables “groups of signs to exist, and enables rules or forms to become manifest” (Foucault, 1972: 99). Thus, in theorising the tactics related to the production of psychiatric “truth” and
the development of a power/knowledge specific to the human sciences, Foucault (1972, p.86-87) looks,

to describe statements, to describe the enunciative function of which they are the bearers, to analyse the conditions in which this function operates, to cover the different domains that this function presupposes and the way in which those domains are articulated.

In doing so, he notes that “psychiatric discourse finds a way of limiting its domain, of defining what it is talking about, of giving it the status of an object – and therefore of making it manifest, nameable, and describable” (Foucault, 1972: 46). He maintains that the construction of categories and description of disorders (such as the evolving descriptions within the DSM-IV-TR) serves to provide the human sciences with a locatable object of scrutiny (Foucault, 1975b). Of interest here is how the statement functions not to define “objects, fully formed and armed, that the discourse of psychopathology has then merely to list, classify, name,” (Foucault, 1972: 47) but instead how the statement, as a function of certain discursive dividing practices, “enables [the object] to appear... to be placed in a field of exteriority” (Foucault, 1972: 50).

**Recognising particular objects of discourse**

Correspondingly Butler (original emphasis, 1997a: 5) declares that, “[o]ne ‘exists’ not only by virtue of being recognized, but, in a prior sense, by being recognizable.” It would be reasonable to argue that statements within pedagogical discourse that speak to poor regulation, impulse or attentional control are the means by which ‘disordered’ discursive objects (Deleuze, 1988) become articulated and made manifest in a form that is recognizable (Butler, 1997a). In this way, pedagogical use of behavioral descriptors synonymous with ADHD diagnostic criteria, such as the discussion of attentional or regulatory capabilities, effectively speaks into existence the ‘behaviorally disordered’ schoolchild as a recognizable (Butler, 1997a) object of discourse (Foucault, 1972: 50).

Thus borrowing from Foucault, I interpret the statement as an articulation that functions with constitutive effects. In discussing Foucault’s interest in the statement, Deleuze (1988: 8) points to the constitutive properties intrinsic to it by imparting that a “statement has a ‘discursive object’ which does not derive in any sense from a particular state of things, but stems from the statement itself.” To briefly illustrate I have extracted a statement from the Swaynevile State School Supportive Environment Management Plan (Education Queensland, Swaynevile SS Management Plan, 1995). This is a school behavior management policy posted on the Education Queensland website as an example of one school’s approach to student discipline.

Under “Code of Behavior” the school lists the category “**Courtesy**”. The first point outlined is:

- All people are expected to:
  1. Think before they speak

In keeping with my project, the question becomes: how does this statement function?
Tracing the positivity of a knowledge ¹⁰

The constitutive object in this case is a person who speaks only after clearly thinking of what it is they want to say; the considered, thoughtful subject. Correlatively, an opposition is formed. The antithesis of the thinking, considered, reasoned subject is always the unconsidered, poorly-regulated, unreasonable subject, for a “statement always defines itself by establishing a specific link with something else that lies on the same level as itself... almost inevitably, it is something foreign, something outside” (original emphasis, Deleuze, 1988: 11). In locating this statement and identifying its function or constitutive properties, it is also possible to isolate the workings or “positivity” (Foucault, 1972: 214) of a particular power/knowledge, which in this case is the mantra of self-regulation marking the psychological project to construct the self-governing individual (Popkewitz, 2001).

Interestingly, and despite differences in psychological and medical conceptualisations of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), literature from both psychology and medicine revolve around discussions of ADHD as a deficit, not so much in attention, but in the locus of executive control (Barkley, 1998; Wallace, 1999); that is, there is a perceived lack of ability to control where attention is directed (Atkinson & Shute, 1999; Holmes, 2004; Whalen & Henker, 1998). In this way, I read ADHD as a medical/psychological construct that privileges the ability to self-regulate. This is evident in ADHD diagnostic questionnaires, such as the Connor’s Parent/Teacher Rating Scales, where questions relating to calling out in class, remaining seated or in line are common. In privileging such self-regulatory abilities, which in young children is an impossible ideal, medical and psychological discourse sets up a simple bifurcation in childhood behavior that can be and is being appropriated for disciplinary ends.

It matters little why the Swayneville State School behavior management policy made such a statement, for “there is no point in distinguishing between the different types of intentionality” (Deleuze, 1988: 8). Whilst there are probably a number of explanations as to why thinking before speaking is expected, I am interested only in the function the statement performs. Neither does it matter in what context a statement is born, particularly in terms of the analysis of archival records. Entextualisation through writing results in the representation of the child through a case-file, a “decontextualized text-artifact” (Mehan, 1996: 359), which objectifies the child and their alleged actions in clinical terms. This is highly problematic for, as Foucault (1977: 191) maintains, this case is “no longer a monument for future memory, but a document for future use.” The significance of this, particularly in light of the Queensland Government’s intention to establish a central database that tracks not only student academic history but their behavioral ‘history’ as well, is profound (Wardill, 2004). If the discourses teachers use to describe child behavior are indeed constitutive of ‘disorderly’ objects, then the development of such a database could have devastating effects for children who come to be described in these ways, further implicating schooling practices in spiralling ADHD diagnostic rates (Davis, Beer, Gligora, & Thorn, 2001; Mackey & Kopras, 2001).

Thus if statements are “the words, phrases and propositions which revolve round different focal points of power... set in play by a particular problem” (Deleuze, 1988: 17), for
my research project I locate ‘statements’ as things said within the discourses used to describe problematic behavior in schools that function with constitutive effects to speak into existence the ‘behaviorally disordered’ schoolchild as a recognizable (Butler, 1993) object of discourse (Foucault, 1972: 50). Therefore, looking to ADHD and ‘behavior disorderedness’ in schools as a discursive formation, and thereby the ‘behaviorally disordered’ child as a discursive truth-object, entails the location of a particular family of statements and the development of an analytic to examine the words and phrases coagulating around pedagogical descriptions of ‘disruptive’, ‘disordered’ or ‘disturbed’ behavior in schools.

My aim here is to “try to grasp subjection in its material instance as a constitution of subjects” (Foucault, 1980b: 97) through the interrogation of discursive practices that objectify and subjugate the individual. Objectification acts as a locating device; a mechanism of visibility (Deleuze, 1992; Ewald, 1992) that formulates how a “group is seen or known as a problem” (Scheurich, 1997: 107). Once constituted as an object of a particular sort, individuals can be dispersed into disciplinary spaces within that “grid of social regularity” (Scheurich, 1997: 98) and from there, can become subject to particular discourses and practices that result in what Butler (1997b: 358-359) describes as, “the ‘on-going’ subjugation that is the very operation of interpellation, that (continually repeated) action of discourse by which subjects are formed in subjugation.” In other words through the process of objectification, individuals not only come to occupy spaces in the social hierarchy but, through their continual subjugation, come to know and accept their place.

In the context of this paper then, discourse analysis is read as an exercise in explicating statements that function to place a discursive frame around a particular position; that is, statements which coagulate and form rhetorical constructions that present a particular reading of social texts. Elsewhere (Graham, 2005a), I put this ‘analytic’ to work using literary theory to demonstrate how the use of particular techniques in the production of meaning enable such statements to present a particular view of the world and prepare the ground for the “practices that derive from them” (Foucault, 1972: 139). It may be helpful to unpack this somewhat.

Following Foucault, I interpret statements as things said that privilege particular ways of seeing and codify certain practices. First, the effect of statements privileging the psychological notion of self-regularity and self-government is to speak into existence an irregular, ungoverned object – the ‘behaviorally disordered’ child as a recognizable (Butler, 1997a) object of discourse (Foucault, 1972). Second, the regularity of statements, both in general form and dispersion, come to represent a discursive field; a “family of statements” (Deleuze, 1988: 11) that in betraying a certain “positivity” (Foucault, 1972: 214), can be (re)traced and linked to a constituting field of power-knowledge. Third, once an object of scrutiny has been produced through the discursive practices of a particular field of knowledge, that object comes to belong within and to that domain. Finally and consequently, the discourse that constitutes the object also constitutes the knowledges and practices through which that object is disciplined (Foucault, 1972).
This might be why psychologists fear the “capture of a constellation of behaviors by the DSM-IV” (Atkinson & Shute, 1999, p.123) and recommend practitioners refrain from using words “such as ‘symptoms’ and ‘diagnosis’ which automatically give precedence to a medical model of ADHD” (Atkinson & Shute, 1999, p.123). Psychological discourse produces a particular kind of ‘disorderly’ child. Medical discourse produces another. Whilst the medical model may indeed prevail (Atkinson & Shute, 1999; Forness & Kavale, 2001) in the current turf war that characterises the satellite industry surrounding childhood ‘behavior disorderedness’ (Slee, 1994, 1995), it appears that the disciplinary institution of schooling provides psychology with a somewhat captive market (Laurence & McCallum, 1998).

In the schooling context, behavior intervention techniques informed by the psychological model prevail over medical conceptualisations of behavior ‘disorderedness’ and its more conservative estimate of the agentive capabilities of the child. Psychological conceptualisations may find more fertile ground here perhaps because, as Usher & Edwards (1994: 2) maintain, “the very rationale of the educational process and the role of the educator is founded on modernity’s self-motivated, self-directing, rational subject, capable of exercising individual agency.” On the other hand, this may be because, much like psychiatry provided the courts with an indictable subject/object (Foucault, 1975a), psychology provides the disciplinary institution of the school with a punishable subject/object (Graham, 2005a).

Therefore, the constitutive effects of psychopathologising pedagogical discourse imbued with the positivity of psychological power-knowledge works to speak into existence the ‘behaviorally disordered’ child as a recognizable object of scrutiny. The dominance and dispersion of such statements privilege a particular constituting field of power-knowledge which not only prepares the ground for the practices that derive from such statements but also disguises the exclusionary logic of such practices by rearticulating the conditions of exclusion (Graham, 2005b). This is achieved through the establishment of a causal link within/to the recalcitrant, uncooperative ‘unreasoned’ child who ‘chooses’ to make the wrong choices (Graham, 2005b). In this, psychological discourse acts to reconcile the irreconcilable; masking the schism that arises between the discourse of rights and the coercive denial of those rights (Foucault, 1980b) when, for example, a child is excluded from an education to which our justice system states they have a legal right (Graham, 2005b).

I stated earlier that my objective is not to consider whether ADHD/behavior disorder is true but how its objects might become formed; that is, how is this particular difference articulated and brought to attention and what might be the “effects in the real” (Foucault, 1980a: 237). In considering ADHD/behavior disorderedness as a discursive formation and schooling as a system of formation of disorderly objects (Graham, 2006), it makes sense to deploy some form of discourse analysis in order to map the system by which these particular truth-objects are formed and the “types of enunciations” implicated (Foucault, 1972: 205). Having had difficulty finding coherent descriptions of how to do discourse analysis using Foucault, I have chosen to develop what might be called a discursive analytic. This is a methodological plan that looks to locate statements that function with constitutive effects in which one can “recognise and isolate an act of formulation” (Foucault, 1972: 93).
In doing so, I have attempted to describe these statements and the “enunciative function of which they are the bearers” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982: 56) by indicating how things said within pedagogical discourse may call into being a recognizable (Butler, 1997a) object of discourse (Foucault, 1972). The operation of such discursive dividing practices in schooling enables not just for that object to appear and be “placed in a field of exteriority” (Foucault, 1972: 50) but also works to prepare the ground for the exclusionary “practices that derive from them” (Foucault, 1972, p.139). The ‘method’ I have elucidated in this paper is certainly not one I have developed to discipline those who choose to do discourse analysis using Foucault. Instead I have two objectives in mind; first to aid my overall project in calling attention to the dangers inherent to the ways by which problematic child behavior is described in schools; and second, to engage in a critical conversation with others interested in ‘doing’ discourse analysis with Foucault.
References:


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1 I use capitals here to denote CDA because arguably both approaches to discourse analysis are critical.

2 Valerie Harwood (2000) herself does not fall victim to opacity in describing how she went about her doctoral project (see Chapter 2, Stratagem). Her work is exemplary, however, not all those who draw on Foucault do so with the same depth of scholarship. It appears there is a large amount of work out there that makes a loose claim to using Foucault simply because there is some discussion of power and a few quotes from Foucault thrown in, sometimes together with inconsistent ideas and epistemologies (see for example, (Zeeman, Poggenpoel, Myburgh, & Van der Linde, 2002)), which ultimately makes the quest to find a coherent description of how to go about doing discourse analysis when using Foucault even more difficult. Unfortunately, it appears all forms of work that mention Foucault, in greater or lesser degrees, become drawn into the ‘other’ category of discourse analysis to which Taylor refers. Seen in this way, discourse analysis using Foucault comes to mean anything that has a shot of Foucault and a loose focus on power relations. I maintain there is much more to “doing” discourse analysis and using Foucault to do it. In advocating greater rigour in this area of scholarship, I am forced to engage with the tension that arises when arguing for more rigorous scholarship in the area without resorting to delimiting, prescriptive statements of what that scholarship should look like.


4 Here I refer to the earlier citation of Foucault’s description of ‘another possible orientation’ (p.213) in The Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault, 1972)

5 Here I am referring to, for example, referrals to behavior management programs, guidance officers, paediatricians or psychiatrists, suspension, alternative-site placement or school exclusion.