Algebraic Analysis of LEX
Z'aba, Muhammad Reza, Raddum, Havard, Simpson, Leonie, Dawson, Ed, Henricksen, Matt, & Wong, Kenneth (2009) Algebraic Analysis of LEX. In Brankovic, Ljiljana & Susilo, Willy (Eds.) Australasian Information Security Conference (AISC2009), 20-23 January 2009, Wellington, New Zealand.
LEX is a stream cipher that progressed to Phase 3 of the eSTREAM stream cipher project. In this paper, we show that the security of LEX against algebraic attacks relies on a small equation system not being solvable faster than exhaustive search. We use the byte leakage in LEX to construct a system of 21 equa-tions in 17 variables. This is very close to the require-ment for an efficient attack, i.e. a system containing 16 variables. The system requires only 36 bytes of keystream, which is very low.
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|Item Type:||Conference Paper|
|Keywords:||LEX, Advanced Encryption Standard, Stream Cipher|
|Subjects:||Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > INFORMATION AND COMPUTING SCIENCES (080000) > DATA FORMAT (080400) > Data Encryption (080402)|
|Divisions:||Past > Institutes > Information Security Institute|
|Deposited On:||24 Sep 2009 15:30|
|Last Modified:||29 Feb 2012 23:55|
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