A brief philosophical examination of ADHD
Tait, Gordon (2006) A brief philosophical examination of ADHD. In Lloyd, Gwynedd, Stead, Joan, & Cohen, David (Eds.) Critical New Perspectives on ADHD. Routledge (Taylor & Francis Group), London, pp. 83-95.
Concerns have been raised over ADHD from within a range of different disciplines, concerns which are not only voiced from within the hard sciences themselves, but also from within the social sciences. This paper will add the discipline of philosophy to that number, arguing that an analysis of two traditionally philosophical topics - namely "truth" and "free-will" - allows us a new and unsettling perspective on conduct disorders like ADHD. More specifically, it will be argued that ADHD not only fails to meet its own ontological and epistemological standards as an 'objective' pathology, but it also constitutes one more element in what has already become a significant undermining of a crucial component of social life: moral responsibility.
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|Item Type:||Book Chapter|
|Keywords:||ADHD, Free Will, Truth, Education|
|Subjects:||Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGIOUS STUDIES (220000) > PHILOSOPHY (220300) > Epistemology (220304)|
|Divisions:||Current > Research Centres > Office of Education Research|
Current > QUT Faculties and Divisions > Faculty of Education
Past > Schools > School of Cultural & Language Studies in Education
|Deposited On:||25 Nov 2009 13:56|
|Last Modified:||01 Mar 2012 00:06|
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