Identity-based strong designated verifier signature schemes: Attacks and new construction
A strong designated verifier signature scheme makes it possible for a signer to convince a designated verifier that she has signed a message in such a way that the designated verifier cannot transfer the signature to a third party, and no third party can even verify the validity of a designated verifier signature. We show that anyone who intercepts one signature can verify subsequent signatures in Zhang-Mao ID-based designated verifier signature scheme and Lal-Verma ID-based designated verifier proxy signature scheme. We propose a new and efficient ID-based designated verifier signature scheme that is strong and unforgeable. As a direct corollary, we also get a new efficient ID-based designated verifier proxy signature scheme.
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|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Keywords:||identity-based cryptography, digital signature|
|Subjects:||Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > INFORMATION AND COMPUTING SCIENCES (080000) > COMPUTER SOFTWARE (080300) > Computer System Security (080303)|
|Divisions:||Past > QUT Faculties & Divisions > Faculty of Science and Technology
Past > Institutes > Information Security Institute
|Copyright Owner:||Copyright 2009 Elsevier|
|Deposited On:||14 Jan 2010 04:25|
|Last Modified:||29 Feb 2012 14:03|
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