Modeling and Verification of Privacy Enhancing Protocols

Abstract

Privacy enhancing protocols (PEPs) are a family of protocols that allow secure exchange and management of sensitive user information. They are important in preserving users’ privacy in today’s open environment. Proof of the correctness of PEPs is necessary before they can be deployed. However, the traditional provable security approach, though well established for verifying cryptographic primitives, is not applicable to PEPs. We apply the formal method of Coloured Petri Nets (CPNs) to construct an executable specification of a representative PEP, namely the Private Information Escrow Bound to Multiple Conditions Protocol (PIEMCP). Formal semantics of the CPN specification allow us to reason about various security properties of PIEMCP using state space analysis techniques. This investigation provides us with preliminary insights for modeling and verification of PEPs in general, demonstrating the benefit of applying the CPN-based formal approach to proving the correctness of PEPs.