Optimal monitoring in family-owned companies? Evidence from Asia

Chen, En Te & Nowland, John (2010) Optimal monitoring in family-owned companies? Evidence from Asia. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 18(1), pp. 3-17.

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Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Issue: We propose that high levels of monitoring are not always in the best interests of minority shareholders. In family-owned companies the optimal level of board monitoring required by minority shareholders is expected to be lower than that of other companies. This is because the relative benefits and costs of monitoring are different in family-owned companies. Research Findings: At moderate levels of board monitoring, we find concave relationships between board monitoring variables and firm performance for family-owned companies but not for other companies. The optimal level of board monitoring for our sample of Asian family-owned companies equates to board independence of 38%, separation of the Chairman and CEO positions and establishment of audit and remuneration committees. Additional testing shows that the optimal level of board monitoring is sensitive to the magnitude of the agency conflict between the family group and minority shareholders and the presence of substitute monitoring. Practitioner/Policy Implications: For policymakers, the results show that more monitoring is not always in the best interests of minority shareholders. Therefore, it may be inappropriate for regulators to advise all companies to follow the same set of corporate governance guidelines. However, our results also indicate that the board governance practices of family-owned companies are still well below the identified optimal levels. Keywords: Corporate Governance, Board Independence, Board of Directors, Family Firms, Monitoring.

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31 citations in Scopus
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22 citations in Web of Science®

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ID Code: 30568
Item Type: Journal Article
Refereed: Yes
Keywords: Board of directors, , Board independence, Disclosure, Family companies, monitoring, Corporate governance, ownership
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2009.00778.x
ISSN: 1467-8683
Subjects: Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > COMMERCE MANAGEMENT TOURISM AND SERVICES (150000) > BANKING FINANCE AND INVESTMENT (150200) > Finance (150201)
Divisions: Current > QUT Faculties and Divisions > QUT Business School
Current > Schools > School of Economics & Finance
Copyright Owner: Wiley Blackwell
Copyright Statement: The definitive version is available at www3.interscience.wiley.com
Deposited On: 12 Feb 2010 12:40
Last Modified: 29 Feb 2012 14:16

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