Detecting relay attacks with timing-based protocols

Reid, Jason F., Gonzalez Nieto, Juan M., Tang, Tee, & Senadji, Bouchra (2007) Detecting relay attacks with timing-based protocols. In Bao, Feng & Miller, Steven (Eds.) Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS '07), Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), Singapore, pp. 204-213.

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Distance bounding protocols have been proposed as means of detecting relay attacks, also known as 'mafia fraud'. In this paper we present the first symmetric key based distance bounding protocol that is also resistant to so-called 'terrorist fraud', a variant of mafia fraud. Relay attacks present a serious threat to RF security devices (contactless smart cards, RFID tags and the like) because they undermine the implicit assumption that the device is physically close to the reader when it is operating. In applications such as physical access control this assumption of physical proximity is all-important. Distance bounding protocols require a communication channel that can exchange single bits with extremely low latency. This unconventional communication requirement has prompted Hancke and Kuhn to assert in a recent publication that ultra wide band (UWB) radio is necessary to achieve a useful distance bounding resolution. We analyse this assertion and present a alternative, novel communication approach that leverages the phenomena of side channel leakage to deliver a low latency channel. Our proposal is capable of detecting sophisticated relay attacks without resorting to the considerable expense and complexity of UWB radio. We present experimental results to support our arguments.

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ID Code: 3264
Item Type: Conference Paper
Refereed: Yes
Additional URLs:
Keywords: relay attack, mafia fraud, terrorist fraud, contactless smart card, distance bounding protocol
DOI: 10.1145/1229285.1229314
ISBN: 1595935746
Subjects: Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > INFORMATION AND COMPUTING SCIENCES (080000) > COMPUTER SOFTWARE (080300) > Computer System Security (080303)
Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > INFORMATION AND COMPUTING SCIENCES (080000) > DATA FORMAT (080400) > Data Encryption (080402)
Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > INFORMATION AND COMPUTING SCIENCES (080000) > DATA FORMAT (080400) > Data Format not elsewhere classified (080499)
Divisions: Past > QUT Faculties & Divisions > Faculty of Built Environment and Engineering
Past > QUT Faculties & Divisions > Faculty of Science and Technology
Past > Institutes > Information Security Institute
Current > QUT Faculties and Divisions > Science & Engineering Faculty
Copyright Owner: Copyright 2007 ACM
Deposited On: 02 Feb 2006 00:00
Last Modified: 02 Jul 2017 08:38

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