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Tax morale and conditional cooperation

Frey, Bruno & Torgler, Benno (2007) Tax morale and conditional cooperation. Journal of Comparative Economics, 35(1), pp. 136-159.

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Abstract

Why so many people pay their taxes, even though fines and audit probability are low, is a central question in the tax compliance literature. Positing a homo oeconomicus having a refined motivation structure sheds light on this puzzle. This paper provides empirical evidence for the relevance of conditional cooperation, using survey data from 30 West and East European countries. We find a high correlation between perceived tax evasion and tax morale. The results remain robust after exploiting endogeneity and conducting several robustness tests. We also observe a strong positive correlation between institutional quality and tax mmorale.

Keywords: Tax morale; Tax compliance; Tax evasion; Pro-social behavior; Institutions

Impact and interest:

63 citations in Scopus
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49 citations in Web of Science®

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ID Code: 32938
Item Type: Journal Article
DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2006.10.006
ISSN: 01475967
Subjects: Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > ECONOMICS (140000) > APPLIED ECONOMICS (140200) > Public Economics- Taxation and Revenue (140215)
Divisions: Current > QUT Faculties and Divisions > QUT Business School
Current > Schools > School of Economics & Finance
Copyright Owner: Elsevier
Deposited On: 25 Jun 2010 08:43
Last Modified: 29 Feb 2012 23:34

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