Perceptions of fairness and allocation systems

Savage, David A. & Torgler, Benno (2010) Perceptions of fairness and allocation systems. Economic Analysis and Policy, 40(2), pp. 229-248.

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This paper explores the conditions of acceptability of differing allocation systems under scarcity and evaluates what makes a price system more or less fair. We find that fairness in an allocation arrangement depend on the institutional settings inherent in the situation, such as information, transparency and competition and the perceived institutional quality e.g., fiscal exchange and institutional trust). Results also indicate that the solution “weak people first” is seen as the fairest approach to an excess demand situation, followed by “first come, first serve”, the price system and an auction system. On the other hand, a random procedure or an allocation through the government is not perceived to be fair. Moreover, economics students seemed to be less sceptical towards the price system than other subjects although we observe that female students are more sceptical than male students.

Impact and interest:

6 citations in Scopus
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500 since deposited on 20 Oct 2010
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ID Code: 37999
Item Type: Journal Article
Refereed: Yes
Additional Information: Published version available via Official URL.
Additional URLs:
ISSN: 0313-5926
Subjects: Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > ECONOMICS (140000) > APPLIED ECONOMICS (140200) > Experimental Economics (140206)
Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > ECONOMICS (140000) > APPLIED ECONOMICS (140200) > Public Economics- Public Choice (140213)
Divisions: Current > QUT Faculties and Divisions > QUT Business School
Current > Schools > School of Economics & Finance
Copyright Owner: Copyright 2010 David A. Savage and Benno Torgler.
Deposited On: 20 Oct 2010 00:10
Last Modified: 29 Feb 2012 14:22

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