

QUT Digital Repository:
<http://eprints.qut.edu.au/>



This is the author's version published as:

Hartley, John (2010) *Social network markets and 'public thought'*.
In: Educational Challenge : Innovation in Creative Industries, 26-27
March 2010, Tallinn University Baltic Film and Media School, Estonia.

Copyright 2010 John Hartley

Social Network Markets and ‘Public Thought’

John Hartley, AM

ARC Federation Fellow,

ARC Centre of Excellence for Creative Industries and Innovation

Queensland University of Technology

Australia

Keynote paper for International workshop:

**“Educational challenge:
innovation in creative industries”**

Tallinn, Estonia, March 26-27, 2010

Jointly organised by Tallinn University Baltic Film and Media School (BFM) and Stockholm School of Economics in Riga (SSE Riga)



Social Network Markets and ‘Public Thought’

This paper approaches its topic in a somewhat crabwise manner, but hopefully by that means it may succeed in reaching its objective without being eaten alive. It comprises a critique of a recent internet post called ‘The Shock of Inclusion’ by Clay Shirky (his contribution to The Edge World Question of 2010), in which he claims (among other things) that ‘the average quality of public thought has collapsed.’ Shirky may have a point, but not necessarily in the way that he meant. Public thought has collapsed alright, but not because of the ‘here comes everybody’ (Shirky 2008) influx of amateur consumer-user-producers. The collapse is most evident among institutions and media forms that have traditionally *represented* public thought. Recent history suggests that such collapse has begun in three different expert/representative domains: academic (intellectual/literary), political (community) and journalistic (commercial) thought – in that order.

Instead of blaming the internet and the ‘shock of inclusion’ for the ‘end of civilisation as we know it’ as some academic, political and journalistic commentators do (and without necessarily disagreeing that this is where we’re heading), I take up the workshop’s theme of the ‘educational challenge’ that follows from near ubiquitous computing, connectivity, and content-sharing using digital media, in the context of the creative industries and creative innovation. However I do not confine ‘education’ to its current institutional form; rather, I’m interested in self-organising dynamic systems, and how they may develop their own ‘endogenous learning institutions’ (if I may put it that way). In other words, how do emergent, disruptive, social networks teach their own users not only technical skills, but also imaginative possibilities, unthought-of applications, and effective integration into daily

routines and personal identity? And how do such systems, once established, contribute to the growth of knowledge? I also want to focus on the ‘self-made’ or consumer-created axis of this question, rather than turning immediately to the familiar focus on firms. The traditional distinction between producers and consumers is itself in process of dynamic change, so I don’t want to reinstate too quickly the perspective of ‘how to exploit your consumer market’ that Shirky himself adopts in his book *Here Comes Everybody*, which advises that the route to success for online enterprise is ‘a plausible promise, an effective tool, and an acceptable bargain with the users’ (Shirky 2008). Shirky is certainly on the money in the way this formula links technology (an effective tool) with its context of use – both imagination (a plausible promise) and sociality (an acceptable bargain). It is also clear from his qualifying terms – ‘plausible; effective; acceptable’ – that he subscribes to what economists call ‘satisficing’ or ‘bounded rationality,’ where decisions or choices are made in the absence of complete information. Thus the actions of firms must be reciprocal with those of consumers, who must be recruited rather than exploited. In other words, both firms and consumers operate in an environment of social networks, both live and digital, and consumers are also causal agents in those networks. So I’m on the look-out for ways in which the productive potential of social networks may be ‘exploited’ by *all* the agents in the system, not just firms.

Instead of re-importing closed expert systems (or firms organised along industrial lines) by the back door, a learning mechanism exists in open complex networks, in the form of informal, self-organised and unmanaged *social network markets*. This term has been developed by researchers in the CCI to *define* the creative industries (Potts et al 2008). A ‘social network market’ is one where *choices are determined by the choices of others*; where the important influences on choice include novelty, attention, signalling, status, copying, and heuristic solutions; and where ‘rational choice’ is an *outcome* of collective or networked relationships, rather than an individual *input* into the process. Also, because social network

markets coordinate the uptake and use of novelty, they generate new knowledge and thus value across many other domains, both cultural and economic. In this sense, the creative industries may be seen as the practical form taken by creativity as a *social technology* of innovation – one with ‘bottom-up’ as well as ‘top-down’ causation.

I offer an alternative to Shirky’s idea of an ‘Invisible College’ or Royal-Society-like association (Shirky 2010) to guide the growth of ‘public thought’ on the internet. I want to illustrate what we mean by ‘social network markets’ in the context of the organisation of ‘public thought.’ Here I want to go beyond the ‘usual suspects’ in discussions of social networks – Web 2.0, Wikipedia, YouTube, Facebook and Google – and turn instead to some unlikely-looking candidates: *airport bestsellers*, *fashion media*, and what I call the *Eisteddfod Model* of creative innovation. These neglected and often despised genres are all good examples of social network markets in the ‘economy of attention’ (Lanham 2006; Boyd 2009: 99-112). Thus, airport bestsellers (both novels and non-fiction, especially business, self-help, popular science and technology books) give temporary and competitive prominence to certain ideas or creative innovations, and they also offer different forms of guidance to the self-publishing billions on the internet. Fashion media *bundle* infinite choices into meaningfulness, and distribute across whole populations the values associated with entrepreneurial risk: e.g. creative destruction (last season); the creation of new ideas (novelty); and rewards based on high-risk status (celebrity). The Eisteddfod Model uses an example from the analogue era (going back to pre-modern society) to show that social network markets predate digital media – and even modern capitalism – as self-organised systems for propagating and improving creative talent and new ideas among populations by means of competitive festivals.

In this paper I will only have time to mention one of these.

The lesson I want to draw from these models is that we have become so preoccupied with familiar and often well-liked institutions (from news media all the way up to ‘civilisation as we know it’), based on their *representative expertise*, that we are neglecting to identify the emergent institutional forms that mediate between systematic thought (e.g. disciplinary knowledge; specialist expertise; science) and popular, untutored public thought. Like Clay Shirky I am interested in the difference being made by digital literacy and the internet (Hartley 2009), in the face of which, according to Shirky, the familiar representative forms of ‘public thought’ – academic, political and journalistic – have indeed begun to ‘collapse.’ In fact, a good way to test just how far that collapse has gone in each case might be to measure the intensity of the ‘culture of complaint’ (Hughes 1993) about loss of status by the erstwhile ‘beneficiaries of the system where making things public was a privileged activity’ (Shirky 2010). But instead of ‘keening’ about it (as Shirky puts it), I suggest that the *generative edge of public thought* is to be found at the point of interaction between the vast population of internet self-publishers and the competitive ideas in social network markets.

Public Thought and Shirky’s Shock of Inclusion

Clay Shirky’s ‘Shock of Inclusion’ on *The Edge* site was one of numerous contributions by various notables to the question for 2010: ‘How Has The Internet Changed The Way You Think?’ I really liked this short piece when I first read it, but there was also a niggling problem with it, which is what provoked this paper. First, let me quote from what Shirky said. The paragraphs that made me think (my bolding) are these:

This **shock of inclusion**, where professional media gives way to participation by two billion amateurs (a threshold we will cross this year) means that **average quality of public thought has collapsed**; when anyone can say anything any time, how could it not? If all that happens from this influx of amateurs is the destruction of existing models for producing high-quality material, we would be at the beginning of another Dark Ages.

The **beneficiaries of the system where making things public was a privileged activity**, whether academics or politicians, reporters or doctors, will complain about the way the new abundance of public thought upends the old order, but **those complaints are like keening at a wake; the change they fear is already in the past. The real action is elsewhere.**

Given what we have today, the Internet could easily become Invisible High School, with a modicum of educational material in an ocean of narcissism and social obsessions. We could, however, also use it as an Invisible College, the communicative backbone of real intellectual and civic change, but to do this will require more than technology. It will require that we adopt norms of **open sharing and participation**, fit to a world where **publishing has become the new literacy.**

The idea that most struck a chord was this one: that the ‘average quality of public thought has collapsed.’ Shirky probably meant this in a banal, arithmetic sense – given the same task (say, writing opinion columns in the press), two billion amateurs will score a lower individual average on any quality measure than a few experienced professional specialists. It seems therefore that he is conceding the *more means worse* argument (a classic manoeuvre of the educated Left),¹ for he talks about ‘the shock of inclusion’ as (potentially) ‘another Dark Ages’ where ‘pancake people’ (widely-spread and thin)² connect through ‘an ocean of narcissism and social obsessions.’

I’m not ready to concede that argument. It has no basis in either maths or in history. In terms of the maths, let’s say that among internet users, only a miniscule one in a thousand (0.1 percent) qualify as *high* (as opposed to ‘average’) ‘quality.’ Out of two billion users, that still amounts to two million quality creators – more than any previous mass medium could muster. Of course the real proportion will be much higher. When I first went to university, only 4 percent of the UK population were graduates; now it is more like 40 percent. Not all graduates are high quality, so let’s stick to the lower figure. Four percent of 2bn is 80 million

¹ See, e.g. www.newstatesman.com/200103260019.

² See: www.theatlantic.com/doc/200807/google/4.

– the population of Germany. Could you call participation by such numbers in ‘public thought’ a ‘collapse’? In terms of history, *more* of anything worthwhile has never meant *worse* – more education, healthcare, affluence, freedom, comfort, intellectual or entrepreneurial activity ... whatever has consistently resulted in, well, *more*. Growing up as a poor kid without a breadwinner in the family, I still had better dental care than Ramesses the Great,³ better education than the Queen of England (who never went to school),⁴ more intellectual freedom than the pope⁵ ... and so on. In short, extending once-priestly or royal privileges to everyone benefits ... everyone. Why would this not be true also of ‘public thought’? So let’s hear no more of the collapse of the ‘average quality of public thought’ *in general*.

Sequence of Collapse

None of this crossed my mind when I first read Shirky’s piece, however. I took him to mean something else, because my imagination was caught by that word ‘collapse.’ I took it to refer to the collapse of the existing system of ‘public thought’ and its *replacement* by the ‘influx of the amateurs’; i.e. that ‘the average quality of public thought has collapsed’ *among the professional ‘thought class.’*

Changes brought on by the ‘abundance of public thought’ hit the academy long ago; more recently politics itself, and at last the commercial media too, especially those tied to industrial-era or broadcast platforms, are feeling the winds of change. This is what really got me excited about Shirky’s piece. It struck me that there is a *sequence* in the collapse of the ‘average quality of public thought.’ If Shirky is right that change feared by the ‘beneficiaries

³ See: www.newscientist.com/article/mg18625061.900-why-the-pharaohs-never-smiled.html?page=3.

⁴ See: www.royal.gov.uk/HMTheQueen/Education/Overview.aspx.

⁵ See: www.newscientist.com/article/mg19726452.000.

of the system where making things public was a privileged activity' is 'already in the past' – then there must be a history – a causal sequence – of such change. If so, then 'keening' by 'beneficiaries' may in fact be used as an indirect measure of the location, presence and intensity of change. Here's what I would hypothesise on that topic: The collapse was first experienced in the academy (a proxy for intellectual and literary life); then in politics (a proxy for community or public life); then in journalism (a proxy for corporate interests in the copyright industries).

1. ***Academic (intellectual/literary) collapse.*** Throughout the twentieth-century expansion of mass, modernist media, the social status of knowledge-professions, from doctors and academics to priests and teachers, steadily declined. As 'the masses' have *benefitted* from the expansion of knowledge, so the professions involved in its distribution or application, including scientists, engineers and designers, have *proletarianised*. The social prestige and political influence of the professoriate – as a class – has been in genteel decline, especially in the humanities, since WWII (probably earlier). To some extent the collapse was internal, as imperial-modernist certainties were challenged by successive waves of critical theory (structuralism, feminism, identity politics, relativism, deconstruction, constructivism, postmodernism), critiquing the knowledge-power nexus and disputing the truth-claims of science. In recent decades this precipitated open hostility towards the academic left in the so-called culture wars.

Literary intellectuals responsible for 'public thought' were once proud to carry the moral, political and aesthetic conscience of empires on their shoulders – Kipling (Nobel laureate for Literature) called it the White Man's Burden⁶ and Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch (King

⁶ See: www.online-literature.com/kipling/922/.

Edward VII Professor of English at Cambridge) called it *Noblesse oblige*.⁷ Now they are reduced to an ambition for satisfactory *impact metrics* – among which *forming the taste and judgement of future leaders* does not appear. The ‘keening’ of the remaining professors surfaces periodically in *The Times Higher Education Supplement*, *Times Literary Supplement*, etc.

Meanwhile, the trained expertise upon which our discipline’s vestigial claims to a public platform might have been based has steadily been eroded by the increasingly obvious fact that such expertise is neither scarce nor valuable – *everyone* is an ‘expert’ on popular culture; and few want to pay for knowledge about ‘ordinary’ life. Now, we may be able to produce high-quality ‘public thought’ on our specialist topic; but it’s so micro, arcane and impenetrable that ... there’s no public paying attention, so who cares?

2. ***Political (community) collapse.*** ‘Public thought’ on the question of ‘Are we all going to die?’ ended with the end of the Cold War internationally and capitalist/ socialist struggles internally. As the danger of Mutually Assured Destruction (by weapons or workers) faded, politics became *purier*; that is, more abstract, not *about* anything except adversarial opposition itself. Robert Hughes (1993) called the result the *Culture of Complaint*. The USA became, he wrote, ‘obsessed with therapies and filled with distrust of formal politics; sceptical of authority and prey to superstition; its political language corroded by fake pity and euphemism.’ Excessive politicisation corrupts: ‘Polarization is addictive. It is the crack of politics – a short, intense rush that the system craves again and again, until it begins to collapse.’⁸

⁷ See: www.bartleby.com/190/8.html.

⁸ See: www.scottlondon.com/reviews/hughes.html.

The ‘quality’ of *political* ‘public thought’ nosedives. Instead of looking for reds under the beds, we’re looking for child molesters – or teenage tearaways. Someone to blame for our continuing sense of risk in conditions of unprecedented security.

3. ***Journalism (commercial) collapse.*** It’s the Economy, Stupid. Here’s where Clay Shirky gets interested; not when professions or politics suffer systemic collapse, but when business plans are threatened. The principal large-scale ‘beneficiaries of the system where making things public was a privileged activity’ were of course *publishers* – of songs, sights, and stories. That is, the music business, broadcasting and the movies, the press, and publishing – the existing copyright industries.

The one bit of this sector of the economy where ‘public thought’ was linked directly to *private enterprise* was journalism (loosely defined, i.e. including opinion, commentary, features and PR). It’s not just individual firms; whole industries are crumbling, *business models* don’t work ... hey, it’s the *end of civilisation as we know it!*

So now journalism has something to campaign about in which its own fate is implicated. It’s back to the good old days of ‘are we all going to die?’ ... but now the ‘we’ is a plc. The campaign is not confined to editorials, the op-ed pages and features, but permeates so-called hard news too. Journalism as a whole is geared up to turn ‘public thought’ into a culture of complaint ... about *piracy*.

Along the way, editors are quite happy to stage front-page news reports that white-ant their online rivals in ‘making things public,’ by whatever pretext that comes to hand: ‘A massive spike in violent attacks by young Queensland girls has been blamed on the internet...’ (*Courier Mail*). Here is where we are now: the latest outbreak of ‘keening’ is by commercial creators, manufacturers and disseminators (up to and including Rupert

Airports are perhaps the best physical manifestation we have of humanity's skill in developing social-network infrastructure; they're an analogue version of the 'packet switching' that enables the internet to function. Here we come to the last bit of the Shirky piece that I quoted at the beginning of this one:

We could, however, also use it [the Internet] as an Invisible College, the communicative backbone of real intellectual and civic change, but to do this will require more than technology. It will require that we adopt norms of **open sharing and participation**, fit to a world where **publishing has become the new literacy**.

Shirky favours a latter-day 'Invisible College,' a term he borrows from the precursor to the Royal Society. This was the network of experimental inquiry and open argumentation that we now call science, which was established among early-modern chemists in Europe.¹⁰ I support his sentiment that a world where everyone is a publisher may drive progressive intellectual and civic change; and like him I am interested in ways of organising and sharing knowledge outside of formal institutions. In fact I wrote a book on these topics (Hartley 2009).

However, I do not subscribe to Shirky's idea of an Invisible College. His talk of an 'influx of amateurs' and 'another Dark Ages' has made me suspicious. If the Invisible College is just a few self-selected savants, for instance the mutually congratulatory luminaries gathered on The Edge website itself, it smacks of *Brave New World*, not to mention the latter-day *Illuminati*.¹¹

But if, at the other extreme, it is taken to be the internet as a whole ('here comes everybody'), then such a vast system-of-systems cannot hope to achieve purposeful change, even if it is called for from within the ranks of users themselves. In the face of his own vision of near-universal participation, his nerve fails: 'Given what we have today, the Internet could easily become Invisible High School, with a modicum of educational material in an ocean of

¹⁰ See: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invisible_College.

¹¹ See: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illuminati.

narcissism and social obsessions.’ He creates an adversarial system – the Invisible High School *versus* the Invisible College; one displays ‘narcissism and social obsessions’; the other an ethic of ‘open sharing and participation.’ Of course, the immediate question is: what’s the difference between these two? And why set up yet another boring ‘elite’ vs ‘mass’ model of knowledge creation? The real challenge is to see how both ‘narcissism and social obsession’ and ‘open sharing and participation in creative innovation and the pursuit of knowledge (new ideas) can be understood as part of the same system, and extended across whole populations. This would be a truly evolutionary approach to the growth of knowledge.

What then might be a model for directed, educative change, including ‘open sharing and participation’ among *any* if not *all* Netizens, in the iterative improvement of contested knowledge (... i.e. science), as a self-organising, grass-roots approach to knowledge transfer, so as to use the emergent productive capacity of the internet to best effect?

The answer is staring us in the face. What does everybody do at airports? They buy books to read on planes. The Invisible College is ... *airport bestsellers*. Such books belong to a peculiar genre. They must fit in with the realities of air travel: long but not too long, absorbing and narratively compelling, not like work ... and extremely well promoted, branded, and celebrity-endorsed, because travellers must be able to choose on the fly, as it were, without access to their habitual feedback loops. Most such books are novels; but significant sub-genres exist in non-fiction, including business, popular science, history and biography. The whole point of them is that they address non-specialist, ordinary readers with other priorities and purposes. They address the *general public*, which is thereby constituted in the form of a constantly changing but continuously replenished market.

Please note that almost all of the ‘digital literati’ lambasted by Andrew Keen, along with Andrew Keen and Clay Shirky themselves, are authors of non-fiction bestsellers, the

ideal-type of which is the business book you buy at the airport. Where once these clustered around the prating of alpha males (Jack Welch syndrome), there is now a sizeable segment devoted to digital topics, often by (or co-authored with) those who've made some money.

Indeed, such books are part of the definition of the 'digerati':

The 'digital elite.' People who are extremely knowledgeable about computers. It often refers to the movers and shakers in the industry. Digerati is the high-tech equivalent of 'literati,' which refers to scholars and intellectuals, or 'glitterati,' the rich and famous. Digerati, 'technorati' and 'geekerati' are synonymous. See Technorati and Illuminati.¹²

The airport bestseller is the book most likely to be cited by high-profile controversialists (like Andrew Keen or Clay Shirky) as they conduct their online arguments. It is the common currency of communication about the internet among the diverse and multivalent, not to say mobile and shifting, population of non-specialist readers. It is the medium of instruction for the 'influx of amateurs' – a readily available resource that they can turn to for inspiration. Needless to say, this being the age of the internet, anyone can write one. *eHow* for instance gives good advice, but notice that it does require more than mere specialist knowledge and even good wordcraft (Step 2: 'succeed in business'). Note also that Step 4 is *promotion* – 'simple market forces' (i.e. Adam Smith's 'Invisible Hand')¹³ need a helping hand from marketing.¹⁴

Improving and Extending the Quality of Public Thought

The problem of the 'quality of public thought' is solved. In the first place, those who have followed the advice above – from Eric Beinhocker (*The Origin of Wealth*) to the

¹² See: www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=geekerati&i=41273,00.asp.

¹³ See: plus.maths.org/issue14/features/smith.

¹⁴ See Schumpeter on marketing's centrality: www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog/MCCPRI.html.

Freakonomics guys – tend to write really good books. ‘Quality’ is condensed into the simple and unarguable form of sales data: if it’s a bestseller, it’s a good idea (until it is overturned by a subsequent bestseller). This system feeds on itself: if I’ve heard the buzz I’ll buy the book.

Conversely, if you academic experts – drear drudges of dismal data – have done nothing more than master your subject, perfect your methodology, and discover something new, then bad luck. You won’t compete until you’ve caught the eye of public *attention*, as Richard Lanham and Brian Boyd have both stressed ... in their own airport bestsellers (*The Economics of Attention* and *On the Origin of Stories*). Promotion, including celebrity-status, attention-seeking antics, polemical attacks and controversies, turns out to be of crucial importance to the propagation of knowledge. Mere *expertise* runs a distant second. The airport bestseller is thus a *signalling mechanism*.

This takes us beyond the ‘shock of inclusion.’ The initial phase of Schumpeterian creative destruction ‘upends the old order’ (as Shirky puts it). The existing ‘beneficiaries of the system where making things public was a privileged activity’ are dethroned. However they don’t disappear – perforce, they regroup, trying to adapt to the new circumstances. But the ‘real action’ is happening over at the airport. Here we can observe the emergence of a new order – a market in ideas for busy, mobile, half-attentive but motivated and self-directing consumer-agents. This market also establishes a pecking order among opinion-formers, who are the true educators of the ‘here comes everybody’ era.

Airport bestsellers do for tradable ideas what newspapers once did for nations, and what universities are still supposed to do – they *create a public* for new knowledge, and they sort the ideas according to their uptake among that public. This process, of differential uptake, is what we might once have called *education* and even intellectual *emancipation*, except that now it is self-directed, demand-led, and self-organising.

Of course, it's not entirely online. The 'shock of inclusion' proceeds in multiplatform mode. There is plenty of online chatter about the latest offerings, and many of the best titles are (legally) available online in their entirety (Leadbeater's *We-Think*; Zittrain's *The Future of the Internet ... and How to Stop It*). But these books have to take physical form too; else why do we have Amazon ... or airports, come to that?

Clay Shirky says that 'publishing has become the new literacy' – and I agree with him. I've claimed that 'journalism is a human right' (i.e. that in a democracy, everyone is a journalist – they can publish as well as hold opinions; broadcast as well as know facts); and I also agree that the internet marks the biggest step-change in the growth of knowledge-technologies since Gutenberg. But we don't yet know how to harness all the new 'public thought' that's already out there. Much of it is dismissed as idle chatter, or what the linguists call 'phatic' communication, designed to keep in contact – which means to *attract attention* – rather than to communicate thought.¹⁵ We know even less about how to stimulate, improve or propagate its 'quality' (this is the problem that the Eisteddfod model is designed to address).

In this context, the argy-bargy of complaint, controversy and keening should not be taken at face value. It is not important to decide on a winner or loser among all the arguments, nor to agree with this or that commentator. Instead, note the importance of *signalling* in the propagation of public thought. If you want to get an idea across, get attention. If you want attention, keep the lines of communication open. Thus, the rhetoric of polemical argument itself performs a phatic function (like eighty percent of internet traffic). It's going ... 'Look at me!'¹⁶

The lesson we should be learning is that mechanisms for *extending* and *improving* the quality of public thought exist – airport bestsellers as Invisible College; and other examples

¹⁵ See: www.signosemio.com/jakobson/a_fonctions.asp.

¹⁶ See: www.austrade.gov.au/Exports-Beckon-Look-At-Moi-Look-At-Moi-/default.aspx.

we haven't had time to explore today. The readership is proving both able and willing to take advice. It may take a while, but so did the real impact of print, which took about 150 years to emerge. However, we can see here a model for propagation and improvement of popular public thought. What we don't have yet is a mechanism from extending the system beyond readerships. Here there is plenty of room for improvement. The internet is populated by a much larger public than the one captured by the readership of even the most popular bestseller. Lots of people out there don't read books at all, but they do count among Shirky's two billion.

So the question is: How to reach out to *everybody*? If there has been a 'collapse of public thought' (among academics, public representatives and commercial media) it is in the willingness of all of them to exclude non-specialist, amateur, ordinary consumers altogether; or to assume that empty chatter (phatic entertainment) is enough for the likes of them. It would be a big – epochal – mistake to imagine the internet in the same terms, making an invidious distinction between what Shirky calls 'the Invisible College' (Hooray!) and 'an ocean of narcissism and social obsessions' (Boo!), not only because we're slow to recognise the same elements in our own 'public thought,' but also because we know in advance which way many users will choose to jump. The existing organs of public enlightenment (the professional beneficiaries of 'making things public') have lost popular attention; the internet still has it. The educational challenge is to start from there.

References

- Boyd, B.(2009) *On the Origins of Stories*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hartley, J. (2009) *The Uses of Digital Literacy*. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press; Philadelphia: Transaction Publishers; London: Kingston University Press.
- Hughes, R. (1993) *The Culture of Complaint*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lanham, R. (2006) *The Economy of Attention*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Potts, J., S. Cunningham, J. Hartley, P. Ormerod (2008) 'Social network markets: A new definition of the creative industries.' *Journal of Cultural Economics*, 32(3), 167-85.

Shirky, C. (2010) 'The Shock of Inclusion.' The Edge World Question:
www.edge.org/q2010/q10_1.html#shirky

Shirky, C. (2008) *Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organizations*.
New York: Penguin.

Thomson, R. (January 23, 2010) 'End of the world as we know it.' *The Australian*:
www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/end-of-the-world-as-we-know-it/story-e6frg6zo-1225822636729.