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Stronger difficulty notions for client puzzles and denial-of-service-resistant protocols

Stebila, Douglas, Kuppusamy, Lakshmi, Rangasamy, Jothi, Boyd, Colin, & Gonzalez Nieto, Juan (2011) Stronger difficulty notions for client puzzles and denial-of-service-resistant protocols. In Kiayias, Aggelos (Ed.) Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2011, Springer, San Francisco, California, pp. 284-301.

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Abstract

Client puzzles are meant to act as a defense against denial of service (DoS) attacks by requiring a client to solve some moderately hard problem before being granted access to a resource. However, recent client puzzle difficulty definitions (Stebila and Ustaoglu, 2009; Chen et al., 2009) do not ensure that solving n puzzles is n times harder than solving one puzzle. Motivated by examples of puzzles where this is the case, we present stronger definitions of difficulty for client puzzles that are meaningful in the context of adversaries with more computational power than required to solve a single puzzle.

A protocol using strong client puzzles may still not be secure against DoS attacks if the puzzles are not used in a secure manner. We describe a security model for analyzing the DoS resistance of any protocol in the context of client puzzles and give a generic technique for combining any protocol with a strong client puzzle to obtain a DoS-resistant protocol.

Impact and interest:

7 citations in Scopus
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2 citations in Web of Science®

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235 since deposited on 22 Feb 2011
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ID Code: 40036
Item Type: Conference Paper
Additional URLs:
Keywords: client puzzles, proof of work, denial of service resistance, protocols
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-19074-2_19
ISSN: 0302-9743
Subjects: Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > INFORMATION AND COMPUTING SCIENCES (080000) > COMPUTER SOFTWARE (080300) > Computer System Security (080303)
Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > INFORMATION AND COMPUTING SCIENCES (080000) > DATA FORMAT (080400) > Data Encryption (080402)
Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > INFORMATION AND COMPUTING SCIENCES (080000) > DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING (080500) > Networking and Communications (080503)
Divisions: Past > Schools > Computer Science
Past > QUT Faculties & Divisions > Faculty of Science and Technology
Past > Institutes > Information Security Institute
Copyright Owner: Copyright 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
Copyright Statement: This is the author-version of the work. Lecture Notes in Computer Science published, by Springer Verlag, will be available via SpringerLink. http://www.springer.de/comp/lncs/
Deposited On: 22 Feb 2011 10:33
Last Modified: 21 Feb 2013 15:48

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