Identifying non-competitive bids in construction contract auctions

Skitmore, Martin (2002) Identifying non-competitive bids in construction contract auctions. OMEGA: International Journal of Management Science, 30(6), pp. 443-449.

View at publisher


Construction contract auctions are characterised by (1) anticipated high outliers due to the presence of non-competitive bids, (2) very small samples and (3) uncertainty of the appropriate underlying density function model of the bids. This paper describes the simultaneous identification of high outliers and density function by systematically identifying and removing candidate (high) outliers and examining the composite goodness-of-fit of the resulting reduced samples with the normal and lognormal density functions. Six different identification strategies are tested empirically by application, both independently and in pooled form, to several sets of auction data gathered from around the world. The results indicate the normal density to be the most appropriate model and a multiple of the auction standard deviation to be the best identification strategy.

Impact and interest:

15 citations in Scopus
Search Google Scholar™
8 citations in Web of Science®

Citation counts are sourced monthly from Scopus and Web of Science® citation databases.

These databases contain citations from different subsets of available publications and different time periods and thus the citation count from each is usually different. Some works are not in either database and no count is displayed. Scopus includes citations from articles published in 1996 onwards, and Web of Science® generally from 1980 onwards.

Citations counts from the Google Scholar™ indexing service can be viewed at the linked Google Scholar™ search.

Full-text downloads:

423 since deposited on 16 May 2006
8 in the past twelve months

Full-text downloads displays the total number of times this work’s files (e.g., a PDF) have been downloaded from QUT ePrints as well as the number of downloads in the previous 365 days. The count includes downloads for all files if a work has more than one.

ID Code: 4139
Item Type: Journal Article
Refereed: Yes
Keywords: Construction, contract, auctions, non, competitive bids, outliers, goodness, of, fit, small samples
DOI: 10.1016/S0305-0483(02)00057-9
ISSN: 0305-0483
Divisions: Past > QUT Faculties & Divisions > Faculty of Built Environment and Engineering
Copyright Owner: Copyright 2002 Elsevier
Copyright Statement: Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher.
Deposited On: 16 May 2006 00:00
Last Modified: 09 Jun 2010 12:32

Export: EndNote | Dublin Core | BibTeX

Repository Staff Only: item control page