Automated proofs for Diffie–Hellman–based key exchanges
Ngo, Long, Boyd, Colin, & Gonzalez Nieto, Juan M. (2011) Automated proofs for Diffie–Hellman–based key exchanges. In Backes, Michael & Zdancewic, Steve (Eds.) 2011 IEEE 24th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF 2011), IEEE, Abbaye des Vaux-de-Cernay, Cernay-la-Ville, pp. 51-65.
We present an automated verification method for security of Diffie–Hellman–based key exchange protocols. The method includes a Hoare-style logic and syntactic checking. The method is applied to protocols in a simplified version of the Bellare–Rogaway–Pointcheval model (2000). The security of the protocol in the complete model can be established automatically by a modular proof technique of Kudla and Paterson (2005).
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|Item Type:||Conference Paper|
|Keywords:||Diffie Hellman key exchange, automated, proof, Hoare logic|
|Subjects:||Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > INFORMATION AND COMPUTING SCIENCES (080000) > COMPUTER SOFTWARE (080300) > Computer System Security (080303)|
|Divisions:||Past > QUT Faculties & Divisions > Faculty of Science and Technology
Past > Institutes > Information Security Institute
|Copyright Owner:||Copyright 2011 IEEE|
|Copyright Statement:||This work has been submitted to the IEEE for possible publication. Copyright may be transferred without notice, after which this version may no longer be accessible|
|Deposited On:||12 Jul 2011 02:03|
|Last Modified:||13 Jul 2011 00:24|
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