Formal analysis of secure contracting protocol for E-Tendering
Du, Rong, Foo, Ernest, Boyd, Colin A., & Choo, Kim-Kwang R. (2006) Formal analysis of secure contracting protocol for E-Tendering. In Fourth Australasian Information Security Workshop (Network Security) (AISW 2006), 16 - 19 Jan 2006, Hobart, Australia.
Formal specification and verification of protocols have been credited for uncovering protocol flaws; revealing inadequacies in protocol design of the Initial Stage and Negotiation Stage; and proved that improved protocol performs in the desired manner while under modelled attacks from dishonest players. It also shows how formal methods can be used by protocol designer to achieve a better design of a complex system. Formal methods can also populate an abstract concept with a more complete and consistent protocol specification. Complex system protocol can be easily specified with simplifying assumptions for a high level of protocol verification. This set of assumptions can then be used to further explore the protocol. Using formal methods for complex secure system protocol design will provide not only better quality protocol but could also be the first step in advancing an abstract concept to a more practical stage for development.
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|Item Type:||Conference Paper|
|Keywords:||Secure e, contract, E, commerce security, E, tendering|
|Subjects:||Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > INFORMATION AND COMPUTING SCIENCES (080000)|
|Divisions:||Past > QUT Faculties & Divisions > Faculty of Science and Technology|
|Copyright Owner:||Copyright 2006 Australian Computer Society|
|Copyright Statement:||Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher.|
|Deposited On:||19 Jul 2006|
|Last Modified:||29 Feb 2012 13:18|
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