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Towards a provably secure DoS-Resilient key exchange protocol with perfect forward secrecy

Kuppusamy, Lakshmi, Rangasamy, Jothi, Stebila, Douglas, Boyd, Colin, & Nieto, Juan Gonzalez (2011) Towards a provably secure DoS-Resilient key exchange protocol with perfect forward secrecy. In Bernstein, Daniel J. & Chatterjee, Sanjit (Eds.) Indocrypt 2011, Springer, Chennai, India, pp. 379-398.

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Abstract

Just Fast Keying (JFK) is a simple, efficient and secure key exchange protocol proposed by Aiello et al. (ACM TISSEC, 2004). JFK is well known for its novel design features, notably its resistance to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Using Meadows’ cost-based framework, we identify a new DoS vulnerability in JFK. The JFK protocol is claimed secure in the Canetti-Krawczyk model under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. We show that security of the JFK protocol, when reusing ephemeral Diffie-Hellman keys, appears to require the Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption in the random oracle model. We propose a new variant of JFK that avoids the identified DoS vulnerability and provides perfect forward secrecy even under the DDH assumption, achieving the full security promised by the JFK protocol.

Impact and interest:

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ID Code: 47824
Item Type: Conference Paper
Keywords: Denial of service, Meadows’ cost-based framework, Just Fast Keying, client puzzles, key agreement, perfect forward secrecy
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-25578-6_27
ISBN: 9783642255779
Subjects: Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > INFORMATION AND COMPUTING SCIENCES (080000) > COMPUTER SOFTWARE (080300) > Computer System Security (080303)
Divisions: Past > QUT Faculties & Divisions > Faculty of Science and Technology
Past > Institutes > Information Security Institute
Copyright Owner: Copyright 2011 Springer
Copyright Statement: This is the author-version of the work. Conference proceedings published, by Springer Verlag, will be available via Lecture Notes in Computer Science http://www.springer.de/comp/lncs/
Deposited On: 20 Dec 2011 08:08
Last Modified: 19 Jul 2014 04:08

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