Modeling key compromise impersonation attacks on group key exchange protocols
Gorantla, Choudary, Boyd, Colin, Gonzalez Nieto, Juan M., & Manulis, Mark (2011) Modeling key compromise impersonation attacks on group key exchange protocols. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 14(4), 28:1-28:24.
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Two-party key exchange (2PKE) protocols have been rigorously analyzed under various models considering different adversarial actions. However, the analysis of group key exchange (GKE) protocols has not been as extensive as that of 2PKE protocols. Particularly, an important security attribute called key compromise impersonation (KCI) resilience has been completely ignored for the case of GKE protocols. Informally, a protocol is said to provide KCI resilience if the compromise of the long-term secret key of a protocol participant A does not allow the adversary to impersonate an honest participant B to A. In this paper, we argue that KCI resilience for GKE protocols is at least as important as it is for 2PKE protocols.
Our first contribution is revised definitions of security for GKE protocols considering KCI attacks by both outsider and insider adversaries. We also give a new proof of security for an existing two-round GKE protocol under the revised security definitions assuming random oracles. We then show how to achieve insider KCIR in a generic way using a known compiler in the literature. As one may expect, this additional security assurance comes at the cost of an extra round of communication. Finally, we show that a few existing protocols are not secure against outsider KCI attacks. The attacks on these protocols illustrate the necessity of considering KCI resilience for GKE protocols.
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|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Keywords:||group key exchange, key compromise impersonation|
|Subjects:||Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > INFORMATION AND COMPUTING SCIENCES (080000) > COMPUTER SOFTWARE (080300) > Computer System Security (080303)|
Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > INFORMATION AND COMPUTING SCIENCES (080000) > DATA FORMAT (080400)
|Divisions:||Past > Schools > Computer Science|
Past > QUT Faculties & Divisions > Faculty of Science and Technology
Past > Institutes > Information Security Institute
|Copyright Owner:||ACM COPYRIGHT NOTICE. Copyright © 2011 by the Association for Computing Machinery, Inc.|
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|Deposited On:||19 Jan 2012 08:23|
|Last Modified:||03 Oct 2014 10:04|
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