Social norms and corruption
Dong, Bin, Dulleck, Uwe, & Torgler, Benno (2009) Social norms and corruption. In Ciccone, A (Ed.) Proceedings of the European Economic Association and the Econometric Society European Meeting, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, Catalonia, Spain, pp. 1-48.
We explore theoretically and empirically whether corruption is contagious and whether conditional cooperation matters. We argue that the decision to bribe bureaucrats depends on the frequency of corruption within a society. We provide a behavioral model to explain this conduct: engaging in corruption results in a disutility of guilt. This disutility depends negatively on the number of people engaging in corruption. The empirical section presents evidence using two international panel data data sets, one at the micro and one at the macro level. Results indicate that corruption is influenced by the perceived activities of peers. Moreover, macro level data indicates that past levels of corruption impact current corruption levels.
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|Item Type:||Conference Paper|
|Keywords:||corruption, interdependent preferences, conditional cooperation, contagion effect|
|Subjects:||Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > ECONOMICS (140000) > APPLIED ECONOMICS (140200)|
|Divisions:||Current > QUT Faculties and Divisions > QUT Business School|
Current > Schools > School of Economics & Finance
|Deposited On:||07 Feb 2012 14:19|
|Last Modified:||01 Mar 2012 13:50|
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