A different algebraic analysis of the ZUC stream cipher
Al Mashrafi, Mufeed (2011) A different algebraic analysis of the ZUC stream cipher. In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Security of Information and Networks, ACM, Macquarie Graduate School of Management, Sydney, NSW, pp. 191-198.
Existing algebraic analyses of the ZUC cipher indicate that the cipher should be secure against algebraic attacks. In this paper, we present an alternative algebraic analysis method for the ZUC stream cipher, where a combiner is used to represent the nonlinear function and to derive equations representing the cipher. Using this approach, the initial states of ZUC can be recovered from 2^97 observed words of keystream, with a complexity of 2^282 operations. This method is more successful when applied to a modified version of ZUC, where the number of output words per clock is increased. If the cipher outputs 120 bits of keystream per clock, the attack can succeed with 219 observed keystream bits and 2^47 operations. Therefore, the security of ZUC against algebraic attack could be significantly reduced if its throughput was to be increased for efficiency.
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|Item Type:||Conference Paper|
|Keywords:||Algebraic Attacks, Stream Ciphers, ZUC, 128-EEA3, 128-EIA3, Multivariate Equations|
|Subjects:||Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > INFORMATION AND COMPUTING SCIENCES (080000) > COMPUTER SOFTWARE (080300) > Computer System Security (080303)|
|Divisions:||Past > Institutes > Information Security Institute
Current > QUT Faculties and Divisions > Science & Engineering Faculty
|Copyright Owner:||Copyright 2011 ACM|
|Deposited On:||21 Feb 2012 22:59|
|Last Modified:||22 Feb 2012 03:31|
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