The non-binding vote on executive pay : a review of the CLERP 9 reform
Chapple, Larelle June & Christensen, Blake (2005) The non-binding vote on executive pay : a review of the CLERP 9 reform. Australian Journal of Corporate Law, 18(3), pp. 263-287.
Directors’ and executives’ remuneration, including levels of pay, accountability and transparency, is controversial. Section 250R of the CLERP (Audit Reform & Disclosure) Act 2004 that was not greatly anticipated, requires the holding of a non-binding resolution on board remuneration at companies’ annual general meetings. The reform has been criticised on the basis that, inter alia, it blurs the respective roles of shareholders and directors. This article identifies possible motivations for the imposition of the non-binding resolution in Australia. These are evaluated with reference to sources of corporate governance policy and the current state of Australia’s relevant corporate governance structures. We speculate that the non-binding vote will not amount to a substantive addition to the corporate governance regime.
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|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > COMMERCE MANAGEMENT TOURISM AND SERVICES (150000) > ACCOUNTING AUDITING AND ACCOUNTABILITY (150100)|
|Divisions:||Current > QUT Faculties and Divisions > QUT Business School
Current > Schools > School of Accountancy
|Deposited On:||08 Jun 2012 00:40|
|Last Modified:||08 Jun 2012 00:40|
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