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Conditional corruption

Dong, Bin, Dulleck, Uwe, & Torgler, Benno (2011) Conditional corruption. Journal of Economic Psychology, 33(3), pp. 609-627.

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Abstract

In this paper we discuss whether corruption is contagious and whether conditional cooperation matters. We use the notion of “conditional corruption” for these effects. We analyze whether the justifiability to be corrupt is influenced by the perceived activities of others. Moreover, we also explore whether – and to what extent – group dynamics or socialization and past experiences affect corruption. We present evidence using two data sets at the micro level and a large macro level international panel data set. The results indicate that the willingness to engage in corruption is influenced by the perceived activities of peers and other individuals. Moreover, the panel data set at the macro level indicates that the past level of corruption has a strong impact on the current corruption level.

Impact and interest:

6 citations in Scopus
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3 citations in Web of Science®

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ID Code: 53883
Item Type: Journal Article
Additional URLs:
Keywords: Corruption, Contagion effect, Conditional cooperation, Interdependent preferences
DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2011.12.001
ISSN: 1872-7719 (online) 0167-4870 (print)
Divisions: Current > QUT Faculties and Divisions > QUT Business School
Current > Schools > School of Economics & Finance
Copyright Owner: Copyright 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Deposited On: 28 Sep 2012 11:54
Last Modified: 08 Oct 2012 11:49

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