The new governance approach to the devolution of corporate governance
Rahim, Mia Mahmudur (2012) The new governance approach to the devolution of corporate governance. Competition and Change, 16(4), pp. 343-352.
The moral arguments associated with justice, fairness and communitarianism have rejected the exclusivity of cost‐benefit analysis in corporate governance. Particularly, the percepts of new governance (NG) have included distributive aspects in efficiency models focused on maximizing profits. While corporate directors were only assigned to look after the return of investment within the traditional framework of corporate governance (CG), NG has created the scope for them to look beyond the set of contractual liabilities. This article explores how and how far NG notions have contributed to the devolution of CG to create internal strategies focusing on actors, ethics and accountability in corporate self-regulation.
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|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Keywords:||Corporate governance; shareholder primacy; new governance; enlightened shareholder primacy; corporate social responsibility|
|Subjects:||Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > COMMERCE MANAGEMENT TOURISM AND SERVICES (150000)
Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > LAW AND LEGAL STUDIES (180000)
|Divisions:||Current > QUT Faculties and Divisions > QUT Business School
Current > Schools > School of Accountancy
|Deposited On:||08 May 2013 22:20|
|Last Modified:||12 Jun 2013 15:45|
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