Brothers in arms – An experiment on the alliance puzzle

Ke, Changxia, Konrad, Kai A., & Morath, Florian (2013) Brothers in arms – An experiment on the alliance puzzle. Games and economic behaviour, 77(1), pp. 61-76.

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Abstract

The generic alliance game considers players in an alliance who fight against an external enemy. After victory, the alliance may break up, and its members may fight against each other over the spoils of the victory. Our experimental analysis of this game shows: In-group solidarity vanishes after the break-up of the alliance. Former ‘brothers in arms’ fight even more vigorously against each other than strangers do. Furthermore, this vigorous internal fighting is anticipated and reduces the ability of the alliance to mobilize the joint fighting effort, compared to a situation in which victorious alliance members share the spoils of victory equally and peacefully

Impact and interest:

5 citations in Scopus
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6 citations in Web of Science®

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ID Code: 62184
Item Type: Journal Article
Refereed: Yes
Keywords: Alliance, Conflict, Contest, Free-riding, Hold-up problem, In-group solidarity
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.011
ISSN: 0899-8256
Divisions: Current > QUT Faculties and Divisions > QUT Business School
Current > Schools > School of Economics & Finance
Deposited On: 29 Aug 2013 03:49
Last Modified: 29 Aug 2013 23:04

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