A framework for security analysis of key derivation functions
Chuah, Chai Wen, Dawson, Edward, Gonzalez Nieto, Juan Manuel, & Simpson, Leonie (2012) A framework for security analysis of key derivation functions. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 7232, pp. 199-216.
This paper presents a comprehensive formal security framework for key derivation functions (KDF). The major security goal for a KDF is to produce cryptographic keys from a private seed value where the derived cryptographic keys are indistinguishable from random binary strings. We form a framework of five security models for KDFs. This consists of four security models that we propose: Known Public Inputs Attack (KPM, KPS), Adaptive Chosen Context Information Attack (CCM) and Adaptive Chosen Public Inputs Attack(CPM); and another security model, previously defined by Krawczyk , which we refer to as Adaptive Chosen Context Information Attack(CCS). These security models are simulated using an indistinguisibility game. In addition we prove the relationships between these five security models and analyse KDFs using the framework (in the random oracle model).
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|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Additional Information:||Information Security Practice and Experience. 8th International Conference, ISPEC 2012, Hangzhou, China, April 9-12, 2012. Proceedings. Print ISBN 978-3-642-29100-5|
|Keywords:||Key derivation function, Security framework, Indistinguishability, Cryptographic keys|
|Divisions:||Current > Schools > School of Electrical Engineering & Computer Science
Current > QUT Faculties and Divisions > Science & Engineering Faculty
|Copyright Owner:||Copyright 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg|
|Copyright Statement:||The final publication is available at link.springer.com|
|Deposited On:||09 Sep 2013 05:36|
|Last Modified:||11 Sep 2013 03:44|
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