Formalising human recognition : a fundamental building block for security proofs

Radke, Kenneth, Boyd, Colin, Gonzalez Nieto, Juan, Manulis, Mark, & Stebila, Douglas (2014) Formalising human recognition : a fundamental building block for security proofs. In Proceedings of the Twelfth Australasian Information Security Conference (AISC 2014) [Conferences in Research and Practice in Information Technology, Volume 149], Australian Computer Society Inc. , Auckland, New Zealand, pp. 37-45.

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A fundamental part of many authentication protocols which authenticate a party to a human involves the human recognizing or otherwise processing a message received from the party. Examples include typical implementations of Verified by Visa in which a message, previously stored by the human at a bank, is sent by the bank to the human to authenticate the bank to the human; or the expectation that humans will recognize or verify an extended validation certificate in a HTTPS context. This paper presents general definitions and building blocks for the modelling and analysis of human recognition in authentication protocols, allowing the creation of proofs for protocols which include humans. We cover both generalized trawling and human-specific targeted attacks. As examples of the range of uses of our construction, we use the model presented in this paper to prove the security of a mutual authentication login protocol and a human-assisted device pairing protocol.

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ID Code: 64590
Item Type: Conference Paper
Refereed: Yes
Additional URLs:
Keywords: Ceremony, Human protocol, provable security, HTTPS, TLS, Authentication, HPA, protocol
ISBN: 978-1-921770-32-6
Subjects: Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > INFORMATION AND COMPUTING SCIENCES (080000) > COMPUTER SOFTWARE (080300) > Computer System Security (080303)
Divisions: Current > Schools > School of Electrical Engineering & Computer Science
Current > Institutes > Institute for Future Environments
Current > QUT Faculties and Divisions > Science & Engineering Faculty
Copyright Owner: Copyright 2014 Australian Computer Society, Inc.
Copyright Statement: This paper appeared at the Australasian Information Security Conference (ACSW-AISC 2014), Auckland, New Zealand, January 2014. Conferences in Research and Practice in Information Technology (CRPIT), Vol. 149, Udaya Parampalli and Ian Welch, Ed. Reproduction for academic, not-for-profit purposes permitted provided this text is included.
Deposited On: 19 Nov 2013 00:15
Last Modified: 08 Apr 2014 08:16

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