CFO inside debt and corporate innovation

Siddiqui, Sayla Sowat (2013) CFO inside debt and corporate innovation. Masters by Research thesis, Queensland University of Technology.

Abstract

This thesis examines the importance of CFO incentives on the value maximization of firm. It examines the association between CFO inside debt compensation i.e., CFO pensions and deferred compensation, and investment in corporate innovation. It finds that instead of encouraging innovation, CFO inside debt appears to have a dampening effect on investment in innovation.

Impact and interest:

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Full-text downloads:

401 since deposited on 27 Nov 2013
149 in the past twelve months

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ID Code: 64762
Item Type: QUT Thesis (Masters by Research)
Supervisor: How, Janice & Verhoeven, Peter
Keywords: Inside debt, Innovation, Research and Development (R&D) expenditure, Pensions, Deferred compensation, Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO)
Divisions: Current > QUT Faculties and Divisions > QUT Business School
Current > Schools > School of Economics & Finance
Institution: Queensland University of Technology
Deposited On: 27 Nov 2013 00:38
Last Modified: 07 Sep 2015 21:53

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