Modelling after-the-fact leakage for key exchange

Alawatugoda, Janaka, Stebila, Douglas, & Boyd, Colin (2014) Modelling after-the-fact leakage for key exchange. In Proceedings of the 9th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS 2014), National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT), Kyoto, Japan.

Abstract

Security models for two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols have developed over time to prove the security of AKE protocols even when the adversary learns certain secret values. In this work, we address more granular leakage: partial leakage of long-term secrets of protocol principals, even after the session key is established. We introduce a generic key exchange security model, which can be instantiated allowing bounded or continuous leakage, even when the adversary learns certain ephemeral secrets or session keys. Our model is the strongest known partial-leakage-based security model for key exchange protocols. We propose a generic construction of a two-pass leakage-resilient key exchange protocol that is secure in the proposed model, by introducing a new concept: the leakage-resilient NAXOS trick. We identify a special property for public-key cryptosystems: pair generation indistinguishability, and show how to obtain the leakage-resilient NAXOS trick from a pair generation indistinguishable leakage-resilient public-key cryptosystem.

Impact and interest:

8 citations in Scopus
4 citations in Web of Science®
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ID Code: 68332
Item Type: Conference Paper
Refereed: Yes
Additional URLs:
Keywords: Key exchange protocols, Public-key, Side-channel attacks, Security models, Leakage-resilient, After-the-fact, NAXOS
Divisions: Current > Schools > School of Electrical Engineering & Computer Science
Current > QUT Faculties and Divisions > Science & Engineering Faculty
Copyright Owner: Copyright 2014 Please consult the authors
Deposited On: 12 Mar 2014 04:20
Last Modified: 03 Aug 2014 06:52

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