Truncated differential analysis of reduced-round LBlock
Emami, Sareh, McDonald, Cameron, Pieprzyk, Josef, & Steinfeld, Ron (2013) Truncated differential analysis of reduced-round LBlock. Lecture Notes in Computer Science : Cryptology and Network Security, 8257, pp. 291-308.
In this paper we present truncated differential analysis of reduced-round LBlock by computing the differential distribution of every nibble of the state. LLR statistical test is used as a tool to apply the distinguishing and key-recovery attacks. To build the distinguisher, all possible differences are traced through the cipher and the truncated differential probability distribution is determined for every output nibble. We concatenate additional rounds to the beginning and end of the truncated differential distribution to apply the key-recovery attack. By exploiting properties of the key schedule, we obtain a large overlap of key bits used in the beginning and final rounds. This allows us to significantly increase the differential probabilities and hence reduce the attack complexity. We validate the analysis by implementing the attack on LBlock reduced to 12 rounds. Finally, we apply single-key and related-key attacks on 18 and 21-round LBlock, respectively.
Impact and interest:
Citation counts are sourced monthly from and citation databases.
These databases contain citations from different subsets of available publications and different time periods and thus the citation count from each is usually different. Some works are not in either database and no count is displayed. Scopus includes citations from articles published in 1996 onwards, and Web of Science® generally from 1980 onwards.
Citations counts from theindexing service can be viewed at the linked Google Scholar™ search.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Additional Information:||Proceedings of the 12th International Conference, CANS 2013, Paraty, Brazil, November 20-22. 2013.|
|Keywords:||Block cipher, LBlock, Truncated differetial analysis, Probability distribution, Log-likelihood ratio, Key-recovery attack|
|Copyright Owner:||Copyright 2013 Springer International Publishing Switzerland|
|Deposited On:||27 Mar 2014 23:07|
|Last Modified:||24 Jul 2014 23:16|
Repository Staff Only: item control page