Continuous after-the-fact leakage-resilient key exchange

Alawatugoda, Janaka, Boyd, Colin, & Stebila, Douglas (2014) Continuous after-the-fact leakage-resilient key exchange. In Information Security and Privacy: 19th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2014, Proceedings [Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volume 8544], Springer, Wollongong, Australia, pp. 258-273.

View at publisher


Security models for two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols have developed over time to provide security even when the adversary learns certain secret keys. In this work, we advance the modelling of AKE protocols by considering more granular, continuous leakage of long-term secrets of protocol participants: the adversary can adaptively request arbitrary leakage of long-term secrets even after the test session is activated, with limits on the amount of leakage per query but no bounds on the total leakage. We present a security model supporting continuous leakage even when the adversary learns certain ephemeral secrets or session keys, and give a generic construction of a two-pass leakage-resilient key exchange protocol that is secure in the model; our protocol achieves continuous, after-the-fact leakage resilience with not much more cost than a previous protocol with only bounded, non-after-the-fact leakage.

Impact and interest:

3 citations in Scopus
Search Google Scholar™
4 citations in Web of Science®

Citation counts are sourced monthly from Scopus and Web of Science® citation databases.

These databases contain citations from different subsets of available publications and different time periods and thus the citation count from each is usually different. Some works are not in either database and no count is displayed. Scopus includes citations from articles published in 1996 onwards, and Web of Science® generally from 1980 onwards.

Citations counts from the Google Scholar™ indexing service can be viewed at the linked Google Scholar™ search.

Full-text downloads:

63 since deposited on 01 May 2014
7 in the past twelve months

Full-text downloads displays the total number of times this work’s files (e.g., a PDF) have been downloaded from QUT ePrints as well as the number of downloads in the previous 365 days. The count includes downloads for all files if a work has more than one.

ID Code: 70850
Item Type: Conference Paper
Refereed: Yes
Additional URLs:
Keywords: Leakage resilience, Continuous leakage, Key exchange, Security models, After-the-fact
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-08344-5_17
ISBN: 978-3-319-08343-8
Divisions: Current > Schools > School of Electrical Engineering & Computer Science
Current > QUT Faculties and Divisions > Science & Engineering Faculty
Copyright Owner: Copyright 2014 Please consult the authors
Deposited On: 01 May 2014 02:29
Last Modified: 25 Jul 2014 13:50

Export: EndNote | Dublin Core | BibTeX

Repository Staff Only: item control page