Reason is too large : analogy and precedent in law

Hunter, Dan (2001) Reason is too large : analogy and precedent in law. Emory Law Journal, 50(4), pp. 1197-1264.

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Abstract

Hunter argues that cognitive science models of human thinking explain how analogical reasoning and precedential reasoning operate in law. He offers an explanation of why various legal theories are so limited and calls for greater attention to what is actually happening when lawyers and judges reason, by analogy, with precedent.

Impact and interest:

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ID Code: 70975
Item Type: Journal Article
Refereed: No
Additional URLs:
ISSN: 2163-324X
Divisions: Current > QUT Faculties and Divisions > Faculty of Law
Current > Schools > School of Law
Deposited On: 02 May 2014 04:12
Last Modified: 02 May 2014 04:12

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