Non-monotonic Reasoning and the Reversibility of Belief Change
Hunter, Dan (1991) Non-monotonic Reasoning and the Reversibility of Belief Change. In UAI'91 Proceedings of the Seventh conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers , pp. 159-164.
Traditional approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning fail to satisfy a number of plausible axioms for belief revision and suffer from conceptual difficulties as well. Recent work on ranked preferential models (RPMs) promises to overcome some of these difficulties. Here we show that RPMs are not adequate to handle iterated belief change. Specifically, we show that RPMs do not always allow for the reversibility of belief change. This result indicates the need for numerical strengths of belief.
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|Item Type:||Conference Paper|
|Divisions:||Current > QUT Faculties and Divisions > Faculty of Law
Current > Schools > School of Law
|Copyright Owner:||Copyright 1991 Morgan Kaufmann Publishers|
|Deposited On:||07 May 2014 06:45|
|Last Modified:||07 May 2014 06:45|
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