Alliances in the shadow of conflict

Ke, Changxia, Konrad, Kai A., & Morath, Florian (2015) Alliances in the shadow of conflict. Economic Inquiry, 53(2), pp. 854-871.

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Abstract

Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. This article presents an experiment on the determinants of whether alliances break up and fight internally after having defeated a joint enemy. First, if peaceful sharing yields an asymmetric rent distribution, this increases the likelihood of fighting. In turn, anticipation of the higher likelihood of internal fight reduces the alliance’s ability to succeed against the outside enemy. Second, the option to make nonbinding nonaggression declarations between alliance members does not make peaceful settlement within the alliance more likely. Third, higher differences in the alliance players’ contributions to alliance effort lead to more internal conflict and more intense fighting.

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ID Code: 78602
Item Type: Journal Article
Refereed: Yes
DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12151
ISSN: 1465-7295
Divisions: Current > QUT Faculties and Divisions > QUT Business School
Current > Schools > School of Economics & Finance
Copyright Owner: Copyright 2014 Western Economic Association International
Deposited On: 11 Nov 2014 23:32
Last Modified: 16 Feb 2015 04:36

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