Alliances in the shadow of conflict
Ke, Changxia, Konrad, Kai A., & Morath, Florian (2015) Alliances in the shadow of conflict. Economic Inquiry, 53(2), pp. 854-871.
Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. This article presents an experiment on the determinants of whether alliances break up and fight internally after having defeated a joint enemy. First, if peaceful sharing yields an asymmetric rent distribution, this increases the likelihood of fighting. In turn, anticipation of the higher likelihood of internal fight reduces the alliance’s ability to succeed against the outside enemy. Second, the option to make nonbinding nonaggression declarations between alliance members does not make peaceful settlement within the alliance more likely. Third, higher differences in the alliance players’ contributions to alliance effort lead to more internal conflict and more intense fighting.
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|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Divisions:||Current > QUT Faculties and Divisions > QUT Business School
Current > Schools > School of Economics & Finance
|Copyright Owner:||Copyright 2014 Western Economic Association International|
|Deposited On:||11 Nov 2014 23:32|
|Last Modified:||16 Feb 2015 04:36|
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