kmth price sealed-bid auctions with general independent values and equilibrium linear mark-ups

Skitmore, Martin (2014) kmth price sealed-bid auctions with general independent values and equilibrium linear mark-ups. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 65(12), pp. 1864-1875.

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A generalised bidding model is developed to calculate a bidder’s expected profit and auctioners expected revenue/payment for both a General Independent Value and Independent Private Value (IPV) kmth price sealed-bid auction (where the mth bidder wins at the kth bid payment) using a linear (affine) mark-up function. The Common Value (CV) assumption, and highbid and lowbid symmetric and asymmetric First Price Auctions and Second Price Auctions are included as special cases. The optimal n bidder symmetric analytical results are then provided for the uniform IPV and CV models in equilibrium. Final comments concern implications, the assumptions involved and prospects for further research.

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1 citations in Scopus
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ID Code: 78745
Item Type: Journal Article
Refereed: Yes
Additional Information: Published online 27 November 2013
Keywords: Auction theory, General Independent Value model, Mark-up pricing, kmth price, Independent Private Values, Common Values
DOI: 10.1057/jors.2013.163
ISSN: 1476-9360
Divisions: Current > Schools > School of Civil Engineering & Built Environment
Current > QUT Faculties and Divisions > Science & Engineering Faculty
Copyright Owner: Copyright 2014 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.
Deposited On: 18 Nov 2014 23:19
Last Modified: 09 Jun 2015 13:24

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