Heartbeat and economic decisions : observing mental stress among proposers and responders in the ultimatum bargaining game

Dulleck, Uwe, Schaffner, Markus, & Torgler, Benno (2014) Heartbeat and economic decisions : observing mental stress among proposers and responders in the ultimatum bargaining game. PLOS ONE, 9(9), e108218.

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The ultimatum bargaining game (UBG), a widely used method in experimental economics, clearly demonstrates that motives other than pure monetary reward play a role in human economic decision making. In this study, we explore the behaviour and physiological reactions of both responders and proposers in an ultimatum bargaining game using heart rate variability (HRV), a small and nonintrusive technology that allows observation of both sides of an interaction in a normal experimental economics laboratory environment. We find that low offers by a proposer cause signs of mental stress in both the proposer and the responder; that is, both exhibit high ratios of low to high frequency activity in the HRV spectrum.

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ID Code: 78814
Item Type: Journal Article
Refereed: Yes
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0108218
ISSN: 1932-6203
Divisions: Current > QUT Faculties and Divisions > QUT Business School
Current > Schools > School of Economics & Finance
Copyright Owner: Copyright 2014 Dulleck et al.
Copyright Statement: This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Deposited On: 19 Nov 2014 23:26
Last Modified: 24 Aug 2016 00:33

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