On doctors, mechanics and computer specialists
Dulleck, Uwe & Kerschbamer, Rudolf (2005) On doctors, mechanics and computer specialists. In Austrian Economic Association (NÖG), Vienna Austria.
Our washing machine breaks down, or when our car starts to make strange noises. And for most of us commissioning an expert to solve the problem causes concern. This concern does not disappear even after repair and payment of the bill. On the contrary, one worries about paying for a service that was not provided, or receiving some unnecessary treatment. This article studies the economics underlying these worries. Under which conditions do experts have an incentive to exploit the informational problems associated with markets for diagnosis and treatment? What types of fraud exist? What are the methods and institutions for dealing with these informational problems? Under which conditions does the market provide incentives to deter fraudulent behavior? And what happens if all or some of those conditions are violate.
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|Item Type:||Conference Paper|
|Additional Information:||For more information, please refer to the author. Author contact details: firstname.lastname@example.org|
|Keywords:||Credence Goods, Experts, Fraud|
|Subjects:||Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > ECONOMICS (140000)|
|Divisions:||Current > QUT Faculties and Divisions > QUT Business School|
|Copyright Owner:||Copyright 2005 The Authors|
|Deposited On:||13 Jul 2007|
|Last Modified:||10 Aug 2011 15:10|
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