More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature
Guth, Werner & Kocher, Martin (2014) More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 108, pp. 396-409.
Take-it or leave-it offers are probably as old as mankind. Our objective here is, first, to provide a, probably subjectively colored, recollection of the initial ultimatum game experiment, its motivation and the immediate responses. Second, we discuss extensions of the standard ultimatum bargaining game in a unified framework, and, third, we offer a survey of the experimental ultimatum bargaining literature containing papers published since the turn of the century. The paper argues that the ultimatum game is a versatile tool for research in bargaining and on social preferences. Finally, we provide examples for open research questions and directions for future studies.
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|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Keywords:||Ultimatum bargaining;, Ultimatum game, Experiment, Social preferences|
|Divisions:||Current > QUT Faculties and Divisions > QUT Business School
Current > Schools > School of Economics & Finance
|Copyright Owner:||© 2014 Elsevier B.V|
|Deposited On:||29 Oct 2015 05:36|
|Last Modified:||29 Oct 2015 05:36|
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