Deriving optimal competition in infrastructure procurement

Teo, Pauline, Bridge, Adrian, & Love, Peter (2015) Deriving optimal competition in infrastructure procurement. In 2015 International Conference on Construction and Real Estate Management (ICCREM), 11-12 August 2015, Luleå, Sweden.

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Abstract

Typically only a limited number of consortiums are able to competitively bid for Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects. Consequently, this may lead to oligopoly pricing constraints and ineffective competition, thus engendering ex ante market failure. In addressing this issue, this paper aims to determine the optimal number of bidders required to ensure a healthy level of competition is available to procure major infrastructure projects. The theories of Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm; Game Theory and Auction Theory and Transaction Cost Economics are reviewed and discussed and used to produce an optimal level of competition for major infrastructure procurement, that prevents market failure ex ante (lack of competition) and market failure ex post (due to asymmetric lock-in).

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ID Code: 91095
Item Type: Conference Paper
Refereed: Yes
Additional Information: Cited as: Teo, P., Bridge, A., and Love, P. (2015) Deriving Optimal Competition in Infrastructure Procurement. ICCREM 2015: pp. 1114-1123.
Keywords: Competition, Infrastructure, Procurement
Subjects: Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > BUILT ENVIRONMENT AND DESIGN (120000) > BUILDING (120200) > Quantity Surveying (120203)
Divisions: Current > Schools > School of Civil Engineering & Built Environment
Current > QUT Faculties and Divisions > Science & Engineering Faculty
Copyright Owner: Copyright 2015 American Society of Civil Engineers
Deposited On: 08 Dec 2015 04:34
Last Modified: 13 Jan 2016 03:52

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