Continuous after-the-fact leakage-resilient eCK-secure key exchange

Alawatugoda, Janaka, Stebila, Douglas, & Boyd, Colin (2015) Continuous after-the-fact leakage-resilient eCK-secure key exchange. In Groth, Jens (Ed.) Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer International Publishing, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK, pp. 277-294.

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Abstract

Security models for two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols have developed over time to capture the security of AKE protocols even when the adversary learns certain secret values. Increased granularity of security can be modelled by considering partial leakage of secrets in the manner of models for leakage-resilient cryptography, designed to capture side-channel attacks. In this work, we use the strongest known partial-leakage-based security model for key exchange protocols, namely continuous after-the-fact leakage eCK (CAFL-eCK) model. We resolve an open problem by constructing the first concrete two-pass leakage-resilient key exchange protocol that is secure in the CAFL-eCK model.

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ID Code: 91152
Item Type: Conference Paper
Refereed: Yes
Additional Information: Cryptography and Coding: 15th IMA International Conference, IMACC 2015, Oxford, UK, December 15-17, 2015. Proceedings. Print ISBN 978-3-319-27238-2
Additional URLs:
Keywords: key exchange protocols, side-channel attacks, security models, leakage-resilience, after-the-fact leakage
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-27239-9_17
ISBN: 9783319272399
ISSN: 0302-9743
Subjects: Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > INFORMATION AND COMPUTING SCIENCES (080000) > DATA FORMAT (080400) > Data Encryption (080402)
Divisions: Current > Schools > School of Electrical Engineering & Computer Science
Current > Institutes > Institute for Future Environments
Current > QUT Faculties and Divisions > Science & Engineering Faculty
Funding:
Copyright Owner: Copyright 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
Copyright Statement: The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27239-9_17
Deposited On: 10 Dec 2015 03:11
Last Modified: 13 Dec 2016 05:14

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