Two tests for ex ante moral hazard in a market for automobile insurance

Rowell, David, Nghiem, Son, & Connelly, Luke B. (2016) Two tests for ex ante moral hazard in a market for automobile insurance. Journal of Risk and Insurance. (In Press)

[img] Accepted Version (PDF 408kB)
Administrators only | Request a copy from author

View at publisher


Empirically separating the phenomena of moral hazard and adverse selection in insurance markets has occupied researchers in this field for decades. Recently, the potential benefits of using survey data instead of claims data to control for the different dimensions of private information when testing for evidence of asymmetric information have been explored in the insurance literature. This article extends that approach to present two tests for ex-ante moral hazard in a market for automobile insurance. In this article we specify (1) a recursive model and (2) an instrumental variable model to address endogeneity with respect to policy selection in cross-sectional road traffic crash (RTC) survey data. We report a statistically significant ex-ante moral hazard effect with both models. This result is then subjected to a falsification test, whereby the analysis is repeated in subsamples of at-fault and not-at-fault RTCs. Our antitest produces no evidence of ex-ante moral hazard in the sub-sample of not-at-fault RTCs, in which the true moral hazard may reasonably be assumed to be zero, thus supporting the interpretation of the results of our two models. Our extension of the existing literature via these two specifications may have useful analogs in other insurance markets for which survey data are available.

Impact and interest:

Citation counts are sourced monthly from Scopus and Web of Science® citation databases.

These databases contain citations from different subsets of available publications and different time periods and thus the citation count from each is usually different. Some works are not in either database and no count is displayed. Scopus includes citations from articles published in 1996 onwards, and Web of Science® generally from 1980 onwards.

Citations counts from the Google Scholar™ indexing service can be viewed at the linked Google Scholar™ search.

ID Code: 96218
Item Type: Journal Article
Refereed: Yes
DOI: 10.1111/jori.12161
ISSN: 0022-4367
Subjects: Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > ECONOMICS (140000) > APPLIED ECONOMICS (140200) > Health Economics (140208)
Divisions: Current > QUT Faculties and Divisions > Faculty of Health
Current > Institutes > Institute of Health and Biomedical Innovation
Current > Schools > School of Public Health & Social Work
Copyright Owner: 2016 The Journal of Risk and Insurance
Deposited On: 16 Jun 2016 22:39
Last Modified: 23 Jun 2016 05:31

Export: EndNote | Dublin Core | BibTeX

Repository Staff Only: item control page