Lesser-known consequences of managing marine fisheries using individual transferable quotas
Gibbs, Mark T. (2007) Lesser-known consequences of managing marine fisheries using individual transferable quotas. Marine Policy, 31(2), pp. 112-116.
Managing marine fisheries using output controls in the form of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) can be an attractive alternative to more traditional input controls. There are now a number of examples of where ITQ-managed fisheries have been able to reduce the impact of the major management problems in global fisheries, namely, gross over-capitalisation and effort. However, ITQs are not the perfect management tool and one of the lesser known consequences of ITQ-managed fisheries where ITQs consist of a harvest right is the implicit relationship between ITQ property rights and rights of access to the fishing grounds. This implicit spatial right to the grounds can provide obstacles in the way of allocating water-space within fishing grounds for alternative uses such as marine-protected areas, large-scale aquaculture, and wind farms. These lesser-known consequences of ITQ-managed fisheries are discussed here.
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|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Keywords:||Fisheries management, ITQ, New Zealand, catch per unit effort, fishery management, fishery policy, marine resource, resource development, Australasia|
|Copyright Owner:||2007 Elsevier|
|Deposited On:||29 Jul 2016 06:50|
|Last Modified:||05 Aug 2016 03:20|
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