Scoring rules and competitive behavior in best-value construction auctions

Ballesteros-Pérez, Pablo, Skitmore, Martin, Pellicer, Eugenio, & Zhang, Xiaoling (2016) Scoring rules and competitive behavior in best-value construction auctions. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 142(9), 04016035.

View at publisher

Abstract

This paper examines the extent to which engineers can influence the competitive behavior of bidders in best value or multiattribute construction auctions, in which both the (dollar) bid and technical nonprice criteria are scored according to a scoring rule. From a sample of Spanish construction auctions with a variety of bid scoring rules, it is found that bidders are influenced by the auction rules in significant and predictable ways. The bid score weighting, bid scoring formula, and abnormally low bids criterion are variables likely to influence the competitiveness of bidders in terms of both their aggressive/conservative bidding and concentration/dispersion of bids. Revealing the influence of the bid scoring rules and their magnitude on bidders’ competitive behavior opens the door for the engineer to condition bidder competitive behavior in such a way as to provide the balance needed to achieve the owner’s desired strategic outcomes.

Impact and interest:

1 citations in Scopus
Search Google Scholar™
1 citations in Web of Science®

Citation counts are sourced monthly from Scopus and Web of Science® citation databases.

These databases contain citations from different subsets of available publications and different time periods and thus the citation count from each is usually different. Some works are not in either database and no count is displayed. Scopus includes citations from articles published in 1996 onwards, and Web of Science® generally from 1980 onwards.

Citations counts from the Google Scholar™ indexing service can be viewed at the linked Google Scholar™ search.

Full-text downloads:

7 since deposited on 14 Sep 2016
7 in the past twelve months

Full-text downloads displays the total number of times this work’s files (e.g., a PDF) have been downloaded from QUT ePrints as well as the number of downloads in the previous 365 days. The count includes downloads for all files if a work has more than one.

ID Code: 98836
Item Type: Journal Article
Refereed: Yes
Keywords: Construction auctions, Scoring rule, Capped auctions, Economic bid weighting, Abnormally low bids criterion, Bid scoring formula, Competitive bidding, Contracting
DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0001144
ISSN: 1943-7862
Subjects: Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > BUILT ENVIRONMENT AND DESIGN (120000) > BUILDING (120200) > Quantity Surveying (120203)
Divisions: Current > Schools > School of Civil Engineering & Built Environment
Current > QUT Faculties and Divisions > Science & Engineering Faculty
Copyright Owner: Copyright 2016 American Society of Civil Engineers
Deposited On: 14 Sep 2016 23:39
Last Modified: 17 Sep 2016 20:24

Export: EndNote | Dublin Core | BibTeX

Repository Staff Only: item control page