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On Session Identifiers in Provably Secure Protocols: The Bellare-Rogaway Three-Party Key Distribution Protocol Revisited

Choo, Kim-Kwang R. and Boyd, Colin and Hitchcock, Yvonne and Maitland, Greg M. (2005) On Session Identifiers in Provably Secure Protocols: The Bellare-Rogaway Three-Party Key Distribution Protocol Revisited. In: 4th Conference on Security in Communication Networks - SCN 2004, 8 - 10 Sep 2004, Amalfi, Italy.

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DOI : 10.1007/b105083

Abstract

We examine the role of session identifiers (SIDs) in security proofs for key establishment protocols. After reviewing the practical importance of SIDs we use as a case study the three-party server-based key distribution (3PKD) protocol of Bellare and Rogaway, proven secure in 1995. We show incidentally that the partnership function used in the existing security proof is flawed. There seems to be no way to define a SID for the 3PKD protocol that will preserve the proof of security. A small change to the protocol allows a natural definition for a SID and we prove that the new protocol is secure using this SID to define partnering.

ID Code:1228
Item Type:Conference Paper
Keywords :Session identifiers, provably secure protocols, key establishment protocols
ISBN:9783540243014
Subjects:Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > INFORMATION AND COMPUTING SCIENCES (080000) > INFORMATION SYSTEMS (080600)
Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > INFORMATION AND COMPUTING SCIENCES (080000)
Divisions:QUT Faculties and Divisions > Faculty of Information Technology
Copyright Owner :Copyright 2004 Springer
Copyright Statement :This is the author-version of the work. Conference proceedings published, by Springer Verlag, will be available via SpringerLink. http://www.springer.de/comp/lncs/ Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Deposited On:28 Oct 2005
Last Modified:03 Dec 2008 12:26

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