Complementing Computational Protocol Analysis with Formal Specifications

Choo, Kim-Kwang R. and Boyd, Colin A. and Hitchcock, Yvonne and Maitland, Greg M. (2005) Complementing Computational Protocol Analysis with Formal Specifications. In: IFIP TC1 WG1.7 Second International Workshop on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust - FAST 2004, 26 - 27 Aug 2004, Toulouse, France.

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DOI : 10.1007/0-387-24098-5_10

Abstract

The computational proof model of Bellare and Rogaway for cryptographic protocol analysis is complemented by providing a formal specification of the actions of the adversary and the protocol entities. This allows a matching model to be used in both a machine-generated analysis and a human-generated computational proof. Using a protocol of Jakobsson and Pointcheval as a case study, it is demonstrated that flaws in the protocol could have been found with this approach, providing evidence that the combination of human and computer analysis can be more effective than either alone. As well as finding the known flaw, previously unknown flaws in the protocol are discovered by the automatic analysis.

ID Code:	1229
Item Type:	Conference Paper
Keywords :	Formal specification, key establishment protocol
ISBN:	0387240500
Subjects:	Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification > INFORMATION AND COMPUTING SCIENCES (080000)
Divisions:	QUT Faculties and Divisions > Faculty of Information Technology
Copyright Owner :	Copyright 2005 Springer
Copyright Statement :	This is the author-version of the work. Conference proceedings published, by Springer Verlag, will be available via SpringerLink. http://www.springerlink.com
Deposited On:	23 Jun 2005
Last Modified:	03 Dec 2008 12:26

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