

**Motivation shifting in giving:
Moral balancing effects in prosocial context**

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Master of Business Administration

Bachelor of Business

SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

School of Advertising, Marketing and Public Relations

QUT Business School

Queensland University of Technology

2020

Keywords

Moral balancing, moral licensing, moral cleansing, moral consistency, message appeals, prosocial behaviour.

Abstract

Prior studies on sequential moral behaviours have demonstrated that one moral decision negatively affects the following one, as explained by moral balance theory. When people believe that they have made a moral decision (e.g. engaged in a prosocial act), their subsequent decisions would be less moral. In contrast, when people acted less morally (e.g. rejected a prosocial request), their next decision would be a more moral one. This thesis investigates the idea that rejecting or complying with a prosocial request would affect individuals' subsequent prosocial motivations, whether to benefit the prosocial actor or other people in need. In so doing, two charitable message appeals were used in this study: a message that focuses on the donors' benefits (i.e. self-benefit), and a message that focuses on the benefits to needy others (i.e. other-benefit). In four experiments, this thesis demonstrates that people attempt to keep their moral account in balance as indicated by their subsequent prosocial behaviours. That is, when people agreed to make a donation, they are more generous in their subsequent donation if the charity uses a self-benefit compared with an other-benefit message. Conversely, when people rejected a charity request, their subsequent donation was higher if the charity uses an other-benefit compared with a self-benefit message. The present study is among the first to investigate the joint impact of moral balancing effects and charitable message appeals in influencing donation behaviour. The findings may contribute to future research in consumer's moral self-regulation, specifically ethical decisions, pro-environmental decisions, customer relationship management, food choice, and similar increasingly essential topics.

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Glossary

Below is a list of important terminology used in this thesis.

Moral balancing	a propensity to diverge from a former moral or immoral action in a subsequent decision (Nisan & Horenczyk, 1990).
Moral cleansing	an effort to reduce the feeling of immoral discomfort by conducting positive behaviours after a moral transgression, with the goal to re-establish moral self-image (Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009)
Moral consistency	a tendency to maintain two moral actions in congruence. Since people strive to be moral, the common illustration of moral consistency is when an individual protects his/her positive moral self-image by performing moral behaviour.
Moral licensing	an inclination to commit something immoral after previously engaging in moral acts
Moral regulation	comparison of one's behaviours to moral standards in an attempt to avoid the self-punishment associated with violation of the standards
Other-benefit appeal	charitable message appeals that focus on the welfare of the beneficiaries
Prosocial behaviour	a wide range of actions with objectives to benefit a person or a group of people, including helping, sharing and cooperating.
Self-benefit appeal	charitable message appeals that emphasise the benefits the donor would gain by donating to a cause

Statement of Original Authorship

The work contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted to meet requirements for an award at this or any other higher education institution. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made.

Signature [QUT Verified Signature](#)

Date: 10 – 02 – 2020

Acknowledgement

First and foremost, I thank God for making this possible.

I would like to thank my principal supervisor, Dr Hyun Seung “HS” Jin for opening my eyes to academic research. My PhD journey would not have been accomplished without your patience, guidance and willingness to spend hours to discuss this thesis. You are a cool supervisor.

I would also like to acknowledge the support of my associate supervisor, Dr Louise Kelly who always gives motivation, encouragement and valuable feedbacks. Your constant support is an essential part in developing this thesis.

Throughout my PhD journey, many people have supported me, and I would like to express my sincere gratitude to: Hyoje “Jay” Kim, Scott, Ben, Andi, Dyan, Retno, Thomas, Hesty, Pipit, Rivan, Devi, Wawan, Joko, Marwan, Vika, Joseph, all Z701 research students, and all Indonesian students in Brisbane. Thank you for your friendships. I also want to thank nice people at QUT Business School who helped me a lot during the journey: Carol, Milen, Jonathan, Dennis and Jeremy.

I want to thank my loving wife, Yolanda, who stands beside me in any circumstances. Your love and sacrifices during this journey are amazing. Also, for the gifts from heaven: Aurora and Abixandr, thank you for your warm love.

Lastly, I want to thank the Indonesia Endowment Fund for Education (LPDP) for giving me opportunity to pursue my PhD dreams and for the financial support during my PhD program.

Introduction

1.1. Research background

One day, Amy saw a charity advertisement, which asked potential donors to help people in need. Amy felt motivated to ease the suffering of others and eventually sent some money to the charity. Jane saw the same charity advertisement but made a different decision. She declined the donation appeal. The day after, Amy saw a charity advertisement that emphasised the benefits that a donor may receive for making donations, an egoistic message appeal. Jane saw a purely altruistic charity message, focused on how her donations may help other people to ease their hardships. They were interested in the advertisements, thinking that maybe they should respond to the charity requests differently than how they did the day before.

The stories of Amy and Jane describe when an individual sees two charity advertisements sequentially. The question is, would Amy and Jane be influenced by their prior prosocial decisions in making their recent ones? If so, why? Moral balance theory (Nisan & Horenczyk, 1990) offers an explanation for the stories. The theory suggests that people are inclined to keep their moral position in balance. That is, when individuals engage in actions that are considered highly moral (e.g. prosocial activities), individuals would tend to be more relaxed to the following action in terms of their morality (Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010), and subsequently conduct less moral behaviour. In contrast, after failing to accomplish a prosocial

action or committing less moral behaviour, people tend to become more prosocial in their following actions. For instance, Gneezy, Imas, and Madarász (2014) found that participants who made a selfish decision by increasing their profits in a behavioural game subsequently donated more money to charity than those who were more generous in the game. Amy and Jane might end up giving a donation to the charities, but with different motivations. According to moral balance theory, the next prosocial action by Amy would be based on an egoistic reason, while Jane would donate based on an altruistic motive.

Charity advertising, like commercial advertising, represents a significant portion of a charitable institution's expenses. Cancer Research UK, for example, spent £97 million on marketing to engage new donors in the 2017/2018 financial year, which accounts for almost 15% of total spending in the year (Cancer Research UK, 2019). In Australia, UNICEF spent more than \$10 million on fundraising activities in 2017, which is around one-third of its total expenditure (UNICEF Australia, 2018). Similar to its commercial counterpart, charity advertising must convey the right message to the right potential donors in order to retain the current donors and to recruit new ones. If charities fail to send the right messages, not only they could suffer from inefficient use of marketing resources, they also may experience donor attrition, a condition where active donors stop giving donations, which is considered as a severe issue for charities (Sargeant & Hudson, 2008).

Sachdeva et al. (2009) present the moral balancing process as two altering characters that are depicted as "sinning saints" and "saintly sinners". That is, good people can turn to bad ones, and vice versa. As an example, when an individual

considers themselves as a moral person, they focus more on self-interest and then subsequently give smaller donations to others. Inversely, when an individual believes that they are an immoral person, they tend to be more generous to others (Cornelissen, Bashshur, Rode, & Le Menestrel, 2013; Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 2011). The dichotomy of individuals being moral or immoral as the results of moral balancing effects is the focus of most research on moral balancing in a prosocial context.

However, less attention is given to studies on the moral balancing framework that examine prosocial decisions with distinct motivations. Whether a prosocial decision may influence subsequent prosocial motivations is an important area of research given a prosocial decision can originate from different or even contrasting motivations (Fisher, Vandebosch, & Antia, 2008; Green & Peloza, 2014; White & Peloza, 2009). Therefore, within the moral balancing framework, by acknowledging prior donation behaviour, there is a possibility to foresee donors' motivations to engage in subsequent donation behaviour.

To fill the gap in the literature, this study aims to investigate how individuals may perform sequential moral actions conducted based on contradicting motivations. Prosocial motivations are examined using two different types of charitable message appeals, which are categorised based on different expectations of donation benefits. Self-benefit (i.e., egoistic) appeals emphasise the benefits the donor would gain by donating to a cause, whereas other-benefit (i.e., altruistic) appeals focus on the welfare of the beneficiaries (Chang, 2014; Ye, Teng, Yu, & Wang, 2015). The present work does not aim to determine which message appeal is

best, rather, this study's intention is to gain a better understanding of how each appeal works differently in motivating people to act prosocially.

Previous studies have demonstrated that different message appeals encourage donation intention in different contexts. For instance, females are more likely to respond positively to other-benefit appeals while males responded more positively to self-benefit appeals (Brunel & Nelson, 2000). People are also more attracted to other-benefit appeals when they are aware that their prosocial action is observed by others, compared to when it is made in a private setting. Conversely, in private situations, people tend to engage in prosocial action based on self-benefit rather than other-benefit appeals (Paulin, Ferguson, Jost, & Fallu, 2014; White & Peloza, 2009). However, prior research on different charitable message appeals in sequential moral-related decisions is limited.

1.2. Research problem

The assessment of an individual's morality is the central aspect of moral balance theory, since the appraisal may determine how the individual responds to subsequent prosocial requests. When an individual believes s/he is moral, in a subsequent moral-related decision, the person would focus more on fulfilling self-interest rather than the other people's interests (Blanken, van de Ven, & Zeelenberg, 2015). Whereas, if an individual feels that s/he is immoral, the person would demonstrate more virtue in the following moral-related decisions (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). As such, in the moral balance literature, scholars need to

determine how to measure if people are being moral or immoral, typically when people are engaged in two or more moral-related behaviours.

One common way to ascertain levels of morality is by observing how individuals respond to prosocial requests. Individuals who comply with prosocial requests are regarded as moral people and less moral or immoral people are those who reject prosocial requests (Sachdeva et al., 2009). This argument is supported by the concept of moral identity, an extent to which being a moral person contributes positively to one's identity (Hardy & Carlo, 2011). In line with that, Aquino and Reed (2002) found that people with a high moral identity are more likely to make donations compared with those with reporting a low moral identity. Conway and Peetz (2012) in their paper discussing moral balancing, used the terms *prosocial* and *moral* interchangeably, meaning that they conceptualise these two terms as having a single definition, which is "actions that benefit others at a cost to oneself" (Conway & Peetz, 2012, p. 916).

Another stream of research argues that morality and prosocial behaviour are not necessarily identical. That is, being moral is not entirely represented by helping others, and refusing to help others does not mean that an individual is immoral. For example, Lee, Winterich, and Ross Jr (2014) measured the moral identity of respondents and found that people with a high moral identity actually gave fewer donations than people with low moral identity, particularly when the recipients were believed to be responsible for their circumstances. If necessary, for a greater good, people with a higher sense of morality were also more willing to violate moral principles compared with those for whom morality was less central to identity

(Rixom & Mishra, 2011). These studies demonstrate that under certain circumstances, highly moral people may decide to give less or decline help to other people without feeling the loss of their morality. Thus, in the context of the moral balancing mechanism, there is a need to justify morality not only from merely prosocial actions but also from other factors that may contribute to the prosocial actions.

To resolve this problem, instead of looking at the prosocial decision itself (e.g., helping others or not), this research determines whether an individual is moral or immoral by focusing on one's prosocial motivation. In so doing, other-benefit and self-benefit message appeals are used. It is expected that helping others based on other-benefit or self-benefit message appeals demonstrate the morality of an individual. That is, helping based on other-benefit or altruistic helping is deemed as a stronger expression of morality than helping based on egoistic motives, as confirmed by common social norms (White & Peloza, 2009). This study is then consistent with the prior moral balancing study by Cornelissen et al. (2013), which demonstrated that moral balancing effects take place when people deliberately focus on the benefits of prosocial action, whether to benefit oneself or others.

1.3. Thesis structure

Beyond the current chapter, this thesis is comprised of an additional six chapters as presented below. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 present studies 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Each of these studies is self-contained, i.e. presented from an introduction to a conclusion with a discussion section for each study. These three chapters then have an identical structure.




Figure 1.1. Thesis outline

Chapter 2: Literature review provides a critical review of the literature as it pertains to prosocial behaviour, moral regulation and moral balancing, including moral licensing and moral cleansing. This chapter also provides an analysis of the literature, which subsequently generates a series of research questions.

Chapter 3: Hypotheses development presents the predictions that need to be answered in the studies with the support from the prior literature in moral regulation and message appeals.

Chapter 4: Research design presents the approach used in this thesis in order to answer the research questions as well as to examine the developed hypotheses. The chapter discusses the perspective of the research as well as providing justification of the chosen research design and research methods. Ethical considerations in relation to the implementation of the research are discussed.

Chapters 5-8 present Study 1, 2 and 3 consecutively. The chapters are similar in terms of the structure as they thoroughly discuss how each study is conducted. The chapters present all the details such as the introduction to the study, the motivations to conduct the studies, how the data were collected, the results of analyses and the discussions.

Chapter 9: Discussion and Conclusion presents the overall findings of the thesis by drawing the findings of the first, second and third study together. Following that, this chapter elaborates upon the practical and theoretical contributions of the studies along with the limitations and directions for future research.

1.4. Conclusion

This chapter introduced the importance of moral balancing effects and message appeals as factors that may determine donation intention of consumers. The research gap and research problem were presented, followed by an outline of the thesis. The following chapter provides an analytical review of the relevant literature such as moral regulation, moral balance theory and message appeals.

Chapter 2 - Literature Review

2.1. Introduction

This chapter presents a review of the literature on prosocial behaviour, moral consistency and moral balance theory. This chapter presents the current charitable sector, prosocial literature in general, moral regulation as guidance of individuals' sequential prosocial decisions. Later, it discusses the literature pertaining to moral consistency, moral balance and charitable message appeals, the main theories used in this study. Last, it derives research questions based on the review of the prior research in the areas.

2.2. Contemporary charitable sector

Charities are categorised as not-for-profit organisations that are distinguished from the public and private sector. Charities as the third sector aim to provide goods and services for society without a profit-taking motive as private sectors do, and without statutory power as shown by governments through public sectors (Haugh & Kitson, 2007). If considered as an industry, the charitable sector is among one of the largest. It employs 1.3 million paid staff in Australia alone (Commission, 2017), involves estimated 63 million American volunteers or 25% of the USA's adult population who were spending an average of 52 hours per year donating their time to communities in 2016 (Statistics, 2018). Charity navigator reported that the charity

sector received an estimated of USD 410 billion in 2017 in the USA which was an increase of 5.2% in current dollars from the previous year. The increasing trend of monetary donation continues to grow every year since 2010 (Navigator, 2018).

Charities develop as an attractive sector because they are directly affected by the vast enthusiasm from societies to donate, which leads to an ongoing trend of the charitable sector growth. In Australia, there are approximately 56,000 registered charities for 2013-2022, around 4% growth per year or faster than the country's population growth and the business foundation (Commission, 2017). Similarly, the number of registered charities in the USA was 1.56 million in 2015, an increase of 10.4% in a decade (McKeever, 2018). Indeed, fierce competition among charities to gain individuals' donations, which represent 72% of total donations in 2017 in the USA (Statistics, 2018), is inevitable especially when support from governments for their causes has declined. Bendapudi, Singh, and Bendapudi (1996) suggest that to thrive in such a harsh environment, a charity should adopt effective promotional strategy, including the use of technology in order to present itself and its programs in front of potential and current donors.

Technological advancement offers a relatively easier way to promote causes to donors and prospective donors. Currently, most charities have their own website, and social media channels, where 34% of them have paid for charitable advertising through social media (Statistics, 2018). Social media advertising seems to have received positive responses from donors. For example, in Australia, 58% of respondents declared that they liked donation approach using social media, especially when endorsed by a friend (Australia, 2019). In addition, 55% people

who have engaged with charities on social media eventually take prosocial actions (Statistics, 2018). Still, the highest percentage of donations were made outside social media, which is by doorknock, representing 57.4% of all donations in Australia in 2016 (Australia, 2019). One may speculate that an individual complied more to a prosocial request when the request was made offline than online because the propensity to present oneself as a moral person in front of others may motivate the person to act prosocially (White & Peloza, 2009).

Hence, where do the donations go? Giving to USA noted that religious organisations historically acquired the largest portion of charitable donations, which remained true in 2016 when the organisations received 31% of all donations or valued at USD127.37 billion (Navigator, 2018). The largest increase in 2016 was obtained by environmental and animal charitable organisations, which received 7.2% more donations compared with the prior year (Statistics, 2018). Similar to the recipients of donations, motivations of giving do not change significantly for the past decade. Those motivations are credibility of the charity/cause, the feeling of respect for the charities' work, sympathy to the potential recipients, relationships with someone who might benefit from the charity's service and a wish to have a better community (Australia, 2019). Apart from information obtained from charity organisations regarding prosocial motivations, it is crucial to review academic findings in the area that may assist charitable organisations in promoting their causes (Bendapudi et al., 1996).

2.3. Prosocial behaviour literature at a glance

Prosocial behaviour comprises of a wide range of actions with objectives to benefit a person or a group of people, including helping, sharing and cooperating. These behaviours contrast with antisocial behaviours that are described as damaging, aggressive and violent against others. In fact, the term “prosocial behaviour” did not appear in dictionaries before social psychologists used the term as the antonym of antisocial behaviour (Batson & Powell, 2003). The term “altruism” frequently refers to prosocial behaviours such as helping without expecting something in return or helping by sacrificing the welfare of the prosocial actors (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). The two terms are different in nature because altruism is one of the motivations to conduct prosocial behaviour, as opposed to the behaviour itself. Also, altruism need not engender prosocial behaviours (Batson & Powell, 2003). Thus, altruism is not the only motivation of individuals to perform prosocial behaviours, which makes the behaviour is an interesting yet complex aspect in a human’s life.

People frequently encounter situations in daily life in which they have to make decisions that would benefit either themselves or others. Such decisions involve moral considerations where benefiting other people is regarded as moral, because it is more altruistic than egoistic, while benefiting oneself is deemed as less moral behaviour. In the process of regulating moral behaviour, individuals use particular guidelines. Bandura (1986) explicates that moral regulation is obtained by comparing one’s behaviours to moral standards in an attempt to avoid the self-punishment associated with violation of the standards. The Bandura’s model covers both the inhibitory processes that keep people from performing immoral actions and

proactive processes that encourage people to engage in ethical behaviours. The inhibitory and proactive processes operate as prevention and avoidance focus that may preserve people's positive moral image, to the self and others (Rupp & Bell, 2010).

Research on prosocial behaviour often begins with the question: "Why do people help others?" Although the answer to this question is not straightforward, there are two dominant answers. The *first* factor that determines helping behaviour is the personality traits of the prosocial actors (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Hilbig, Glöckner, & Zettler, 2014). For instance, the theory of social value orientation (SVO) categorises individuals as pro-socials and pro-selves. Pro-socials have a stronger tendency to engage in donations (Van Lange, Bekkers, Schuyt, & Vugt, 2007; Van Lange, Schippers, & Balliet, 2011) compared to pro-selves. Another personality trait that has a close relationship with prosocial behaviour is agreeableness, a trait that describes an individual as having a pleasant character or complying with other's wishes (Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997). Empirical evidence demonstrates that agreeableness has direct and indirect relationships with a willingness to help others in need (Habashi, Graziano, & Hoover, 2016; Martin-Raugh, Kell, & Motowidlo, 2016).

Second, situational factors such as where and when an individual encounters a prosocial dilemma, determines whether the individual decides to make a prosocial decision or not (Aquino, Freeman, Reed II, Lim, & Felps, 2009). For example, individuals respond to charity requests differently when their donations are observed by others or when they are alone (Green & Peloza, 2014; White & Peloza, 2009).

Situational factors can even lead individuals with a low social value orientation (i.e. pro-selfs) to become actively involved in prosocial behaviours, particularly when the individuals expect something in return (Simpson & Willer, 2008). However, certain situational factors may lead an individual to hesitate in helping other people. For instance, the bystander effect explains that an individual who encounters an emergency is less likely to offer help when s/he acknowledges that other people are not responding to the situation, compared with when the individual is alone. The presence of others in such situations may lead the individual to assume that the victim is already receiving help or that help is coming soon (Latane & Darley, 1968).

2.4. Moral regulation in sequential decisions

One of the situational factors that may determine an individual's prosocial decision making is the activation of prior moral decisions (Liu & Aaker, 2008). In other words, when people are considering whether to help others or not, their memory of a prior moral-related decision may assist them in making such decisions. Literature on consumer's sequential decisions, which discuss how a consumer decision affects other decisions, has highlighted two prominent persuasion techniques: foot-in-the-door and door-in-the-face. *First*, foot-in-the-door is an inclination to comply with a subsequently larger request after previously complying with a smaller one (Freedman & Fraser, 1966). In a field study, Freedman and Fraser (1966) first contacted housewives by phone and asked them a few questions about what kinds of soap products they used. This was considered as a small request.

Later in the second contact, the experimenter asked a larger request to the housewives, to allow a survey team to inspect their houses for 2 hours regarding household products they used. The results confirmed that participants who agreed to the first small request were more likely to comply with the second large request than those who were not asked the first request.

Second, door-in-the-face refers to a compliance with a smaller request after rejecting a prior greater demand (Cialdini et al., 1975; Henderson & Burgoon, 2014). Cialdini et al. (1975) in an experiment in a university environment, made two requests to study participants, a large request first followed by a smaller one. Initially, the participants were asked to be counsellors to juvenile delinquents for 2 years or more. None of the participants complied with the first large request. Following that, they were asked to be involved in a volunteering program for 2 hours. The study found that those who were asked the first demanding request showed higher inclination to comply with the second request compared with those who were not asked the first request. Throughout decades, the foot-in-the-door and the door-in-the-face have received numerous attentions from scholars, and have been applied as a marketing approach by charities (Feeley, Anker, & Aloe, 2012; Henderson & Burgoon, 2014).

Two points can be inferred from the foot-in-the-door and door-in-the-face techniques. *First*, prior decisions do affect subsequent decisions. The theory of self-perception is employed to explain the foot-in-the-door effect. DeJong (1979) argued that once individuals agreed with the first request, they would perceive that they are the kind of people who tend to help others. This established self-perception

increases the likelihood of similar actions in the future when they are asked to perform a prosocial behaviour. Cialdini et al. (1975) work on door-in-the-face suggests that the presence of guilt between the first and the second requests plays an important role in shaping compliance toward the second request. *Second*, people may demonstrate consistent decision making, where the following decision is in line with the previous one (e.g. foot-in-the-door), or inconsistent decision making where later decisions deviate from former one (e.g. door-in-the-face).

Research on moral regulation can be categorised as belonging to two different streams of literature, namely moral consistency and moral balancing. Moral consistency refers to moral or immoral behaviour following similar behaviour. For instance, participants who believed they are moral showed increased levels of altruistic behaviour (Aquino et al., 2009). In contrast to moral consistency, moral balancing is a tendency to diverge from a former moral or immoral action in a subsequent decision (Nisan & Horenczyk, 1990). For instance, Effron and Conway (2015) found that acting virtuously can actually license people to do otherwise later. In the same principle yet a different direction, Ding et al. (2016) demonstrated that recalling an immoral experience that an individual committed in the past increases the willingness to engage in prosocial behaviour. Either moral consistency or moral balancing is demonstrated as a response to a prosocial dilemma, the prosocial decision making is related to how an individual use his/her moral principles as a guidance to make such decisions (Cornelissen et al., 2013).

2.5. Moral principles as foundations of moral regulation

Individuals respond to moral dilemmas based on two moral principles: the principles of deontology and utilitarianism (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004). Deontology or the rule-based principle states that a moral decision must be based on the intrinsic nature of the deed, regardless of its consequences. According to the deontology perspective, a moral judgement is made in dichotomy, whether the action confirms the rules and norms or not. In contrast, utilitarianism or the consequentialism principle emphasizes the consequences of moral action to society as a whole. Therefore utilitarianism is more flexible than deontology in terms of compliance toward existing rules and norms (Conway & Gawronski, 2013).

The difference between the two principles is depicted in the well-known trolley dilemma scenario (Foot, 1967). The scenario describes a situation where a runaway trolley is heading toward five people in a railway and will kill them. The only way to save these five people is by flipping a switch that will turn the trolley to the other direction, which will eventually kill an innocent person. At the end of the scenario, people are asked to choose whether to let the trolley run towards the five people or flip the switch, which will result in a death of an innocent person. People operating from the deontology principle tend to let the trolley run in its path because flipping the switch and killing an innocent person would be the result of their actions (as opposed to inaction) and is therefore unacceptable. By contrast, the utilitarian perspective suggests that flipping the switch is the most appropriate decision since the action will result in saving more lives.

Utilitarianism suggests that moral actors try to maximise the benefits and minimise the costs for all individuals, including the actors to whom the moral actions will impact (Mill, 2012). This applies also in moral dilemmas in which an individual is typically facing a conflict whether to benefit him/herself or others. In such situations, when discerning about the implications of one's actions, an individual tends to make a trade-off between satisfying one's needs and the needs of others. That is, pondering the consequences of a previous moral-related behaviour leads individuals to be inconsistent with the current moral self-image. In one of their studies, Cornelissen et al. (2013) found that after participants recalled their unethical behaviours, those high in utilitarianism committed more ethical behaviours (i.e., showing generosity) compared to those who recalled ethical behaviours. Those espousing deontology showed more generosity after they recalled ethical behaviours than those recalling unethical deeds. In other words, utilitarian participants exhibit behaviour that is in line with the moral balancing effects while deontology participants demonstrated the moral consistency effect.

2.5.1. Moral consistency

Moral consistency is a tendency to maintain two moral actions in congruence. Since people strive to be moral, the common illustration of moral consistency is when an individual protects his/her positive moral self-image by performing moral behaviour. For example, Aquino et al. (2009) asked student participants to recall and review the Ten Commandments with the aim to prime the participants with moral condition. Later, the participants were asked to initiate a

cause related marketing program, which is deemed as a prosocial action. The results show that the participants in moral prime condition demonstrated more prosocial behaviour than those in the control group. A recent study explored whether people's behaviours in playing video-game can be transferred to player's real-life behaviours (Iten, Bopp, Steiner, Opwis, & Mekler, 2018). The results of two experiments found that players who decided to behave prosocially in the game were subsequently more likely to donate compare to the other players who behaved egoistically in the game.




Figure 2.1. Moral consistency effect

Moral consistency has its roots in the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962) and self-perception (Bem, 1972), which propose that individuals tend to avoid a disharmony between beliefs and attitudes. For instance, through a field experiment, Baca-Motes, Brown, Gneezy, Keenan, and Nelson (2012) contend that when hotel guests make commitment to practice sustainable behaviour, later they are more likely to behave pro-environmentally compare to hotel guests who

refuse to make such commitment. Baca-Motes et al. (2012) argue that making pro-environment commitment shapes one's self-identity as an individual who concerns about environment, therefore, increases the likelihood that the individual would behave consistently with his/her self-identity.

Mullen and Monin (2016) divide moral consistency into positive and negative moral consistencies, which describe the directions of the moral principle. Positive moral consistency is the more common form of moral consistency where individuals conduct two moral deeds consistently, or a virtuous cycle, as illustrated by Mullen and Monin (2016). Whereas, negative moral consistency, or a vicious cycle, is a tendency to commit a less moral behaviour after another less moral behaviour. Within a door-in-the-face framework, Henderson and Burgoon (2014) found that individuals who reject an initial large prosocial request tend to refuse to make a donation in subsequent prosocial requests. Henderson and Burgoon (2014) suggest that the rejection of the initial prosocial requests presents a salient behavioural signal that the individual is more of egoistic than altruistic. Thus, having the self-representation as an egoistic individual motivates the individual to behave selfishly when the individual is requested to involve in subsequent prosocial actions.

The conditions under which people behave in a consistent or inconsistent way in their moral regulation are discussed in prior research. Conway and Peetz (2012) concluded that different moral mindsets, abstract and concrete mindsets, influence how people regulate their subsequent moral decisions. Construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2003), divides actions and events into two levels of construal, abstract and concrete. *First*, abstract construal is symbolic and often

isolated from its context. In relation to morality, activating an abstract moral mindset would lead people to keep a positive moral self-image and act according to moral norms. Thus, people are more inclined to choose a consistent option when they activate an abstract moral mindset (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Henderson & Burgoon, 2014). *Second*, concrete construal as opposed to abstract construal is rich in detail and contextualized. When people activate a concrete moral mindset, they tend to select alternative options in a subsequent moral decision. A concrete moral mindset indicates that one's moral self-image is already at the desired level; therefore pursuing goals divergent from the current moral self-image is more appealing (Conway & Peetz, 2012). For example, individuals who recalled recent (i.e., concrete) moral or immoral deeds exhibited moral balancing effects, while individuals who recalled temporally distant (i.e., abstract) moral or immoral behaviour demonstrated consistency effects (Conway & Peetz, 2012).

2.5.2. Moral balancing

Moral balance theory posits that people have a tendency to keep their moral self-image balanced over a given time span. The major argument of the theory is that regulating moral decisions depends on the moral actor's perception regarding his or her current moral balance. If the moral balance is positive, that is if the actor perceives that he or she has already completed sufficient moral behaviour in the past, the more likely it is that the actor will deviate from moral norms. Similarly, when the moral balance is negative, or the actor realises that he or she has performed

immoral actions in the past, the actor tends to perform moral actions to maintain balance (Nisan & Horenczyk, 1990).

The implementation of moral balance theory in prosocial contexts is not rare. Given that the moral balance theory is applicable in different cultures, both western and eastern (Ding et al., 2016; Mashuri, van Leeuwen, & van Vugt, 2018), the theory has received attention from scholars. A number of studies have scrutinised the different moral balancing effects: moral licensing and moral cleansing, that are discussed more thoroughly below.

2.5.2.1. Moral licensing

Moral licensing is a tendency to commit something immoral after previously engaging in moral acts. Moral licensing started to receive attention following the publication of Monin and Miller (2001) work, which argued that after people expressed a non-prejudiced opinion, they are more likely to state a prejudiced view. The article contradicted the well-established principle of self-consistency (Bem, 1972; Jones & Koenig, 2018), which suggests that individuals have a strong inclination to have a consistent moral self-image. Following the article, moral licensing theory was widely used to explain motivation and behaviour in several research domains such as racist attitudes (Efron, Cameron, & Monin, 2009; Merritt et al., 2012), environmentally friendly behaviour (Mazar & Zhong, 2010; Meijers, Noordewier, Verlegh, Zebregs, & Smit, 2018), consumer purchasing decisions

(Huber, Goldsmith, & Mogilner, 2008; Khan & Dhar, 2006) and charity donations (Conway & Peetz, 2012; Cornelissen et al., 2013; Jordan et al., 2011).

The argument that people have inclinations to license themselves to engage in a problematic behaviour after a prior moral behaviour is reinforced in consumer behaviour studies regarding sequential choices. For example, Mazar and Zhong (2010) argue that after purchasing environmental friendly products, people may act less prosocially and may be more likely to involve in a less moral behaviours. Mazar and Zhong (2010) invited students from a North America university to participate in a laboratory experiment. The participants were divided into two groups, those who see a conventional product online store and those who see a green product online store. Later, the participants were asked to either rate, or purchase the products. Finally, the participants were involved in a dictator game, where they can decide to either benefit others, or benefit themselves. The result showed that the participants who purchased the green products were less generous than those who purchased conventional products. In the same vein, Fishbach and Dhar (2005) suggest that dieters who believe that they have made significant progress in achieving their ideal weight are more likely to select a chocolate bar over an apple, which is conflicting with their focal goals of losing weight. Scholars argue that the feeling of satisfaction associated with making significant progress towards a goal engenders incongruent subsequent decisions (Huber et al., 2008).

Moral licensing occurs at both the individual and group level. Moral licensing at the individual level focuses on how an individual's prior moral-related behaviour affects the subsequent decision-making process. While moral licensing at

the individual level is relatively isolated from external influence, at group level, it is affected by the behaviour of the group to which the individual is attached (Lasarov & Hoffmann, 2018). For instance, when individuals believe that their fellow group members are more moral than comparable other-group members, they are more likely to behave immorally (Kouchaki, 2011).

Two theoretical views, moral credentials and moral credit can explicate the moral licensing mechanism. In the moral credentials model, one is allowed to change the significance of a subsequent action by reflecting on a prior morality related behaviour (Monin & Miller, 2001). That is, a prior moral behaviour gives credential to the individual to interpret the following ambiguous act as less immoral. For example, male participants who have initially rejected sexist statements subsequently favour male over female candidates for a job. Monin and Miller (2001) argued that this licensing effect occurs because making a clear statement that they were not sexist established a perspective that the male participants are moral people. This feeling gave the participants confidence that their following decision (to select a man over a woman for a position) was not related to sexism.

From the moral credit point of view, moral regulation is described as a moral account where individuals balance every moral conflict they encounter (Nisan & Horenczyk, 1990). Similar to a bank account, people may have a surplus of moral credit when they initially engage in a positive behaviour. Later they can use this credit to purchase a license to commit an immoral or unethical act. For instance, Khan and Dhar (2006) found that people's moral self-concept is boosted after performing ethical behaviour, therefore they feel licensed to engage in a less moral

act afterwards. Rather than labelling a subsequent immoral behaviour as a morally ambiguous deed, as explained by the moral credentials model, people acknowledge that they are about to do something immoral, but still do it, because their good initial behaviour earns them the right to do so (Merritt et al., 2010). However, the moral credit model is less effective than the moral credentials model in situations where the target behaviour is morally ambiguous (Mullen & Monin, 2016), or where individuals strategically select a prior behaviour that can be used to justify the target behaviour (Merritt et al., 2012).

Regardless of the mechanism, the moral licensing effect permits one to perform less moral or morally problematic behaviours (Miller & Effron, 2010). In Monin and Miller (2001), participants who previously rejected sexism feel that they are licensed to express something morally problematic, job-related sexism. Not giving to a charity is also considered a less moral deed until one is convinced that he or she is a moral person due to the individual's prior moral actions (Sachdeva et al., 2009). Furthermore, moral licensing generates confidence that the deviation from moral standards is acceptable not only for oneself but also for others. In their second study, Nisan and Horenzyk (1990) found that an individual who recently behaved immorally is evaluated more negatively for a bad deed than those who performed the same act but recently behaved morally.

2.5.2.2. Moral cleansing

People strive to be morally consistent, in the eyes of others but also for themselves. Internally, holding a positive moral self-image is desirable because being moral is a basic human need (Prentice et al., 2018). Externally, people are motivated to behave morally because of the existence of social norms in regulating moral rewards and punishments for those who behave in moral or immoral ways (White & Peloza, 2009). Although people strive to be morally consistent, there are times when people fail to maintain a moral self-image and fall below their moral ideals. When people violate their moral standards, they often experience discomfort and subsequently attempt to restore moral self-image (Klass, 1978).

Moral cleansing is defined as efforts to reduce the feeling of immoral discomfort after a moral transgression, with the goal to re-establish moral self-image (Sachdeva et al., 2009). West and Zhong (2015) classify moral cleansing into three categories: restitution cleansing, behavioural cleansing and symbolic cleansing. First, restitution cleansing aims to repair the moral transgressions itself. For example, when people realise that sacred values have been violated, they may engage in actions believed to reaffirm those values. Second, behavioural cleansing is a tendency to counterbalance moral self-image across different domains. People may commit wrongdoing in a domain and try to cleanse the transgression in another domain. Stone, Wiegand, Cooper, and Aronson (1997), found that participants were more inclined to donate to a charity after being asked to recall their risky sexual activities. Third, symbolic cleansing is considered an easier way to balance ethical dissonance because it uses metaphorical materials to wash away previous immoral

actions. Rooted in religious ceremonies (e.g. baptism for repentance), physical cleansing is believed to have relation with moral cleansing. In one study, Zhong and Liljenquist (2006) found that those who recollected an immoral past behaviour were more likely to select an antiseptic wipe, which symbolises a cleansing product, over a pencil.

Scholars attempt to illuminate moral cleansing by using different theories, such as: (1) Moral balance theory (Nisan & Horenczyk, 1990); (2) Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1962); and (3) Self-completion theory (Gollwitzer & Kirchhof, 1998). Moral balance and cognitive dissonance theories depict moral cleansing as a readiness to repair a moral imbalance as a result of moral transgression (Sachdeva et al., 2009; Schlegelmilch & Simbrunner, 2018). Similarly, self-completion theory highlights the failure to meet one's standards of desired identity, which subsequently drives individuals to perform a compensatory action to attain alternative symbols of the desired identity. Self-completion theory was extended to the area of morality by Jordan et al. (2011) when they argued that people are inclined to perform moral actions after immoral ones. The theories above agree that prosocial behaviour may restore moral self-image and facilitate an individual to attain a cherished identity.

Moral cleansing, similar to moral licensing, can operate on both an individual level and a group. Conducting a study in real-world conflict, Mashuri et al. (2018) found that when members of an ethnic group are reminded of the group's wrongdoing towards another ethnic group, a sense of perpetratorhood of individuals is increased. This collective feeling of guilt then contributed to positive attitudes

towards the out-group members. Scholars agree that the feeling of collective guilt is initiated when an individual identifies himself as a member of a group, therefore, represents the group's interests instead of the individual's (Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006).




Figure 2.2. Moral balancing effects

Although rooted in the same theory of moral balance, moral licensing and moral cleansing have contradictory effects on society (Sachdeva et al., 2009). Moral licensing contributes negatively to society for its ability to uncover an egoistic side of good people, sometimes even without losing their morality. Prosocial studies on moral licensing have demonstrated that after engaging in moral actions, an individual exhibits reluctance to donate in order to achieve moral balance without the feeling of being a bad person (Conway & Peetz, 2012; Jordan et al., 2011). In contrast, moral cleansing or moral compensation contribute positively to society as it

leads the “sinners” to act prosocially and to perform moral actions (Ding et al., 2016).

2.5.3. Moral balancing effects at two different points in time

Moral balancing effects include two moral-related decisions, whether they are taken immediately or within a certain period of time. Whilst immediate decisions have received attention from scholars, studies that examine moral balancing effects at two different points in time are still rare. One of a few examples of research pertaining to time delay in moral balancing effects was a set of studies conducted by Cascio and Plant (2015). Across four experiments, prospective moral licensing was examined by asking participants to make a prosocial decision after the participants agreed to take part in a charity or a blood drive in the future. This study provided evidence to suggest that moral balancing effects work effectively within a time delay between one prosocial action and another. Although the study by Cascio and Plant (2015) considers two prosocial actions at different time points, the decisions to perform the two prosocial actions are made immediately which one decision follows another straight away.

A time delay between one moral decision and another does not necessarily diminish the moral balancing effect. In a field experiment, Padelford and White (2009) measure participants’ perspectives regarding the morality of profit-making by companies at two points in time, with a six-month gap between the first survey and the second one. They found that participants changed their moral views about

company's profit-making in the second survey. They argued that the shift of moral views between the first and the second survey was influenced by an external factor, such as news media coverage. Additional support is available from a study from McCabe and Michelson (2015). In their field experiments, they found that almost 40% of participants who rejected the first prosocial request complied with the second prosocial request. The time delay between the first and the second prosocial request was an hour to three days.

2.6. Message appeals in promoting donations

Charities encounter aggressive competition with other charities in garnering donations, which requires them to apply effective marketing techniques to attract donors (Bendapudi et al., 1996). The common techniques to promote donations is by communicating good causes using pictures, messages and the combination of the two (Small & Verrochi, 2009). Presenting pictures of the needy or the helped beneficiary in front of donors may increase the importance of making donations (Bendapudi et al., 1996). Information sent by pictures may induce both positive emotions such as empathy and happiness and negative emotions such as guilt, fear and sadness of the potential donors, which subsequently may generate donations (Fisher & Ma, 2014). Although presenting pictures of the beneficiary may affect donors' positive responses, if donors are attentive to charity messages and are sufficiently motivated to read carefully the printing materials, such information sent by the pictures may lose its powers (Small & Verrochi, 2009). This indicates the

importance of charitable messages that may determine the effectiveness of a prosocial campaign.

Since there is no single charitable message appeal fits with all donors, charities attempt to approach potential donors by presenting charitable messages that are in line with the donors' characteristics. For instance Laufer, Silvera, McBride, and Schertzer (2010) suggest that people in individualistic cultures are more likely to help when the charitable message focuses on the roles of the charity instead of the donors in helping other people in need. In contrast, people in collectivistic cultures are more likely to contribute when the message highlights the roles of the donors rather than the roles of the charity in helping others. In addition, the same characteristic may fit with more than one charitable message type. For example, Ye et al. (2015) found that people in an individualistic cultural context demonstrate more inclination to donate when they are exposed to a charitable message appeal that highlights the benefits to others rather than the benefits to oneself. Inversely, people in collectivistic cultures are more likely to donate when they see self-benefits rather than others-benefit message appeals.

Charitable message appeals often contain information regarding the outcomes of the prosocial actions performed by the donors. Such outcomes may influence the target beneficiary, the donor or combination of both. Amatulli, De Angelis, Peluso, Soscia, and Guido (2017) use negative and positive message framing to inform respondents that their decisions to involve (or not) in an environmentally friendly campaign would affect the environment either in positive or negative way. Implicitly, the message framing also indicates that purchasing an

environmentally friendly product can position a consumer as a pro-environment kind of person (i.e., positive framing), while purchasing a non-environmental friendly product leads the consumer to feel ashamed about him/herself (i.e., negative framing). Therefore, message framing is not only focused on the interest of the cause, which is generally to help other people in need (Bendapudi et al., 1996), but also to the interest of the donors.

2.7. Egoistic and altruistic charitable message appeals

Prosocial behaviour literature is predominantly presented in the contexts of helping interventions (Levine, Prosser, Evans, & Reicher, 2005), monetary donations (Shang, Reed, & Croson, 2008), volunteering (White & Peloza, 2009), blood donation (Mellström & Johannesson, 2008) and organ donation (Pessemier, Bemmaor, & Hanssens, 1977). While each context has unique characteristics, they all investigate motives behind prosocial actions, whether to benefit oneself or other people in need. Thus, two types of appeals are often explored in prosocial literature: other-benefit and self-benefit messages (Feiler, Tost, & Grant, 2012; Green & Peloza, 2014; White & Peloza, 2009; Ye et al., 2015). Other-benefit message appeals, or altruistic appeals, highlight the direct impact that donation will have on the beneficiary, even if sometimes the helper's welfare must be sacrificed. The presence of empathy in a prosocial action plays an important role to examine whether the helping motivation was more altruistic or egoistic. Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, and Birch (1981) find that when empathy is high, individuals help victims based on altruistic rather than egoistic reasons.

However, previous research suggests that people tend to assume altruistic actors have a personal investment in their good deeds, meaning that they are motivated more by egoistic interest rather than genuine altruism (Barasch, Levine, Berman, & Small, 2014). In line with that, self-benefit or egoistic appeals allow potential donors to obtain rewards for their prosocial behaviour (Kim, 2014). The theory of self-interest states that individuals are selfish in nature, indicating that people attempt to maximise benefits for themselves even in charitable donations, an action that appears selfless (Ye et al., 2015). The rewards for acting altruistically can be manifested in various forms, such as monetary compensation (Mellström & Johannesson, 2008), tax-deduction benefits (Feldstein & Clotfelter, 1976) or reputational benefits (White & Peloza, 2009). Prosocial literature also notes that people may reap emotional benefits from their good deeds. Individuals may expect to gain happiness (Dunn, Aknin, & Norton, 2014), to experience a warm glowing sensation, or a good feeling about oneself after helping (Andreoni, 1990) and to avoid the feeling of guilt for not helping (Chang, 2014).

Individuals donate because of either the motivation to benefit the self, other people or a blend of the two (Bendapudi et al., 1996). The debate regarding which message appeal is more effective in eliciting willingness to donate remains intense (White & Peloza, 2009). Proponents of self-benefit appeals relate prosocial behaviour with a cost-benefit analysis in which people engage in charity since they are aware of favourable incentives for themselves (Ferguson, Farrell, & Lawrence, 2008; Holmes, Miller, & Lerner, 2002). In contrast, due to its nature as a non-commercial communication, which emphasises altruism, some scholars believe that

other-benefit messages are more successful in gaining people's interest in donating (Fisher et al., 2008; Pessemer et al., 1977). For example, Mellström and Johannesson (2008) found that the blood donations declined by nearly half when the charity offered money to the participants. Although this crowding-out effect is only significant for females, the finding indicates that altruistic messages are still more powerful than their egoistic counterparts in certain contexts. The third form of message appeal is a mixture of egoistic and altruistic – whereby practitioners simply place the two together in a message. Feiler et al. (2012) argue that mixing both message appeals would have a negative effect on the willingness to donate since the presence of both motives will increase the persuasive intent of the message and subsequently lead to negative responses to the charity.

The effectiveness of different message appeals (i.e., self-benefit or other-benefit) in garnering donations vary in different contexts. For instance, self-benefit appeals are more effective than other-benefit appeals in private condition when the donation is made without the presence of others. In contrast, other-benefit appeals generate more donation when it is made in public (Green & Peloza, 2014; White & Peloza, 2009). Besides the variation in public accountability, self and other benefit appeals also work differently in terms of donation types. Kulow and Kramer (2016) suggest that when a consumer's belief in karma is high, time donations works better than money donations if the charity uses other-benefit appeals. The discrepancies between time and money donations are discussed in the following section.

2.8. Time versus money donations

Time and money are multifaceted constructs which have received extensive attention from prosocial scholars (Mogilner & Aaker, 2009). Time and money are the most common resources that people spend on donations, yet people strive to save them, pursue them, worry over them and use them more efficiently (Macdonnell & White, 2015). However, time and money have different psychological characteristics, which leads people to have different preferences in spending the resources. For instance, time is less fungible than money, it is perishable and cannot be stored physically (Mogilner & Aaker, 2009), as a consequence, people are more careful in spending time. Relative to giving money, people are more selective in giving time to others, which makes assessing the qualities of the relationship between the time giver and the recipient is crucial (Reed, Kay, Finnel, Aquino, & Levy, 2016). This helps to explain why when individuals contemplate the concept of time, they prefer to spend time with others they are close with, such as family and friends (Mogilner, 2010).

An individual who gives money and one who donates time both involve moral behaviour (Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 2007), although the psychological properties of focusing on either money or time are distinct. Notably, when people are primed to think about money instead of time, they are less ethical, less active socially and more hardworking (Mogilner, 2010). Activating the concept of money drives people to be self-sufficient, a psychological state where people focus on achieving their own objectives and tend to be detached from others (Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2008). This is not to say that spending money is always self-centred and

separate completely from the interests of others. Dunn et al. (2014) argue that when people spend money for others' benefits, the donors may reap the feeling of happiness, although the act can be considered as less than an altruist behaviour (Chang, 2014). In contrast, giving time to others makes an individual experience a personal connection with the beneficiary and consequently shifts one's focus to others rather than oneself (Mogilner & Aaker, 2009).

Spending either time or money on a prosocial act may affect one's subsequent prosocial decisions. Liu and Aaker (2008) suggest that merely asking people to contemplate donating either their time or money to a charity would generate different responses to a sequence prosocial decision. People are more generous with their money when they were asked previously to donate their time, compared with if they were initially asked to donate their money. Being asked about making a time donation instead of a monetary donation directs people to focus on emotional states such as happiness, and a higher inclination to be involved in a prosocial behaviour (Liu & Aaker, 2008; Mogilner, 2010). In contrast, money as a major currency of economic transactions leads people to attempt to maximise their personal benefits (Liu & Aaker, 2008), partly because money enables individuals to attain goals without help from other people (Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006).

2.9. Theoretical framework

The literature review has discussed the theories and concepts relevant to establishing a set of research questions for the following studies. It starts by

discussing the prosocial literature in general, situational factors that may lead an individual to engage in prosocial behaviour, the utilitarian principle in moral regulation, moral balance theory and concludes by presenting different charitable message appeals. In summation, the following figure illustrates the theoretical framework for the current study.




Figure 2.2. Theoretical framework

2.10. Research questions

The aforementioned discussion regarding how moral consistency, moral balancing and message appeals may influence donation intention points to the overarching research question: *“What is the relationship amongst moral consistency, moral balancing, and message appeals in a consecutive prosocial decision?”* This overarching research question is followed by five sub-research questions as elaborated below.

Research in prosocial literature has exhibited that two prosocial behaviours are related. The relationship between two consecutive prosocial behaviours can follow either the principles of moral consistency or moral balancing. Looking at a simple relationship between two prosocial behaviours regardless of the motivations behind the behaviour, one may determine which moral regulation principle applies to the prosocial context.

Research question 1 : *“What is the relationship between a prosocial decision with a prior prosocial decision?”*

Previous research has demonstrated that moral balancing effects occur when individuals recall moral decisions (Conway & Peetz, 2012). For instance, recalling an event when one was being altruistic or egoistic would heighten tendencies to respond either positively or negatively to prosocial requests. The recalling event process has joint impacts with numbers of other factors in influencing prosocial decisions, such as ethical mind-sets (Cornelissen et al., 2013), moral identity (Ding et al., 2016; Jordan et al., 2011), conceptual abstraction (Conway & Peetz, 2012)

and regulatory focus (Schwabe, Dose, & Walsh, 2018). However, to the researcher's knowledge, studies that included message appeals as one of the factors that affect prosocial behaviours in a moral balancing framework are rare. Thus, the first study of this thesis attempts to close this gap by examining an interaction effect between event recall and message appeals towards donation intention. This is important because this study builds a foundation of empirical evidence as well as provides answers to the overarching research question. Therefore, the second research question is as follows.

Research question 2 : *“Is the relationship between event recall (i.e., immoral event vs. moral event) and donation intention moderated by message appeals (self-benefit vs. other benefit charitable message appeals)?”*

The interaction between event recall and message appeals in influencing donation intention provides empirical support for moral balance theory. It is important to see whether this mechanism is applicable in a more practical approach as well. In a prosocial behaviour context, moral balance theory contends that when people are involved in consecutive prosocial events, their prosocial motivations may not be consistent. That is, the influence of a prior donation behaviour on the current donation behaviour can be observed by the motivations of the individual. The findings would contribute to moral balance and message appeals literature, as well as having practical implications.

Research question 3 : *“Is the relationship between charity responses towards other-benefit message in the first charity request and the*

donation intention in the subsequent charity request moderated by message appeals (self-benefit vs. other-benefit) in the second charity request?”

Three mediating factors are identified in moral balancing literature, namely moral credit (Lin, Ma, & Johnson, 2016), moral distress (M. Gollwitzer & Melzer, 2012) and moral status which is operationalised from moral credit and moral distress. In order to confirm that the moral balancing mechanism works in the current study's framework, research question 5 is formulated to ask:

Research question 5 : *Do moral credit, moral distress and moral status mediate the effects of charity responses in the first charity request on the donation intention in the second charity request?*

2.11. Conclusion

The aforementioned discussion regarding how moral consistency and moral balancing principles, as well as message appeals may influence donation intention leads to the overarching and several sub-research questions. The following chapters are basically intended to answer the research questions.

Chapter 3 – Hypotheses development

3.1. Introduction

This chapter is the extension from the previous one, literature review. In this chapter, the review of the literature is used as the basis to generate hypotheses. It presents moral consistency, moral balancing and moderated mediation hypotheses. In the final section of this chapter, all the hypotheses are summarised.

3.2. Moral consistency hypothesis

Moral consistency mainly relates to people's attempt to maintain positive moral image both to themselves and to others. Thus, preserving good image in front of other people can be considered as a self-presentation behaviour (Leary & Kowalski, 1990). For example, using foot-in-the-door technique, Rind and Benjamin (1994) found that individuals whose impression management concerns are augmented tend to comply with a second request compared with those whose impression management concerns are not heightened. That is, people tend to be more consistent when others observe them than when they are alone. Although impression management theory is considered as one of explanations of moral consistency principle (Guéguen & Jacob, 2001), literature of moral consistency

revealed that people are motivated to be morally consistent even without the presence of others (Baca-Motes et al., 2012).

The notion that a moral decision follows a prior moral decision is supported by prior literature. The feeling of moral discomfort as a result of making inconsistent moral decisions leads people to behave morally consistent. Therefore, after performing a moral behaviour, people attempt to be consistent by performing another moral behaviour afterwards (Aquino et al., 2009). Similarly, performing a less moral behaviour would lead to performing another less moral behaviour afterwards because the initial behaviour forms a label that the individual is an egoistic person (Henderson & Burgoon, 2014). Hence, moral consistency hypothesis for this study is:

H₁ : After individuals agree to donate in the first charity request, their donation intention in the second charity request will be higher than those who reject the first charity request.




Figure 3.1. The influence of the responses to the first charity request to donation intention in the second charity request.

3.3. Moral balancing hypotheses: the interplay between prior moral behaviours and message appeals

Moral balancing is about an alteration of one's moral position, from immoral to moral or vice versa (Nisan & Horenczyk, 1990). In a prosocial context, moral balancing effects are associated with changes in people's inclination to help others. Given the nature of self-benefit and other-benefit messages, which motivate one to conduct prosocial behaviour, one may assume that together with the moral balancing effect, different message appeals may influence willingness to make a donation.

Although activating a utilitarian perspective may induce the moral balancing effect (Cornelissen et al., 2013), types of moral balancing: moral licensing and moral cleansing are processed differently (Mullen & Monin, 2016). Moral licensing occurs because individuals pursue multiple objectives that sometimes are in conflict (Merritt et al., 2010). For example, the moral licensing effect takes place when a job interviewer has to decide whether to hire a male or a female applicant for a stereotypically male job (Monin & Miller, 2001), or when a consumer is deciding whether to buy environmental friendly or conventional products (Mazar & Zhong, 2010). More specifically, moral licensing studies in the prosocial behaviour literature indicate that moral licensing effects result in the fulfilment of an individual's self-interest rather than the interest of others.

Prosocial scholars found that individuals in moral licensing conditions made fewer donations than those in non-moral licensing conditions (Jordan et al., 2011; Khan & Dhar, 2006). Furthermore, individuals reduced the amount of money donated when they planned to be involved in a prosocial act in the future (Cascio &

Plant, 2015). Thus, it can be suggested that egoistic rather than altruistic helping is more appealing after an individual is involved in moral actions. Similarly, it is proposed that compared with people who engaged in a less behaviour, people who behaved morally in their past will donate more when presented with self-benefit appeals. Since moral balancing is not only induced by performing actual moral or immoral behaviour, simply recalling moral related behaviour in the past would invoke such effects (Conway & Peetz, 2012; Jordan et al., 2011), the moral licensing hypothesis is:

H₂ : After individuals recall a moral event, a self-benefit message will generate more donation intention than an other-benefit message.

The theory of moral cleansing postulates that after wrongdoing, people strive to balance their moral self-image by performing positive moral behaviours (Nisan & Horenczyk, 1990); and since helping is considered as a way to repair transgressions, it can facilitate an individual to gain positive moral self-image. However, egoistic helping (i.e., helping to satisfy self-interest) may not be effective in shaping positive moral self-image because common social norms suggests that people should help others based on altruistic rather than egoistic reasons (Fisher et al., 2008). Therefore, it is expected that after individuals commit an immoral act, an attempt to restore moral self-image will be facilitated more effectively by altruistic compared to egoistic helping. Individuals who have previously committed immoral behaviour are more motivated to engage in altruistic helping compared with those who previously conduct moral action. This study proposes that the moral cleansing effect may occur

when individuals are engaged more in altruistic than egoistic helping. This study therefore predicts:

H₃ : After individuals recall an immoral event, an other-benefit message will generate more donation intention than a self-benefit message.

Hypotheses 2 and 3 are drawn as a research model in Figure 1 below.




Figure 3.2. The moderating role of message appeals in the relationship between event recall and donation intention.

3.4. Responses to charity requests based on *altruistic message* and the subsequent prosocial decision

Similar to the event recall tasks, individuals' responses to charity requests may engender moral balancing effects as well. Research has found that there are connections between two consecutive prosocial behaviours, even though the nature

of the relationships are not constant. For instance, recent research by Jones and Koenig (2018) suggests that supporting a social cause can increase subsequent donation to a charity. In contrast, Conway and Peetz (2012) found that conducting prosocial actions can decrease intention to be involved in a subsequent prosocial event.

Individuals have a strong desire to be moral in their everyday lives (Aquino & Reed, 2002). However, after individuals conduct or imagine conducting a prosocial behaviour, they lose some of their motivation to achieve morality goals (Cascio & Plant, 2015; Miller & Effron, 2010). According to moral balance theory, when prosocial actors focus on the outcomes of their prosocial actions, whether to benefit themselves or others, their prosocial motivations may differ between their former and later prosocial actions (Cornelissen et al., 2013). More specifically, after an individual conducts a prosocial action based on altruistic reasons, the individual tends to maximise the benefits for him/herself. Thus, the following moral licensing prediction is:

H₄ : After individuals agree to donate based on an other-benefit message in the first charity request, a self-benefit message will generate more donation intention than an other-benefit message in the second charity request.

Declining a charity request would lead to feelings of moral discomfort and eventually affect the individual's aspired moral self (Conway & Peetz, 2012). A low moral self-image would encourage individuals to take necessary action in order to return to balance (Nisan & Horenczyk, 1990). In this position, if the individual is

requested to engage in a subsequent prosocial behaviour, an altruistic reason is likely to be more effective than egoistic reason in order to repair moral self-image. Since an altruistic reason is accepted as more moral than an egoistic reason in helping others (White & Peloza, 2009), altruistic helping behaviour may assure oneself that he/she is actually a moral person. Therefore, the formal moral cleansing hypothesis is the following:

H₅ : After individuals refuse to donate based on an other-benefit message in the first charity request, an other-benefit message will generate more donation intention than a self-benefit message in the second charity request.




Figure 3.3. The moderating role of message appeals in the relationship between charity responses to other-benefit message in the first charity request and donation intention in the second charity request.

3.5. Mediation hypotheses

Moral balance theory posits that individuals experience a moral state after an initial moral-related decision, which regulates the subsequent moral-related decision. As such, this moral state as a mediator can explain the mechanism underlying the moral balancing theory, both moral licensing and moral cleansing. The potential mediating factors are moral *credit*, moral *distress* and moral *status*.

3.5.1. Moral credit hypotheses

Moral licensing theory suggests that behaving in a morally laudable way and performing a socially approved act licenses people to commit unethical acts (Jordan et al., 2011). However, prior to the subsequent moral-related decisions, individuals may have experienced an excess of moral self that may bridge prior moral behaviour to commit immoral decisions. As explained by the moral credit model, individuals gain moral credits for behaving morally, and moral debits for every unethical act (Lin et al, 2016) which fluctuates continually around an equilibrium, depends on an individual's history of moral and immoral deeds (Miller & Effron, 2010). Therefore, changes in moral credits can be examined after individuals engage in a moral-related behaviour.

A surplus of moral credit may create hesitation to perform altruistic behaviour. Since people strive to keep their moral balance (Nisan & Horenzyk, 1990), the excess of moral credit can be used to purchase immoral acts, including giving less in present donations than previous donations (Sachdeva et al., 2009) or performing egoistic helping. Thus, when an individual agrees to perform a prosocial act based on altruistic messages in the first charity request, the individual would

experience an excess of moral credit and feel licence to engage in egoistic helping in the subsequent charity event. By contrast, if individuals refuse a charity request based on an altruistic message, they will experience a deficit of moral credit. Consequently, in a subsequent charity request, they tend to comply more with altruistic message appeals than egoistic message appeals in order to gain positive moral self-image. This theory informs the next hypotheses, which states:

- H₆ : Charity responses to *other-benefit* message in the first charity request influence the perceived moral credit. Compliance to a charity request based on an other-benefit message is associated with a higher moral credit while a rejection is related to a lower moral credit.
- H₇ : The relationship between moral credit and donation intention in the subsequent charity request is moderated by message appeals in the second charity request (self vs. other benefit). Moral credit increases donation intention in the second charity request only when a self-benefit message appeal is used, not an other-benefit message.
- H₈ : Moral credit mediates the relationship between charity responses to first charity request and donation intention in the second charity request. The mediation is moderated by message appeals in the second charity request.




Figure 3.5. The mediating role of moral credit in the relationship between charity responses in the first charity request and donation intention in the second charity request.

3.5.2. Moral distress hypotheses

The investigation of moral cleansing effects in a prosocial context is based on how performing altruistic behaviour links to relieving negative emotions generated by moral transgressions (Klass, 1978). In support of this argument, prior studies suggest that emotional distress (Eisenberg et al., 1989) and personal sadness (Cialdini et al., 1987) elevate compliance towards prosocial requests.

Moral balance theory postulates that when moral self-image is lower than the moral standard, people become motivated to engage in corrective behaviours (Nisan & Horenczyk, 1990). Moral distress for example, is a negative emotion that arises when individuals encounter threats to their moral self-image after violating moral standards. For instance, M. Gollwitzer and Melzer (2012) found that participants

experience moral distress when they play violent video games, particularly when the games include violence against human characters. People address moral distress by physically cleaning themselves (M. Gollwitzer & Melzer, 2012; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006) or conducting prosocial behaviors in order to establish their moral self-image. However, since altruistic helping is morally more desirable than egoistic helping in repairing moral self-image, the former will generate a stronger effect than the latter. Therefore, after an individual refuses the first charity request based on an altruistic message, the individual's moral distress level is relatively high, which leads to altruistic helping in a subsequent charity request. The following hypotheses are:

- H₉ : Charity responses to an *other-benefit* message in the first charity request influence the perceived moral distress. Compliance to a charity request is associated with a lower moral distress while a rejection is related to a higher moral distress.
- H₁₀ : The relationship between moral distress and donation intention in the subsequent charity request is moderated by message appeals in the second charity request (self vs. other benefit). Moral distress decreases donation intention in the second charity request only when a self-benefit message appeal is used, not an other-benefit message.
- H₁₁ : Moral distress mediates the relationship between charity responses to first charity request and donation intention in the second charity request. The mediation is moderated by message appeals in the second charity request.




Figure 3.6. The mediating role of moral distress in the relationship between charity responses in the first charity request and donation intention in the second charity request.

3.5.3. Moral status hypotheses

Individuals use particular guidelines in making moral-related decisions which can be in the forms of moral standard (Bandura, 1986) or activation of prior moral decisions (Baca-Motes et al., 2012; Sachdeva et al., 2009). Prior research has used moral identity, an extent to which being moral is central to one’s identity (Hardy & Carlo, 2011), as a construct that determines an individual’s moral decision. However, there are inconsistent findings in how moral identity affects moral behaviours. For instance, while Aquino et al. (2009) argue that moral identity positively influences moral behaviour, Sachdeva et al. (2009) suggest that moral identity increases the likelihood to perform a less moral behaviour. Although moral identity is considered as a mixture between situational factors and personality traits

(Aquino et al., 2009; Aquino & Reed, 2002), it is mostly accounted as something that is relatively constant across conditions (Hardy & Carlo, 2011).

Moral status is an individual's moral state, which is considered as a point of reference in deciding to behave morally or less morally when the individual encounter a moral dilemma. Although moral identity may influence moral actions (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Hardy & Carlo, 2011) as what moral status is capable of, unlike moral identity which is a set of moral traits, moral status is affected directly by one's prior moral behaviour. In this study, moral status is a combination between positive and negative emotions experienced by an individual as a result of responses to a prosocial request. Moral status is operationalised by accumulating two moral concepts, moral credit (Lin et al., 2016) and moral distress (M. Gollwitzer & Melzer, 2012). These two concepts represent the current position of moral status either positively, when an individual experiences an excess of moral credit, or negatively, when moral distress is considerably higher than moral credit. Thus, the following hypotheses are:

H₁₂ : Charity responses to an *other-benefit* message in the first charity request influence the perceived moral status. Compliance to a charity request based on an other-benefit message is associated with a higher moral status while a rejection is related to a lower moral status.

H₁₃ : The relationship between moral status and donation intention in the subsequent charity request is moderated by message appeals in the second charity request (self vs. other benefit). Moral status increases donation

intention in the second charity request only when a self-benefit message appeal is used, not an other-benefit message.

H₁₄ : Moral status mediates the relationship between charity responses to first charity request and donation intention in the second charity request. The mediation is moderated by message appeals in the second charity request.




Figure 3.7. The mediating role of moral status in the relationship between charity responses at the first charity request and donation intention in the second charity request.

3.8. Summary of hypotheses

Following hypotheses as depicted below in Table 2 were developed on the basis of the literature review.

Table 3.1. Summary of research questions and hypotheses

Research questions and hypotheses	Study
<p>RQ1 : “What is the relationship between a prosocial decision with a subsequent prosocial decision?”</p>	<p>Study 2 & Study 3</p>
<p>H₁ : After individuals agree to donate in the first charity request, their donation intention in the second charity request will be higher than those who reject the first charity request.</p>	
<p>RQ2 : “Is the relationship between event recall (i.e., immoral event vs. moral event) and donation intention moderated by message appeals (self-benefit vs. other benefit charitable message appeals)?”</p>	<p>Study 1</p>
<p>H₂ : After individuals recall a moral event, a self-benefit message will generate more donation intention than an other-benefit message.</p>	
<p>H₃ : After individuals recall an immoral event, an other-benefit message will generate more donation intention than a self-benefit message.</p>	
<p>RQ₃ : “Is the relationship between charity responses towards <i>other-benefit</i> message in the first charity request and the donation intention in the second charity request moderated by message appeals (self-benefit vs. other-benefit) in the second charity request?”</p>	<p>Study 2 & Study 3</p>
<p>H₄ : After individuals agree to donate based on <i>an other-benefit</i> message in the first charity request, a self-benefit message will generate more donation intention than an other-benefit message in the second charity request.</p>	
<p>H₅ : After individuals refuse to donate based on <i>an other-benefit</i> message in the first charity request, an other-benefit message will generate more donation intention than a self-benefit message in the second charity request.</p>	

RQ4 : Do moral credit, moral distress and moral status mediate the effects of charity responses in the first charity request on the donation intention in the second charity request? Study 2 & 3

- H₆ : Charity responses to an *other-benefit* message in the first charity request influence the perceived moral credit. Compliance to a charity request based on an other-benefit message is associated with a higher moral credit while a rejection is related to a lower moral credit.
- H₇ : The relationship between moral credit and donation intention in the second charity request is moderated by message appeals in the second charity request (self vs. other benefit). Moral credit increases donation intention in the second charity request only when a self-benefit message appeal is used, not an other-benefit message.
- H₈ : Moral credit mediates the relationship between charity responses to first charity request and donation intention in the second charity request. The mediation is moderated by message appeals in the second charity request.
- H₉ : Charity responses to an *other-benefit* message in the first charity request influence the perceived moral distress. Compliance to a charity request is associated with a lower moral distress while a rejection is related to a higher moral distress.
- H₁₀ : The relationship between moral distress and donation intention in the second charity request is moderated by message appeals in the second charity request (self vs. other benefit). Moral distress increases donation intention in the second charity request when an other-benefit message appeal is used, not a self-benefit message.
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- H₁₁ : Moral distress mediates the relationship between charity responses to first charity request and donation intention in the second charity request. The mediation is moderated by message appeals in the second charity request.
- H₁₂ : Charity responses to an *other-benefit* message in the first charity request influence the perceived moral status. Compliance to a charity request is associated with a higher moral status while a rejection is related to a lower moral status.
- H₁₃ : The relationship between moral status and donation intention in the second charity request is moderated by message appeals in the second charity request (self vs. other benefit). Moral status increases donation intention in the second charity request when a self-benefit message appeal is used, not an other-benefit message.
- H₁₄ : Moral status mediates the relationship between charity responses to first charity request and donation intention in the second charity request. The mediation is moderated by message appeals in the second charity request.
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3.10. Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the literature from relevant theories as well as generated the overarching and the sub-research questions. It also developed the hypotheses that will be examined later on. The following chapter will present the overview of the research design that is employed to conduct this study.

Chapter 4 – Research design

4.1. Introduction

Based on the literature review at Chapter Two, Chapter Three reviewed the literature required to interpret, develop and support the research questions. The current chapter outlines the research design that is used to answer the research questions as well as provides an explanation of the employed methods. The chapter begins by presenting the paradigmatic research perspective and is followed by a discussion of the overall research methods. The ethical considerations are presented before the conclusion of the chapter.

4.2. Research Paradigm

Adopting a philosophical standpoint or research paradigm is important for researchers in justify the research methods (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Four research paradigms are positivism, post-positivism, critical theory and constructivism. Each paradigm is an indication of the of the researcher's philosophical assumptions regarding ontology, epistemology and methodology contents that have to be reflected in the research design (Crotty, 1998). Among the four research paradigms, this research is rooted in post-positivism. The paradigm holds that reality and one's perception of reality are not necessarily attached to each other. Therefore, post-

positivism assumes that findings of research are not always objective. Rather objectivity is the ideal standard to be achieved in research (Guba & Lincoln, 1994).

In order to answer the research questions, a research design is needed to determine what type of research approach is to be used, particularly to collect and analyse the data. Research approaches are categorised as exploratory, descriptive or causal (Aaker, Kumar, & Day, 2008). *First*, the exploratory approach is used to develop hypotheses from the gathered data by scrutinising possible links between variables. Hypotheses from exploratory research are either ill-defined or even do not exist. *Second*, descriptive approach uses hypotheses that are predictive, but also tentative and speculative. However, there is no clear cause-effect relationship tested in descriptive research. *Third*, causal research uses hypotheses that explicitly present cause-effect relationships. Causal research examines whether one variable affects another variable. This study uses the causal approach since the main objective of the study is to inspect the effect of independent variables (i.e. event recall and charity responses) towards dependent variables (i.e. donation intention). Thus, this research seeks to establish causal relationships which are examined from the perspectives of reliability, internal and external validity (Crotty, 1998).

4.3. Overview of methods

Four studies were conducted to examine the moderating effects of message appeals on the relationship between moral licensing or cleansing effects and intention to donate. In the first study, the data were collected in the laboratory with

QUT Business School students as the participants, while in the studies 2, 3a and 3b, the data were collected via Amazon Mechanical Turk portal. This study used experimental design and the data were analysed with Analysis of Variance technique. The sample types, the experimental research design and analytical technique are discussed more thoroughly below.

4.3.1. Sample type

Study 1 used data that were collected from students at Business School QUT in a laboratory. In social science studies, student samples are commonly used especially if the studies emphasise on human behaviour and decision-making process (Thomas, 2011) which are actually the main interests of this study. Critics to the use of student samples mostly regarding the homogeneous of the student samples compared with nonstudent samples in terms of their age, experience and cognitive skills (Stevens, 2011). Although student samples are generally not suitable for survey studies or qualitative methods, however, student samples are appropriate in behavioural laboratory experiments particularly when the study focuses accuracy and control in order to achieve internal validity (Thomas, 2011).

The data for studies 2 and 3 were collected from the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) survey pool. All participants were over 18 years old and were residing in the United States, the home of approximately 80% of the total MTurk workers (Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). It is possible that the participants state that they reside in the USA but actually they live outside the country. However, this deception can only be committed by sophisticated users and it is considered as a low risk. The participants were restricted from taking part in two or more studies.

Once the participants completed a study, they were given a specific qualification that prevent them from participating in the next studies.

MTurk has risen in popularity for a number of reasons. *First*, MTurk participants are more demographically diverse than common internet samples and student samples (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011) *Second*, data gathered from Amazon MTurk is as reliable as the data obtained through traditional methods such as student participants. In addition, MTurk offers a cheaper and a faster way to collect data (Paolacci et al., 2010). *Third*, MTurk participants are more attentive to tasks compared with traditional subject pool samples such as students. Hauser and Schwarz (2016) compared MTurk participants with collegiate participants in terms of their attention given to the same tasks. In three online experiments, they found that a higher proportion of MTurk participants passed the Instruction Manipulation Check (IMC) questions than collegiate participants did.

4.3.2. Experimental design

The main goal of this study is to address the overarching research question, *“What is the relationship amongst moral consistency, moral balancing, and message appeals in a consecutive prosocial decision?”* Thus, this study asks whether there is a relationship between independent variables and a dependent variable. In other words, this study seeks a causal relationship between two group variables. Correlational research designs are not sufficient to answer the research questions since they can only demonstrate that two or more variables are linked to each other, not necessarily related in a cause-effect relationship (Field & Hole, 2002). Therefore, a causal research design is required. Causal relationships only

exist if the effect was preceded by the cause, and there is no other plausible explanations for the effect except the cause (Aaker et al., 2008).

Experimental designs are used to investigate causal relationships between two or more factors due to their ability to address the requirements of causal relationships (Field & Hole, 2002). Experimental designs are able to (1) manipulate the cause and observe the effect afterwards, (2) see the relationship between the cause and the effect by inspecting the variations of the two, and (3) use various method to reduce the other plausible explanations (Shadish, 2002). In contrast, correlational research does not manipulate factors. Data is collected through a snapshot of variables at a point in time in the real world, which means the variables are not isolated and relationships observed are vulnerable to other confounding uncontrolled variables (Field & Hole, 2002). Therefore, this study follows experimental design procedures to address research questions.

Types of experimental design that are commonly employed in social studies are: randomised experiment, quasi-experiment and natural experiment (Shadish, 2002). *First*, in a randomised experiment, different treatment is given to different group (including no treatment), and the results are compared to find differences between groups. Random assignment causes the difference between groups are likely to be the results of the treatments, not the difference that have been existed before the study. *Second*, quasi-experiment is used when the researcher is unable to fully control over manipulation of the independent variables. For instance, it is may be difficult to randomly assign participants to distinct level of the independent variables due to ethical reasons (Field & Hole, 2002). *Third*, natural experiment is

used when the researcher aims to examine the difference between a treatment and a comparison group in a real-world occurrence, therefore, it can increase the external validity of the study (Shadish, 2002). Natural or field experiments are less common than randomised experiments in marketing field, arguably because it is more complicated to conduct, lasts for a longer time and is more expensive than randomised experiments (Malhotra, Hall, Shaw, & Oppenheim, 2006).

4.3.3. Analytical technique

In order to analyse the collected data, a statistical technique, in particular an ANOVA was used in the studies. The results of ANOVA can identify an interaction between independent variables and the main effect of each independent variable towards dependent variable (Shadish, 2002). ANOVA is particularly useful for experimental designs where it controls one or more independent variables to examine the effect on a dependent variable (Hair, Anderson, Babin, & Black, 2010). ANOVA was selected because in each study, there were independent variables, each of which contains two or three factors. A number of studies in moral balancing and prosocial motivation areas have used ANOVA to examine the interaction between two or more independent variables in influencing a dependent variable, as well as the main effect of each independent variable towards dependent variable (Cascio & Plant, 2015; Chang, 2014; Conway & Peetz, 2012; Cornelissen et al., 2013; White & Pelozo, 2009).

4.4. Ethical Considerations

Prior to commencing any data collection procedure, researchers are obligated to achieve ethical clearance from the Queensland University of Technology's Human Ethics Committee in accordance with the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (approval number: 1700000861). At the beginning of each survey, the purpose and expected benefits were explained to participants. This study was considered as having negligible risks. The participants were also informed that they are free to continue or discontinue their participation at any time without penalty.

4.5. Conclusion

This chapter has presented and justified the research design adopted in this thesis. It started by discussing the paradigmatic perspective of the thesis, followed by the overall research methods and ethical considerations in implementing the research. The following three chapters present the three studies undertaken for this thesis, along with the answers to the research questions.

Chapter 5 – Study 1

5.1. Introduction

This study aimed to address the second research question: “*Is the relationship between event recall (i.e., immoral event vs. moral event) and donation intention moderated by message appeals (self-benefit vs. other benefit charitable message appeals)?*” Following that, this study examined the willingness of participants to donate time after previously being asked to recall an event in their lives, when they either behaved morally or immorally. In particular, this study tested whether message appeals (self-benefit vs. other benefit messages) moderate the relationship between im(moral) event recall and intention to donate. This study predicted that moral licensing and cleansing effects occur when different message appeals are used.

Formally, the tested hypotheses were divided into moral licensing and moral cleansing hypotheses. Moral licensing hypothesis predicts that after individuals recall a moral event, a self-benefit message will generate more donation intention than an other-benefit message. Whereas, moral cleansing hypothesis states that after individuals recall an immoral event, an other-benefit message will generate more donation intention than a self-benefit message.

The methods that were used to conduct this first study are outlined in this chapter. First, it addressed the study design and how the participants were recruited. Second, it elaborated the stimuli and the experimental procedure used in the study. Third, it explains the instruments used to measure the manipulation checks, mediating and the dependent variables. Fourth, it presents the results of the statistical analysis. Finally, the results are discussed along with the conclusion of this chapter.

5.2. Methods

5.2.1. Pretest

A pretest was conducted to ensure that message appeals used in this study would create the expected effects. Sixty student participants took place in the pretest. Half of the participants saw an other-benefit message while the other half were presented a self-benefit message. Cronbach alpha ($\alpha = .92$) indicated that the dependent variable (i.e., donation intention) is reliable.

All participants were requested to answer four questions on 9-point scales adapted from White and Peloza (2009). The items were used to measure manipulation checks in the main study. Indexing of the perceived self and other-benefit demonstrated that participants in the self-benefit condition ($M = 3.98$, $SD = 1.62$) rated the message as more egoistic than participants in the other-benefit condition ($M = 2.83$, $SD = 1.62$); $t(58) 2.77$, $p < .001$). The pretest was successful, indicating that the items were considered acceptable to be used in the main study.

5.2.2. Design and participants

Participants were randomly distributed in a 2 (event recall: moral vs. immoral) x 2 (message appeals: self-benefit vs. other-benefit) between participant experimental design. Two hundred and four students participated in the study, 97 females (48%) and 107 males (52%). Sample size was considered sufficient for a factorial design since each group in the study consists of between 20 to 50 participants (Aaker et al., 2008).

5.2.3. Stimuli and procedure

Half of the participants were asked to recall an event in their lives when they behaved morally, while the other half were asked to recall an immoral event in their lives. Participants in the moral recall condition read the following instruction, “*Please recall an event when you were loyal to a friend, were generous when you could have been selfish, were kind to someone for no particular reason, or caring toward someone who needed you.*” In contrast, participants in the immoral recall condition were instructed to recall an event when they were *disloyal to a friend, were greedy, were mean or uncaring toward someone who needed them* (Conway & Peetz, 2012). A number of scholars stimulate moral licensing and moral cleansing effects by using this event recall task. Recalling a moral event would generate a moral licensing effect, while recalling immoral event would create a moral cleansing effect (Cornelissen et al., 2013; Ding et al., 2016; Schwabe et al., 2018; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006).

Following the first task, half of the participants in each condition were exposed to a charity advertisement, either focusing on a self-benefit or an other-benefit message (see Appendix B). The self-benefit message promoted the potential benefits that participants can reap if they make time donations. The advertisement emphasised egoistic messages such as: volunteering makes people feel less lonely, helps them through a personal problem, and increases their self-esteem. The other-benefit or altruistic message informed participants that their time donation would help cancer patients as well as the patient caregivers. Participants then were asked to indicate their willingness to donate time to a charity based on the advertisement they have just seen. The charity was Cancer Council Australia, a well-established non profit organisation with the main goal to ease the suffering of cancer patients. Featuring a credible charity increases the possibility that participants would be attentive to the message (Bendapudi et al., 1996). After responding to the dependent variable, participants responded to questions regarding the manipulation checks and demographic data. Participants then were debriefed and thanked.

5.2.4. Measures

Dependent variable. This study used a scale that assesses intention to donate time or to volunteer to a charity adopted from White and Peloza (2009), which consists of two items on a nine-point scale (1 = very unlikely, and 9 = very likely). Sample questions include “How likely would you to be to make a time donation (i.e., volunteer) to the Cancer Council Australia?”

Manipulation check. To confirm whether the self-benefit and other-benefit messages were successfully manipulated, participants evaluated each message using four items on 9-point scales (White & Peloza, 2009). Sample questions include “To what degree is this an altruistic appeal?” and “To what degree is this an egoistic appeal?” Indexes of the perceived self-benefit and other-benefit were created by reversing the scores of the first two items, and calculating the average score of other-benefit and self-benefit appeals. The higher the score of the index, the more egoistic the message.

Event recall coding. Two coders, blind to both conditions and hypotheses, were involved in coding the stories in the event recall task. They then assessed the morality of the recollected behaviours on 9-point bipolar scale (-4 = very immoral, 4 = very moral). The coders’ ratings were averaged as the final score. Intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) = .91, demonstrated a high initial interrater reliability. The coding procedure was adapted from Jordan et al. (2011).

5.3. Results

5.3.1. Data cleaning

All participants submitted complete data; therefore, no missing data was found. However, eleven participants were excluded from the main analysis for the following reasons. Three participants indicated that he or she could not recall any moral related event that was required by the task, while eight participants wrote unrelated moral events in the task.

5.3.2. Descriptive statistics

Descriptive analyses were performed. Cronbach alpha of donation intention ($\alpha = .91$) indicates a reliable internal consistency within the scales (Hinton, McMurray, & Brownlow, 2014). The dependent variable was inspected for normality. The assessment of the data encompassed of examination of skewness and kurtosis, as well as the graphical views of histograms and QQ plots. The Shapiro-Wilk test for normality recommends that donation intention is ranged within -1.00 and 1.00 for skewness and kurtosis (Field, 2013). Outside the range, there may be a serious normality issue in the data. The results showed that there was no normality violation of the dependent variable.

5.3.3. Manipulation checks

5.3.3.1 Message appeals manipulation check

Independent sample t-test showed that there was a significant difference between participants who were exposed to self-benefit and other-benefit messages regarding how they rated the appeals. The index of perceived self-benefit revealed that the participants in the self-benefit condition rated the message was more egoistic ($M = 4.66$, $SD = 2.30$) than those in the other-benefit condition ($M = 3.10$, $SD = 1.59$); $t(202) 5.66$, $p < .001$). This indicated that the message appeals worked properly in stimulating the desired responses from participants. Similar findings were obtained by White and Peloza (2009) when they examined the manipulations of message appeals in their studies.

5.3.3.2. Event recall manipulation check

The past moral events that participants described were typical everyday interpersonal relationships, such as lending money to relatives who needed it, giving food and money to homeless people, or taking care of a sick friend or family. The past immoral events were mostly regarding everyday social relationships, such as spreading gossip about a friend behind the friend's back, taking someone else's food, or lying to a person. The coders rated the morality of the stories written by the participants in moral and immoral event recall conditions differently. The index of morality indicated that participants in the moral event recall condition ($M = 3.25$, $SD = 1.48$) wrote more moral stories than those in immoral event condition did ($M = -2.09$, $SD = 1.66$); $t(202) = -24.23$, $p < .001$). Thus, it is concluded that the respondents have completed the event recall task instructions appropriately. Previous study by Jordan et al. (2011) found consistent results, where participants in each condition successfully completed the task given to them.

5.3.4. Hypotheses testing

5.3.4.1. Preliminary analysis

Age and gender were firstly employed as control variables in model testing since previous studies argued that the variation of age (Matsumoto, Yamagishi, Li, & Kiyonari, 2016) and gender (Espinosa & Kovářík, 2015) influence individuals' donating behaviours. However, since the presence of age and gender as the covariates did not affect the data pattern and the overall statistical results, they were omitted from the main analysis.

5.3.4.2. Main analysis

A two-way ANOVA was conducted to inspect the interaction between event recall and message appeals on the intention to donate time to charity. Event recall consisted of two levels of morality (i.e., moral and immoral), while message appeals included two levels (i.e., self-benefit and other-benefit). Although the results demonstrated no main effects of both event recall ($F(1, 200) = .06, p = .81$) and the message appeals ($F(1, 200) = .91, p = .34$) on donation intention, the interaction effect of the two independent variables on donation intention was significant ($F(1, 200) = 5.33, p = .02$). The interaction between event recall and message appeals in influencing donation intention is illustrated in the following figure.




Figure 5.1. The interaction effect of event recall and message appeals on donation intention.

As predicted, other-benefit message ($M = 5.82$, $SD = 2.11$) generated more donation intention than self-benefit message ($M = 4.75$, $SD = 2.29$) after the participants recalled immoral event ($t(99) = -2.42$, $p = .02$). This indicated that moral cleansing effect occurs in the study. That is, when people recalled immoral event, they tend to repair the moral self-image by performing altruistic rather than egoistic helping afterwards. However, this study did not find significant difference between self-benefit message ($M = 5.43$, $SD = 2.41$) and other-benefit message ($M = 4.99$, $SD = 2.47$) in moral event recall condition ($t(101) = .92$, $p = .36$). Although helping based on egoistic reason was higher than altruistic reason after people recalled moral event, the difference between these two helping motivations was not statistically significant. In other words, moral licensing effect was not found in this study.

Table 5.1. Study 1: Means of donation intention in each condition

		Message Appeals	
		Self-benefit	Other-benefit
Event recall	Immoral	4.75 (2.29)	5.82 (2.11)
	Moral	5.43 (2.21)	4.99 (2.47)

Figures in the bracket are standard deviations

The following table summarises the findings in the first study, and the support to the hypotheses developed in this study.

Table 5.2. Results of the hypotheses testing Study 1

Hypotheses	Results
H ₁ : After individuals recalled moral event, a self-benefit message will generate more donation intention than an other-benefit message.	Supported (<i>p-value</i> = .02)
H ₂ : After individuals recalled immoral event, an other-benefit message will generate more donation intention than a self-benefit message.	Not Supported (<i>p-value</i> = .36)

5.4. Discussion

The results of this study provide an answer to the second research question, “*Is the relationship between event recall (i.e., immoral event vs. moral event) and donation intention moderated by message appeals (self-benefit vs. other benefit charitable message appeals)?*” The statistically significant interaction between event recall task and message appeals was the evidence that there is a moderating role of message appeals in the relationship between event recall and donation intention. This provides initial evidence that message appeals play an important role in the association between moral balancing effects and prosocial behaviour.

As predicted, recalling immoral action compared to moral action led individuals to perform more altruistic than egoistic helping. This confirms moral cleansing theory, where people tend to behave morally after previously committing a moral transgression (Sachdeva et al., 2009). The moral balancing effect revealed in

this study was also consistent with a prior study by Cornelissen et al. (2013) who found that when people focus on the consequences of im(moral) actions, they are inclined to balance their following moral decisions. That is, when people think about the significance of their prosocial decision, whether it benefits the self or other people, they are more likely to make an inconsistent moral decision afterwards.

This study did not find moral licensing effects in the research model. It was expected that participants who recalled a moral event later give higher donation based on self-benefit than other-benefit message. However, there was no significant difference between donations based on self-benefit and other-benefit message appeals. There is a possible reason for this. Moral behaviour is something that has been learned from a young age (Eisenberg-Berg, 1979), internalised in individuals' personal norm and confirmed by social norms (Batson & Powell, 2003). Unlike immoral behaviour that is considered as a moral deviation that needs to be repaired (Klass, 1978), moral behaviour may be deemed as something "normal", or even is seen as an ethical obligation (Wilke & Lanzetta, 1982). Thus, moral behaviour for some people probably is not a type of deviation from a moral standard that needs to be balanced.

An interplay between event recall and message appeals in affecting donation intention was revealed, which confirmed that altruistic helping compensates previous immoral behaviours. Conversely, although not statistically significant, the data pattern showed that prior moral behaviour licenses individuals to perform egoistic helping. Different helping motivations (i.e., helping either to benefit oneself or others) then plays an important role in balancing the moral self-image of

individuals. However, since the event recall task is designed to frame participants with moral or immoral behaviour in general, the task does not exclusively represent donation behaviours. For instance, one of the participants described a moral event as the moment when she was loyal to her boyfriend. Another issue with event recall task is that its practical implication is not as strong as its theoretical implication. Therefore, the following study discusses individuals' responses to consecutive charity requests.

Although Study 1 has provided valuable information regarding the association between moral balancing effects and donation behaviour, the study does not inform the underlying theoretical mechanism of moral balance theory in the research model. In order to supply such information, the next study would explore the role of three potential mediators, namely moral credit, moral distress and moral status as the theoretical explanation of the moral balancing mechanism.

5.5. Conclusion

Chapter 5 has outlined the motivations to conduct the Study 1, the methods, the results of statistical analyses and the discussion. The next chapter describes in detail regarding the second study, including the attempts to address the limitations found in the first study.

Chapter 6 - Study 2

6.1. Introduction

The goal of this study was to address the limitation of Study 1 regarding the event recall task as the manipulation technique. Although Study 1 has produced a moral balancing effect, the event recall task used in the study has rather weak external validity. Study 2 uses a sequential decision procedure (Cascio & Plant, 2015; Khan & Dhar, 2006), where a prosocial decision is followed by another prosocial decision. Two prosocial events that the participants encountered were the ones when they saw the first and the second charity requests. Only an other-benefit message was used in the first charity request because altruistic message appeals are a common perspective of charitable organisations in communicating their activities (Bendapudi et al., 1996). Two different message appeals (i.e., other-benefit and self-benefit) were used in the second charity request.

This study predicted that moral consistency and moral balancing behaviours occur in a prosocial context. Moral consistency is examined by observing the direct relationship between two prosocial decisions, while moral balancing effects are inspected by investigating the moderating role of different message appeals (i.e., message appeal in the second charity request) in such relationship. Moral balancing effects occur when message appeals in the second charity request are inconsistent with the individuals' charity responses in the first charity request. Two consecutive

charity requests employed in this study were blood donation and time donation, two common charity requests in both daily lives and scientific studies (Bendapudi et al., 1996).

This study proposes that individuals would demonstrate moral consistency principle where a compliance with a charity request leads to more donation intention in the second charity request. However, the motivation of giving in the second charity request depends on how the individuals responds to the first charity request, which shows moral balancing effects. That is, if they comply with the first charity request, their donation in the second charity request would be higher on a self-benefit message. In contrast, if they decline the first charity request, they would donate higher on an other-benefit message in the second charity request.

Three mediation tests were conducted in this study to confirm the moral balancing mechanism. Moral deeds in the past give moral credit, and consequently license individuals to perform a subsequent less moral action (Sachdeva et al., 2009) as represented by an egoistic helping. In contrast, since individuals have tendencies to be morally consistent, transgressions to moral standard trigger the feeling of moral distress, which subsequently leads to corrective behaviours (Freedman, Wallington, & Bless, 1967; M. Gollwitzer & Melzer, 2012) by performing good deeds (Ding et al., 2016), as represented by an altruistic helping. Thus, this study aimed to investigate whether the relationship between charity responses at Time 1 and donation intention at Time 2 is mediated by moral credit and moral distress. In addition, this study examined the mediating role of moral status as a composite

variable of moral credit and moral distress. Thus, the mediating hypotheses are comprised of moral credit, moral distress and moral status hypotheses.

This chapter outlines the methods used in this study. First, it describes the study design and participant recruitment. Second, the stimuli and the experimental procedure are explained. Third, it elaborates the measurements of the variables. Fourth, it exhibits the results of the analysis. Last, it discusses the results.

6.2. Method

6.2.1. Pretest

Sixty MTurk workers participated in a pretest, and were compensated USD 0.50 for participating in the study. The aim of the pretest was to ensure that a charitable message from American Red Cross functions properly, since the message has not been used before. This pretest did not examine the effectiveness of the message from American Cancer Society since the message has been tested earlier in the Study 1. The participants were presented with the charitable message from American Red Cross and then were asked four item questions on a 9-point scale adapted from White and Peloza (2009) that were used to measure manipulation check in the main study. Two items asked the participants to rate how altruistic the message resulted in a higher mean score ($M = 7.73$, $SD = 1.62$) than the other two items asked the egoistic rate of the message ($M = 3.04$, $SD = 2.33$). Thus, in average, participants rated the message was more altruistic than egoistic.

Another objective of the pretest was to inspect the reliabilities of moral credit and moral distress variables. Cronbach alpha values showed that moral credit ($\alpha = .97$) are considered highly reliable, while moral distress ($\alpha = .68$) is considered moderately reliable (Hinton et al., 2014).

6.2.2. Design and participants

One hundred and forty-four adults took part in the study. The participants were invited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) where each participant earned 1.00 USD for their contributions. Participants were randomly distributed in two conditions, self-benefit message and other-benefit messages between participant experimental design. The mean age of participants was 35.38 years old ($SD = 9.87$), 70 were females (48%) and 75 were males (52%). Sample size is considered sufficient since the number of people in each group was between 20 to 50 participants (Aaker et al., 2008).

6.2.3. Stimuli and procedure

Participants were asked to respond to two charity advertisements. The first advertisement was from the American Red Cross (see Appendix C), asking to participate in a blood drive, while the second advertisement asked participants to donate time to the American Cancer Society (see Appendix D). Participants were informed that they would be asked to make hypothetical decisions regarding the content of the charity advertisements.

In the first round, participants were asked their willingness to participate in a blood drive. The charity message was an other-benefit message, which focused on the positive impacts of donating blood that can be achieved by those who need blood transfusions, such as anaemia patients, accident victims, and cancer patients. Participants then were asked to respond to an American Red Cross charity advertisement by indicating their willingness to make a blood donation. They were instructed to respond with binary answers, yes or no. After that, the participants answered a series of questions regarding potential mediators (i.e., moral credit, and moral distress). Following the mediator questions, participants answered the manipulation check questions and filler task questions. Fifteen simple math questions were used as filler task questions as adapted from Jordan et al. (2011). The goal of requesting participants to take a filler task is to eliminate any short-term memory effects before they were asked to answer the dependent variable's measures (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996).

In the second round of the experiment, participants were shown a charity advertisement from the American Cancer Society which asked them to volunteer. Participants in the first round then were randomly divided into two groups, consisting of those who see either the self-benefit message and other-benefit message. As in the first study, the self-benefit message highlighted the benefits of volunteering such as a good way to make friends, makes people feel better about themselves, and makes people feel needed. The other-benefit message informed them that the donor's time donation will support the cancer patients as well as the patient's caregivers. Participants then were asked to rate their willingness to

volunteer for the American Cancer Society. Next, participants answered the manipulation check, and demographic data questions. Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked.

6.2.4. Measures

Dependent variable. Identical to Study 1, this study adopted a scale used to measure an intention to donate time from White and Peloza (2009). The scale consists of two items on a nine-point scale (1 = very disinclined, and 9 = very inclined). Sample questions is, “How inclined are you to volunteer with the American Cancer Society?”

Blood donation intention. Intention to make a blood donation was measured by a dichotomous question, “Do you intend to make a blood donation to American Red Cross?” The question was answered on 2-point scales (1= Yes, 0 = No).

Moral credit. Moral credit was measured with a 4 item-scale adopted from Lin et al. (2016). Sample items are, “After I decided to donate blood (or not) to American Red Cross, I feel that I have built up my account of moral credit,” “After I decided to donate blood (or not) to American Red Cross, I feel that I have added my moral credit.” The questions were answered on 9-point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree).

Moral distress. The moral distress scale was adapted from M. Gollwitzer and Melzer (2012) consisted of four items. Sample item is, “How guilty did you feel

after decided to donate blood (or not) to American Red Cross?” and How much you enjoy your decision to donate blood (or not) to American Red Cross? (reverse coded). Participants answered the questions on 9-point scales (1 = not at all, 9 = very guilty).

Moral status. Moral status score was generated by subtracting the score of moral distress from moral credit. The goal was to obtain the gap between a current positive moral state (i.e., moral credit) and the negative one (i.e., moral distress).

Manipulation checks. Participants evaluated two charity messages they were exposed to in terms of the egoistic and altruistic contents using four items adapted from White and Peloza (2009) on 9-point scales. Sample questions were: “To what degree is that appeal associated with looking out for the interests of others?” and “To what degree is that appeal associated with looking out for your own interests?” As in the Study 1, the scores of the first two items were reversed, and the average scores were calculated to create the indexes of each message appeal. The higher the index score, the message is perceived as more egoistic rather than altruistic.

6.3. Results

6.3.1. Data cleaning

There was no missing data. Nevertheless, five participants were omitted from the study for the following reasons. Four participants indicated that they were unable to donate blood because of health issues. One participant indicated that s/he has

personal problems with one of the charities, and his preference had affected his answers.

6.3.2. Descriptive statistics

Descriptive analyses were performed to inspect reliability and normality of the continuous variables. Cronbach alpha of donation intention ($\alpha = .94$) and moral credit ($\alpha = .97$) showed a high level of internal consistency, whereas moral distress ($\alpha = .60$) showed a moderate level of internal consistency (Hinton et al., 2014). All continuous variables were inspected for normality. The inspection was the assessment of skewness and kurtosis, including the graphical displays of histogram and QQ plots. The results of Shapiro-Wilk test for normality showed that the variables are within a range of -1 and 1 for skewness and kurtosis. Therefore, there was no serious normality violations in the variables as suggested by Field (2013). Means and standard deviation of all continuous variables are presented in the table 6.1.

6.3.3. Manipulation checks

Manipulation checks were conducted for the charity advertisement by using independent sample t-test. The manipulation check for charity advertisement from American Cancer Society informed that the participants in the self-benefit and the other-benefit conditions rated the message differently. The index of perceived self-benefit appeals demonstrated that participants in the self-benefit condition indicated

that the message was more egoistic ($M = 5.02$, $SD = 2.50$) than those in the other-benefit condition ($M = 3.21$, $SD = 2.16$); $t(142) 4.72$, $p < .001$). The manipulation check for American Red Cross' advertisement showed that the two items asked the altruistic rate of the message resulted in a higher mean score ($M = 7.62$, $SD = 1.78$) than the other two items asked the egoistic rate of the message ($M = 2.99$, $SD = 2.08$). Thus, these results showed that the manipulations for this study were successful.

Table 6.1. Study 2: Means and standard deviation of time donation intention

Responses to the first charity request	Moral Credit	Moral Distress	Moral Status	Message appeals in the subsequent charity request	Donation Intention in the second charity request
Yes (N = 78)	5.34 (2.22)	3.21 (1.37)	2.13 (2.67)	Self-benefit	6.14 (2.06)
	4.85 (2.41)	4.24 (1.64)	.60 (3.06)	Other-benefit	4.28 (2.38)
No (N = 66)	4.79 (2.47)	4.06 (1.69)	.73 (3.66)	Self-benefit	4.50 (2.32)
	3.05 (2.23)	5.56 (1.22)	-2.52 (2.51)	Other-benefit	4.37 (2.24)

Figures in the bracket are standard deviations

6.3.4. Hypotheses testing

Age and gender were initially used as control variables in all hypotheses testing procedure since previous studies argued that differences of age (Matsumoto et al., 2016) and gender (Espinosa & Kovářik, 2015) affect prosocial behaviours. However, since the presence of age and gender as the covariates did not affect the

data pattern and the overall statistical results, they were excluded from the main analysis.

6.3.4.1. Moral consistency hypothesis

The number of participants who intended to donate blood was 78 (54%) while 66 (36%) rejected donating blood to the American Red Cross. An independent t-test was conducted to see whether the participants who refused and complied with the blood donation drive were different in time donation intention. Results showed that participants who said “Yes” showed more intention to donate time ($M = 5.28$, $SD = 2.39$) than those who said “No” to American Red Cross ($M = 4.44$, $SD = 2.27$); $t(142) 2.27, p < .05$). Regardless the type of message appeals was being used, the data pattern shows *consistency effect*, where people who agreed to donate blood in the first charity request later donated more time in the second charity request than those who refused to donate blood.

6.3.4.2. Moral balancing hypotheses

A two-way ANOVA test was conducted to examine the interaction effect of charity responses at Time 1 (Yes vs. No) and message appeals at Time 2 to donation intention. The interaction of the two independent variables significantly affected donation intention ($F(1, 140) = 5.30, p = .02$). There was also a significant main effect of the charity responses to the first charity request ($F(1, 140) = 4.22, p = .04$) and of the message appeals in the subsequent charity request ($F(1, 140) = 6.70, p = .01$) on donation intention in the subsequent charity request. These results confirmed that message appeals in the second charity request moderates the relationship

between charity responses to the first charity request and donation intention in the second charity request. Therefore, answered the third research question. The interaction effect is illustrated in the following figure.




Figure 6.1. The interaction effect of charity responses in the first charity request and message appeals in the second charity request on time donation intention in the second charity request.

To test the hypotheses (H₄ and H₅), a series of independent sample t-test was conducted. Participants responded to the blood donation drive differently, either to comply or to refuse (i.e., Yes vs. No). The differences between these two groups in responding to different message appeals at Time 2 were examined. *First*, the

difference of time donation intention between self-benefit and other-benefit conditions in the group of participants who complied with the blood donation drive (i.e., “Yes” group) was inspected. The results showed that there was a significant difference in time donation intention between participants who saw self-benefit message appeal (M = 6.14, SD = 2.06) and those who saw other-benefit message appeal at Time 2 (M = 4.28, SD = 2.38); ($t(76) = 3.71, p < .001$) after previously agreed to join the blood donation drive (i.e., “Yes” group).

Table 6.2. Study 2: Means and standard deviation of time donation intention in each condition

Responses to the first charity request	Message appeals in the subsequent charity request	
	Self-benefit	Other-benefit
Yes	6.14 (2.06)	4.28 (2.38)
No	4.50 (2.33)	4.37 (2.24)

Figures in the bracket are standard deviations

Second, an inspection of the difference between self-benefit and other-benefit conditions in the group of participants who refused to join the blood drive (i.e., “No” group) was conducted. Unlike the previous group, the difference between participants who saw self-benefit message appeal (M = 4.50, SD = 2.33) and those who saw other-benefit message appeal after previously declined blood donation request (M = 4.37, SD = 2.23) was not significant ($t(64) = .23, p = .82$).

6.3.4.3. Moral credit hypotheses

Charity responses and moral credit

An independent t-test was used to examine the relationship between the first charity responses (1 = Yes, 0 = No) and moral credit. As predicted, participants who complied with the charity request showed higher moral credit ($M = 5.11$, $SD = 2.31$) than those who refused the request ($M = 3.97$, $SD = 2.50$; $t(142) = 2.84$, $p = .005$). After participants agree to donate blood in the first charity request, their level of moral credit was significantly higher than those who rejected to join the blood drive.

Moral credit, message appeals and donation intention

Bootstrap moderation analysis (Process Model 1; Hayes, 2013) was conducted to inspect the moderating role of message appeals (1 = self-benefit, 0 = other-benefit) in the relationship between moral credit and donation intention. The results showed that the interaction of moral credit and message appeals in the second charity request did not predict the time donation intention in the second charity request ($b = .14$, $SE = .15$, $p = .35$). Message appeals used in the second charity request did not moderate the relationship between moral credit and donation intention in the second charity request.

Mediating role of moral credit

Bootstrap moderated mediation analyses (Process Model 14; Hayes, 2013) was conducted. Charity responses to the first charity request (1 = Yes, 0 = No) was the independent variable, moral credit was the mediator, message appeals in the

second charity request was the moderator (1 = self-benefit, 0 = other-benefit) and the intention to donate in the second charity request was the dependent variable. The indirect effect of charity responses in the first charity request on donation intention in the subsequent charity request as mediated by moral credit was not significant as confirmed by the moderated mediation index ($b = -.15$, $SE = .21$, $95\% CI = -.69, .16$). Overall, this study did not find a mediating role of moral credit in the relationship between the first charity responses and time donation intention in the second charity request.




Figure 6.2. The moderated mediation model of moral credit in the relationship between the first charity responses and time donation intention in the subsequent charity request.

6.3.4.4. Moral distress hypotheses

Charity responses and moral distress

To examine the relationship between the first charity responses (1 = Yes, 0 = No) and moral distress, an independent sample t-test was performed. As predicted the participants who complied with the charity request showed lower moral distress ($M = 3.69$, $SD = 1.58$) than those who refused the request ($M = 4.76$, $SD = 1.66$) ($t(142) = -3.99$, $p < .001$). When participants refuse to donate blood in the first charity request, their level of moral distress was greater than those who agree to donate blood.

Moral distress, message appeals and donation intention

Bootstrap moderation analysis (Process Model 1; Hayes, 2013) was performed to examine the moderating role of message appeals (1 = self-benefit, 0 = other-benefit) in the relationship between moral distress and donation intention. The interaction of moral distress and message appeals in the second charity request (1 = self-benefit, 0 = other-benefit) affected time donation intention in the second charity request ($b = -.73$, $SE = .24$, $p = .003$). Simple slope analysis revealed that when moral distress is low, time donation intention is higher if self-benefit message was used. In contrast, when moral distress is high, time donation intention is higher if other-benefit message was used.

Mediating role of moral distress

Bootstrap moderated mediation analyses (Process Model 14; Hayes, 2013) was conducted to examine the mediating role of moral distress in the relationship between charity responses to the first charity request (1 = Yes, 0 = No) and donation intention in the second charity request. The significant moderated mediation index ($b = .82$, $SE = .33$, $95\% CI = .29, 1.64$) informed that the indirect effect of charity responses in the first charity request on time donation intention in the subsequent charity request as mediated by moral distress was significant. This result exhibited that moral distress mediates the relationship between charity responses in the first charity request and time donation intention in the second charity request as moderated by message appeals in the second charity request.




Figure 6.3. The moderated mediation model of moral distress in the relationship between the first charity responses and time donation intention in the subsequent charity request.

6.3.4.5. Moral status hypotheses

Charity responses and moral distress

To observe the association between the first charity responses (1 = Yes, 0 = No) and moral status, an independent sample t-test was performed. The participants who complied with the charity request showed greater moral status ($M = 1.43$, $SD = 2.94$) than those who refused the request ($M = -.79$, $SD = 3.55$) ($t(142) = 4.10$, $p < .001$). When participants agree to donate blood in the first charity request, their perceived moral status was higher than those who decline the charity request.

Moral status, message appeals and donation intention

The moderating role of message appeals (1 = self-benefit, 0 = other-benefit) in the relationship between moral status and donation intention was examined using Bootstrap moderation analysis (Process Model 1; Hayes, 2013). The results confirm the moderating role of message appeals in the second charity request (1 = self-benefit, 0 = other-benefit) in the relationship between moral status and donation intention in the second charity request ($b = .22$, $SE = .11$, $p = .04$). In particular, when moral status is high, time donation intention is higher if a self-benefit, not an other-benefit message was used.

Mediating role of moral status

Bootstrap moderated mediation analyses (Process Model 14; Hayes, 2013) was conducted to inspect the mediating role of moral status. The indirect effect of charity responses in the first charity request towards donation intention in the second

charity request as mediated by moral status was confirmed ($b = .54$, $SE = .32$, 95% $CI = .03, 1.26$). This result showed that moral status mediates the relationship between charity responses in the first charity request and time donation intention in the second charity request. The mediation is moderated by message appeals in the second charity request.




Figure 6.4. The moderated mediation model of moral status in the relationship between the first charity responses and time donation intention in the subsequent charity request.

The following table recaps the findings in the second study and the level of support to the hypotheses.

Table 6.3. Results of the hypotheses testing Study 2

Hypotheses	Results
<p>H₁ : Individuals who agree to donate in first charity request demonstrate more donation intention in the second charity request compared with those who reject the first charity request.</p>	<p>Supported ($p = .03$)</p>
<p>H₄ : After individuals agree to donate based on an <i>other-benefit</i> message in the first charity request, a self-benefit message will generate more donation intention than an other-benefit message in the second charity request.</p>	<p>Supported. ($p < .001$)</p>
<p>H₅ : After individuals refuse to donate based on an <i>other-benefit</i> message in the first charity request, an other-benefit message will generate more donation intention than a self-benefit message in the second charity request.</p>	<p>Not supported. ($p = .82$)</p>
<p>H₆ : Charity responses to an <i>other-benefit</i> message in the first charity request influence the perceived moral credit. Compliance to a charity request based on an other-benefit message is associated with a higher moral credit while a rejection is related to a lower moral credit.</p>	<p>Supported. ($p = .005$)</p>
<p>H₇ : The relationship between moral credit and donation intention in the second charity request is moderated by message appeals in the second charity request (self vs. other benefit). Moral credit increases donation intention in the second charity request only when a self-benefit message appeal is used, not an other-benefit message.</p>	<p>Not supported. ($p = .35$)</p>

H ₈	: Moral credit mediates the relationship between charity responses to first charity request and donation intention in the second charity request. The mediation is moderated by message appeals in the second charity request.	Not supported. (CI = -.69, .16)
H ₉	: Charity responses to an <i>other-benefit</i> message in the first charity request influence the perceived moral distress. Compliance to a charity request is associated with a lower moral distress while a rejection is related to a higher moral distress.	Supported. ($p < .001$)
H ₁₀	: The relationship between moral distress and donation intention in the second charity request is moderated by message appeals in the second charity request (self vs. other benefit). Moral distress increases donation intention in the second charity request when an other-benefit message appeal is used, not a self-benefit message.	Supported. ($p = .003$)
H ₁₁	: Moral distress mediates the relationship between charity responses to first charity request and donation intention in the second charity request. The mediation is moderated by message appeals in the second charity request.	Supported. (CI = .29, 1.64)
H ₁₂	: Charity responses to an <i>other-benefit</i> message in the first charity request influence the perceived moral status. Compliance to a charity request is associated with a higher moral status while a rejection is related to a lower moral status.	Supported. ($p < .001$)

H ₁₃ :	The relationship between moral status and donation intention in the second charity request is moderated by message appeals in the second charity request (self vs. other benefit). Moral status increases donation intention in the second charity request when a self-benefit message appeal is used, not an other-benefit message.	Supported. (<i>p</i> = .04)
H ₁₄ :	Moral status mediates the relationship between charity responses to first charity request and donation intention in the second charity request. The mediation is moderated by message appeals in the second charity request.	Supported. (CI = .03, 1.26)

6.4. Discussion

This study found that participants are consistent in their donation behaviour. People who complied with the first charity request (i.e., blood donation drive) gave more time donations in the subsequent charity request compared with those who refused the first charity request. This data pattern is in line with previous findings that highlighted individuals' consistency in their prosocial behaviour (Jones & Koenig, 2018). Nonetheless, when message appeals in the second charity request were included in the analysis, the data pattern changed. People who complied with the first charity request subsequently donated more on an egoistic rather than an altruistic reason in the second charity request. This indicated that the moral licensing effect was found in the developed research model, showing that people tend to behave inconsistently in their moral decisions, particularly when message appeals were used in the second charity requests.

Individuals experienced two distinct emotions when they respond differently to a charity request. The participants who rejected a charity request feel more morally distressed than those who complied with the charity request. Also, people who agreed to make a donation perceive their moral credit level is higher than those who rejected the charity request. These findings are consistent with previous studies regarding the emergence of positive emotions after performing altruistic behaviour (Dunn et al., 2014; Liu & Aaker, 2008), and negative emotions as a consequence of neglecting a prosocial request (O'Keefe & Figge, 1997). In addition, when the positive emotion (i.e., moral credit) and the negative one (i.e., moral distress) were computed as a single variable (i.e., moral status), the new variable helps to explain the mechanism of moral balancing effects.

The current study demonstrated the moral cleansing mechanism in the research model. Moral distress was found to mediate the effect of charity responses in the first charity request on the donation intention in the subsequent charity request, consistent with prior moral cleansing studies (Ding et al., 2016; M. Gollwitzer & Melzer, 2012). When people are morally low distressed, they give higher donation based on egoistic than altruistic appeal. Conversely, when people are morally high distressed, donation will be higher for altruistic than egoistic appeals. In addition, the mediating role of moral status in the relationship between responses to the first and the second charity request was found. In a high moral status condition, individuals give higher donation when they see a self-benefit message, while if they experience a low moral status, the donation is higher when they are exposed to an other-benefit message. Operationalised as a combination of

moral credit and moral distress, moral status is able to represent one's moral state from the positive angle (i.e., moral credit) and the negative one (i.e., moral distress). As such, moral status can explain the moral balancing effects, both moral licensing and moral cleansing. Therefore, this study extends moral balancing theory by highlighting the importance of message appeals, whether it benefits oneself or others, in prosocial behaviours.

Moral credit was expected to explain moral licensing effect in the research model. However, the results did not confirm the mediating effect of moral credit between the first and the subsequent charity responses. Although the participants experienced high moral credit after they complied with the first charity request, in the following charity request, egoistic message did not generate more donation than altruistic message, as predicted by moral licensing theory (Cascio & Plant, 2015; Sachdeva et al., 2009). It is possible that when individuals reap high moral credit, they perceive it as a reward for helping others. In other words, helping others has licensed individuals to receive moral credit as a form of emotional benefits (Andreoni, 1990; Dunn et al., 2014), which eventually balances their moral self-image. At this point, when one's moral position is balanced, predicting the following prosocial motivation within moral balance framework is difficult.

Despite its contributions, there are at least two aspects that can be improved from this study. *Firstly*, this study was conducted in a cross sectional condition when a prosocial decision is followed immediately by another prosocial decision, while in daily life consumers may see two charity advertisements at two different points in time. *Secondly*, this study used a single donation order (i.e., blood – time)

presented as charity advertisements. However, since different types of donation may influence willingness to make a subsequent donation (Liu & Aaker, 2008), the following study will interchange the order of charity advertisements to see whether different effects may occur.

6.5. Conclusion

Study 2 extended Study 1 findings by using sequential decision procedure. The results are consistent with the previous studies in moral balancing literature. The next study will use a time gap between the first and the second charity advertisement. In addition, a different order of charity advertisement will be used.

Chapter 7 - Study 3a

7.1. Introduction

The goals of this study were twofold. *First*, it attempted to replicate the findings from study 2 with a time gap between the first charity request (henceforth: Time 1) and the second charity request (henceforth: Time 2). *Second*, this study aimed to investigate whether the advertisement order influences the moral balancing effects. In so doing, two common charity requests, time donation and monetary donation were used in this study with different order. As in Study 2, American Cancer Society asked for time donation, while monetary donation was advertised by Make-A-Wish America foundation. Only other-benefit messages was used at Time 1, whereas both other-benefit and self-benefit were used at Time 2.

This study predicted that moral balancing effects are stronger when time donation is asked at Time 1 than when monetary donation is asked at Time 1. Activate the concept of time relative to money makes people to be more ethical and socially connected with others. In contrast, thinking about the concept of money drives individuals to be less moral and less sensitive to social exclusion (Gino & Mogilner, 2014; Mogilner, 2010). In line with that, people are more generous in the second charity request (i.e., Time 2) after previously are asked to donate time than money because being asked to make a time donation, people are primed with morality and emotional meaning (Liu & Aaker, 2008).

Therefore, responses to a time donation request (i.e., Yes vs. No) would generate stronger moral balancing effects than responses to a monetary donation request. When an individual agree with a time donation request, compared with a money donation request, the individual believes that s/he was involved in a moral cause which eventually lessen the willingness to engage in an altruistic behaviour afterwards. Similarly, when an individual decline a time donation request, relative to a money donation request, s/he would attempt to repair his or her moral self-image for failing to accomplish a prosocial request by conducting an altruistic behaviour afterwards. This study also proposed that responses to either a monetary or a time donation request influence one's moral state. More specifically, responses to a time donation request (Yes vs. No) have a stronger effect on moral credit, moral distress and moral status compared with responses to a monetary donation request.

This chapter begins by introducing the motivations for conducting this study, presenting predictions that will be examined in the study, providing methods and results obtained from the data analysis and conclude by discussing the overall results.

7.2. Methods

7.2.1. Pretest

The goal of the pretest was to ensure that the charitable message from Make-A-Wish America is appropriate to be used in the main study. Eighty Mechanical Turk respondents participated and were compensated USD 0.50 for taking part in

the study. In the charity advertisement, half of the participants saw an other-benefit message while the other half saw a self-benefit message. All participants were asked to respond to four questions on 9-point scales adapted from White and Peloza (2009). The index of the perceived self and other-benefit demonstrated that participants who saw self-benefit message ($M = 4.26$, $SD = 1.78$) rated the message as significantly more egoistic than participants in the other-benefit condition ($M = 2.72$, $SD = 1.42$); $t(37) 2.97$, $p < .01$. These results indicated that the message was appropriate to be used in the main study.

7.2.2. Design and participants

Two hundred and eighty participants joined the experiment. The participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), and were compensated 2.00 USD for their contributions to the study. Since each group in the study consists of 20 to 50 participants, the sample size was considered sufficient for a factorial design (Aaker et al., 2008). Participants were randomly distributed in a 2 (donation order: Time-Money vs. Money-Time) x 2 (Time 2 message appeals: self-benefit vs. other benefit) between participant experimental design. The mean age of participants was 37 years old ($SD = 10.1$), 160 were males (57%) and 120 were females (43%).

7.2.3. Stimuli and procedure

Participants were instructed to view two charity advertisements. They were informed that they would be asked to respond to the advertisements by indicating their willingness to make charity donations. The first group saw American Cancer Society charity advertisement which asked participants to make a time donation followed by the second one from Make-A-Wish America asked for a monetary

donation. The donation order was reversed for the second group: monetary donation first then followed by time donation. There was a 24-hour time gap exist in between the first advertisement (i.e., Time 1) and the second one (i.e., Time 2). The 24-hour time gap was adapted from the previous study by Freeman, Aquino, and McFerran (2009) who investigated moral-related behaviours.

After seeing the first charity advertisement, the participants were asked to respond to the advertisement by indicating their willingness to make a donation. They were asked to answer the question in a binary scale (Yes or No). The other-benefit appeal in the monetary donation stated that the donations would make the recipients' wishes come true and would make a significant difference in the recipients' lives, while time donation advertisement is identical to Study 2. Next, the participants in both Time-Money and Money-Time groups answered a series of questions about potential mediators (i.e., moral credit, and moral distress). At the end of Time 1, the participants were reminded that they would receive an email regarding instructions and a link to the second part of the survey in the next 24-hours.

At Time 2, the participants were randomly divided into two groups, one group saw a self-benefit message while the other group saw an other-benefit message. The self-benefit message in the monetary donation focused on the benefits of the donors, such as: the donors will find happiness and will obtain a good feeling for doing the right thing. Following that, participants in the self-benefit and the other-benefit conditions were asked their willingness to make donations. The

participants then were instructed to answer the demographic questions and manipulation check questions. They were finally debriefed and thanked.

7.2.4. Measures

Dependent variable. This study used a scale adapted from White and Pelozo (2009) to assesses intention to donate which consist of two items on a nine-point scale (1 = very unlikely, and 9 = very likely). Sample question included “How likely would you to be to make a time donation (i.e., volunteer) to American Cancer Society?”

Manipulation check. Manipulation check procedure was identical to the first and the second study. In order to confirm that the self-benefit and other-benefit messages were successfully manipulated, participants rated each message using four items on 9-point scales adapted from White and Pelozo (2009). Sample questions were: “To what degree is that appeal associated with looking out for the interests of others?” and “To what degree is that appeal associated with looking out for your own interests?” The indexes of perceived self-benefit and other-benefit were generated by reversing the scores of the first two items and calculating the average score of other-benefit and self-benefit appeals. The higher the score of the index, the more egoistic the message.

7.3. Results

7.3.1. Data cleaning

As in Study 1 and Study 2, missing data was not found in the study. Among 500 participants who completed the first part of the study, only 290 responded to the second part of the study, or resulted in a 44% attrition rate. However, ten participants were omitted for the following reasons. Four participants indicated that they have personal problems with the charities (i.e., American Cancer Society and Make-A-Wish America), and six participants failed in answering attentive check questions.

7.3.2. Descriptive statistics

The data were examined for the normality assumption, more specifically for all continuous variables. The examination included the assessment of skewness and kurtosis, graphical displays of histogram and QQ plots. There is no normality violation by all continuous variables since Shapiro-Wilk test for normality showed that the variables are within a range of - 1.00 and 1.00 for skewness and kurtosis as suggested by Field (2013). The values of means and standard deviation of the continuous variables in each condition are presented in the following table. Table 7.1. presents the central measurements when Time donation was used at Time 1, while Table 7.2. when Money donation was used at Time 1.

Table 7.1. Study 3a: Means and standard deviation of the continuous variables at Time-Money condition.

Charity responses at Time 1	Moral Credit	Moral Distress	Moral Status	Message appeals at Time 2	Donation Intention at Time 2
Yes (N = 90)	4.83 (2.32)	1.78 (1.71)	3.05 (2.38)	Self-benefit	6.74 (1.86)
	5.02 (2.45)	1.80 (1.43)	3.22 (2.77)	Other-benefit	5.33 (2.57)
No (N = 60)	2.44 (1.44)	3.58 (2.40)	-1.14 (3.20)	Self-benefit	3.75 (2.03)
	2.22 (1.82)	3.67 (2.70)	-1.44 (3.53)	Other-benefit	4.68 (2.49)

Figures in the bracket are standard deviations

Table 7.2. Study 3a: Means and standard deviation of the continuous variables at Money-Time condition.

Charity responses at Time 1	Moral Credit	Moral Distress	Moral Status	Message appeals at Time 2	Donation Intention at Time 2
Yes (N = 94)	4.66 (2.48)	2.18 (1.73)	2.48 (3.27)	Self-benefit	5.63 (2.60)
	4.80 (2.50)	2.31 (1.87)	2.49 (3.16)	Other-benefit	5.53 (2.15)
No (N = 36)	2.30 (2.26)	2.15 (1.31)	.15 (2.71)	Self-benefit	2.90 (2.34)
	2.29 (2.19)	1.84 (1.39)	.45 (2.49)	Other-benefit	3.03 (2.38)

Figures in the bracket are standard deviations

7.3.3. Manipulation checks

Manipulation checks were conducted for two charity advertisements (i.e., time and monetary donations) by using independent sample t-test procedure. The manipulation check procedure was applied to two charity advertisements. *First*, the results of manipulation check for charity advertisement from American Cancer Society (i.e., time donation) informed that the participants in the self-benefit condition indicated that the message was more egoistic ($M = 5.38$, $SD = 2.64$) than those in the other-benefit condition ($M = 2.36$, $SD = 1.48$); $t(128) 7.98$, $p < .001$. *Second*, the manipulation check results from Make-A-Wish America charity advertisement showed that participants in the self-benefit condition rated the message was more egoistic ($M = 4.08$, $SD = 2.09$) than participants who saw the self-benefit message ($M = 2.05$, $SD = 1.35$); $t(148) 7.03$, $p < .001$. In overall, the results demonstrated that the manipulations for this study were successful.

7.3.4. Hypotheses testing

7.3.4.1. Preliminary analysis

As in the first and the second study, age and gender were initially used as control variables in the analysis since there is evidence that age (Matsumoto et al., 2016) and gender (Espinosa & Kovářík, 2015) may affect prosocial behaviours. However, since the inclusion of age and gender as control variables did not change the data pattern and the hypotheses testing results, age and gender were removed from the main analyses.

A chi-square test of independence was calculated to inspect the relationship between different donation type at Time 1 (Time vs. Money) and charity responses at Time 1 (Yes vs. No). The goal was to test whether there is a difference in charity responses when the participants were exposed to either Time donation or Money donation at Time 1. The results showed a significant relationship between donation type at Time 1 and charity responses at Time 1, $\chi^2 = (1, N = 280) = 4.68, p = .03$. Interestingly, 62.5% participants rejected Time donation request, while only 37.5% participants rejected Money donation request.

7.3.4.2. Moral consistency hypothesis

There were 184 (66%) participants who agreed to make a donation to the charity while 96 (34%) participants rejected to donate. In order to see whether the participants are consistent or not in their charity behaviour across two consecutive charity requests, an independent t-test was conducted. The results demonstrated that participants who said “Yes” at Time 1 showed more intention to donate at Time 2 ($M = 5.82, SD = 2.36$) than those who said “No” at Time 1 ($M = 3.74, SD = 2.38$); $t(278) 6.96, p < .001$. The data pattern shows *consistency effect* of participants in two consecutive charity requests. That is, people who agreed to donate at Time 1 subsequently donated more at Time 2 compared with those who rejected the charity request at Time 1.

Comparable results were obtained when a separate analysis was conducted for those who responded to either Time or Money donations at Time 1. In the Time-Money donation condition, participants who complied with the charity request at Time 1 intended to donate more at Time 2 ($M = 6.07, SD = 2.33$) than those who

rejected the charity request at Time 1 ($M = 4.22$, $SD = 2.30$); $t(148) 4.79$, $p < .001$. Also, in the Money-Time donation condition, those who complied with the charity at Time 1 intended to donate more at Time 2 ($M = 5.58$, $SD = 2.35$) than those who refused to make a donation to the charity at Time 1 ($M = 2.96$, $SD = 2.32$); $t(128) 5.66$, $p < .001$. These results again demonstrated participants' *consistency* in their charity behaviours, as well as a confirmation to Hypothesis 1.

7.3.4.3. Moral balancing hypotheses

A three-way ANOVA test was conducted with donation intention at Time 2 as the dependent variable, and three independent variables, namely: donation order (Time-Money vs. Money-Time), charity responses at Time 1 (Yes vs. No) and message appeals at Time 2 (self-benefit vs. other-benefit). The results showed that the three-way interaction effect was marginally significant ($F(1, 272) = 3.18$, $p = .076$). The main effect of the charity responses at Time 1 ($F(1, 272) = 55.37$, $p < .001$) was significant, such that when participants agreed to donate at Time 1, they give more at Time 2. In addition, the main effect of donation order ($F(1, 272) = 8.21$, $p = .005$) was significant. However, the main effects of message appeals at Time 2 ($F(1, 272) = .14$, $p = .71$) toward donation intention at Time 2 was not significant.

Two-way interaction effect between donation order and charity responses at Time 1 toward donation intention at Time 2 was not significant ($F(1, 272) = 1.78$, $p = .18$), also the two-way interaction between donation order and message appeals at Time 2 ($F(1, 272) = .19$, $p = .66$) was not significant. However, the two-way interaction between charity responses at Time 1 and message appeals at Time 2 (F

(1, 272) = 4.69, $p = .03$) toward donation intention at Time 2 was significant. To understand the relationship between charity responses at Time 1 and donation intention at Time 2, separate analyses were conducted for different donation order (Time-Money vs. Money-Time).

7.3.4.3.1. Two-way interaction in the *Time-Money* order at Time 1

A two-way ANOVA was performed to examine the interaction effect of charity responses at Time 1 (Yes vs. No) and message appeals at Time 2 toward intention to donate at Time 2 when the participants saw Time donation at Time 1 and Money donation at Time 2, or in Time-Money condition. The results showed that the main effect of charity responses at Time 1 towards donation intention at Time 2 was significant ($F(1, 146) = 23.58, p < .001$). However, the main effect of message appeals at Time 2 ($F(1, 146) = .42, p = .52$) was not significant. More importantly, the interaction effect of charity responses at Time 1 and message appeals at Time 2 was significant ($F(1, 146) = 9.86, p = .002$). The interaction effect is illustrated in Figure 7.1.

In order to test the hypotheses, independent sample t-tests were performed. *First*, the independent sample t-test was conducted in the group of the participant who *complied with* charity request at Time 1. The results showed that there was a significant difference in donation intention at Time 2 between those who saw the self-benefit ($M = 6.74, SD = 1.86$) and the other-benefit appeal ($M = 5.33, SD = 2.57$); ($t(88) = 3.02, p = .003$). When the participants are in the Time-Money condition, there is moral licensing effect. *Second*, the donation intention at Time 2 of the participants who *refused* the charity request at Time 1 was examined. The results

showed that there was no significant difference in time donation intention at Time 2 between those who saw self-benefit appeal ($M = 3.75$, $SD = 2.03$) and other-benefit appeal at Time 2 ($M = 4.68$, $SD = 2.49$); ($t(58) = -1.59$, $p = .12$). Therefore, moral cleansing effect was not found when the participants are in Time-Money condition. The means and standard deviations of time donation intention of each group are presented in table 7.1.




Figure 7.1. The interaction effect of charity responses to time donation at Time 1 and message appeals at Time 2 on money donation intention at Time 2.

7.3.4.3.2. Two-way interaction in the *Money-Time* order at Time 1

The results of a two-way ANOVA showed that the main effect of charity responses at Time 1 was significant ($F(1, 126) = 31.13, p < .001$). Nonetheless, the main effect of message appeals at Time 2 to donation intention at Time 2 was not significant ($F(1, 126) = .001, p = .97$), as well as the interaction effect of charity responses at Time 1 and message appeals at Time 2 toward donation intention at Time 2 ($F(1, 126) = .06, p = .81$). The interaction effect is illustrated in the figure 7.2.

Independent sample t-tests were conducted in two different conditions, when participants complied with the charity request at Time 1 and when they refused to donate to charity request at Time 1. When the participants complied with the first charity request, there was no significant differences in donation intention at Time 2 between those who saw self-benefit message appeal ($M = 5.63, SD = 2.60$) and those who saw other-benefit message appeal at Time 2 ($M = 5.53, SD = 2.15$); ($t(92) = .19, p < .85$). Similarly, when the participants refused the charity request at Time 1, the difference between those who saw self-benefit message ($M = 2.90, SD = 2.34$) and those who saw other-benefit message appeal ($M = 3.03, SD = 2.38$) was not significant ($t(34) = -.17, p = .87$). Both moral licensing and cleansing effects were not found when the participants were in the *Money-Time* donation order condition. Table 7.2. provides the means and standard deviations of monetary donation intention at Time 2.




Figure 7.2. The interaction effect of charity responses to money donation at Time 1 and message appeals at Time 2 on time donation intention at Time 2.

7.3.4.4. Moral credit hypotheses

7.3.4.4.1. Moral credit in the Time-Money condition

Charity responses and moral credit

An independent sample t-test was conducted to examine the association between the first charity request (1 = Yes, 0 = No) and moral credit. As predicted participants who complied with the charity request showed a greater moral credit ($M = 4.92$, $SD = 2.37$) than those who refused the request ($M = 2.33$, $SD = 1.63$; (t

(148) = 7.36, $p < .001$). After participants agree to donate at Time 1, their perceived moral credit was significantly higher than those who rejected to donate.

Moral credit, message appeals and donation intention

Bootstrap moderation analysis (Process Model 1; Hayes, 2013) was conducted to inspect the moderating role of message appeals (1 = self-benefit, 0 = other-benefit) in the relationship between moral credit and donation intention. The interaction of moral credit and message appeals at Time 2 ($b = .17$, $SE = .15$, $p = .26$) did not predict the money donation intention at Time 2. In other words, message appeals at Time 2 did not moderate the relationship between moral credit and donation intention at Time 2.

The mediating role of moral credit

Bootstrap moderated mediation analyses (Process Model 14; Hayes, 2013) was conducted. Charity responses at Time 1 (1 = Yes, 0 = No) was the independent variable, moral credit was the mediator, message appeals at Time 2 was the moderator (1 = self-benefit, 0 = other-benefit) and the intention to donate at Time 2 was the dependent variable. The indirect effect of charity responses at Time 1 on monetary donation intention at Time 2 as mediated by moral credit was not significant as shown by moderated mediation index ($b = .44$, $SE = .40$, 95% CI = -.28, 1.28). The figure below describes the moderated mediation model.




Figure 7.3. The moderated mediation model of moral credit in the relationship between charity responses at Time 1 and donation intention at Time 2.

7.3.4.4.2. Moral credit in the Money-Time condition

Charity responses and moral credit

To examine the relationship between the charity responses at Time 1 (1 = Yes, 0 = No) and moral credit, an independent sample t-test was conducted. The results showed that when the participants agree to donate time based on self-benefit message at Time 1, their moral credit ($M = 4.73$, $SD = 2.48$) was higher than when they rejected the charity request ($M = 2.30$, $SD = 2.19$; $t(128) = 5.17$, $p < .001$).

Moral credit, message appeals and donation intention

Bootstrap moderation analysis (Process Model 1; Hayes, 2013) was performed to inspect the moderating role of message appeals (1 = self-benefit, 0 =

other-benefit) in the relationship between moral credit and donation intention. The results informed that the interplay between moral credit and message appeals at Time 2 did not predict donation intention at Time 2 ($b = .17$, $SE = .17$, $p = .30$). There was no moderation effect of message appeals at Time 2 in the relationship between moral credit and donation intention at Time 2.




Figure 7.4. The moderated mediation model of moral credit in the relationship between charity responses at Time 1 and donation intention at Time 2.

The mediating role of moral credit

Bootstrap moderated mediation analyses (Process Model 14; Hayes, 2013) was conducted. Charity responses at Time 1 (1 = Yes, 0 = No) was the independent variable, moral credit was the mediator, message appeals at Time 2 was the moderator (1 = self-benefit, 0 = other-benefit) and the intention to donate at Time 2

was the dependent variable. The moderated mediation index ($b = .41$, $SE = .41$, 95% $CI = -.33, 1.26$) indicated that the indirect effect of charity responses at Time 1 on donation intention at Time 2 as mediated by moral credit did not occur. The following figure portrays the moderated mediation model.

7.3.4.5. Moral distress hypotheses

7.3.4.5.1. Moral distress in the Time-Money condition

Charity responses and moral distress

An independent sample t-test was conducted to examine the association between the first charity request (1 = Yes, 0 = No) and moral distress. As predicted, participants who complied with the charity request showed a lower moral distress ($M = 1.79$, $SD = 1.57$) than those who refused the request ($M = 3.62$, $SD = 2.53$; $(t(148) = -5.48, p < .001)$). When the participants agree to donate at Time 1, their level of moral distress was lower than those who reject the charity request.

Moral distress, message appeals and donation intention

Bootstrap moderation analysis (Process Model 1; Hayes, 2013) was performed to inspect the moderating role of message appeals (1 = self-benefit, 0 = other-benefit) in the association between moral distress and donation intention. The interaction of moral distress and message appeals at Time 2 ($b = -.47$, $SE = .18$, $p = .01$) affected the donation intention at Time 2. In other words, message appeals at Time 2 moderated the relationship between moral distress and donation intention at

Time 2. Simple slope analysis showed that when moral distress was high, other-benefit message appeals generated more donation intention than self-benefit message appeals. In contrast, when moral distress is low, self-benefit appeals generated more donation intention than other-benefit appeals.

Mediating role of moral distress

Bootstrap moderated mediation analyses (Process Model 14; Hayes, 2013) was conducted to examine the mediating role of moral distress in the relationship between charity responses to the first charity request (1 = Yes, 0 = No) and donation intention in the second charity request. The indirect effect of charity responses at Time 1 on monetary donation intention at Time 2 as mediated by moral distress was significant as described by moderated mediation index (b = .87, SE = .38, 95% CI = .22, 1.74). The figure below depicts the moderated mediation model.




Figure 7.5. The moderated mediation model of moral distress in the relationship between charity responses at Time 1 and donation intention at Time 2.

7.3.4.5.2. Moral distress in the Money-Time condition

Charity responses and moral distress

An independent sample t-test was conducted to observe the association between the first charity request (1 = Yes, 0 = No) and moral distress. The results showed that there is no significant difference in perceived moral distress between the participants who refused ($M = 2.01$, $SD = 1.33$) and those who complied with the request ($M = 2.24$, $SD = 1.79$) ($t(128) = -.70$, $p = .48$). This indicates that level of moral distress is independent from individuals' responses to monetary donation request.

Moral distress, message appeals and donation intention

Bootstrap moderation analysis (Process Model 1; Hayes, 2013) was conducted to examine the moderating role of message appeals (1 = self-benefit, 0 = other-benefit) in the relationship between moral distress and donation intention. Next, the interaction between moral distress and message appeals at Time 2 (1 = self-benefit, 0 = other-benefit) did not affect the donation intention at Time 2 ($b = .17$, $SE = .17$, $p = .30$).

The mediating role of moral distress

Bootstrap moderated mediation analyses (Process Model 14; Hayes, 2013) was conducted to examine the mediating role of moral distress in the relationship between charity responses at Time 1 (1 = Yes, 0 = No) and donation intention at Time 2. The moderated mediation index ($b = -.04$, $SE = .10$, 95% CI = $-.40, .07$)

demonstrated that the mediating role of moral distress in the relationship between charity responses at Time 1 and donation intention at Time 2 did not exist. The following figure portrays the moderated mediation model.




Figure 7.6. The moderated mediation model of moral distress in the relationship between charity responses at Time 1 and donation intention at Time 2.

7.3.4.6. Moral status hypotheses

7.3.4.6.1. Moral status in the Time-Money condition

Charity responses and moral status

An independent sample t-test was performed to observe the association between the first charity request (1 = Yes, 0 = No) and moral status. As predicted, participants who complied with the charity request showed a higher moral status (M

= 3.13, SD = 2.56) than those who refused the request (M = -1.29, SD = 3.36; (t(148) = 9.13, $p < .001$).

Moral status, message appeals and donation intention

Bootstrap moderation analysis (Process Model 1; Hayes, 2013) was performed to examine the moderating role of message appeals (1 = self-benefit, 0 = other-benefit) in the relationship between moral distress and donation intention. The results exhibited that the moderating role of message appeals at Time 2 was significant in the link between moral status and donation intention at Time 2 (b = .26, SE = .11, $p = .01$). Moreover, simple slope analysis uncovered that when moral status was high, a self-benefit message appeal generated more donation intention than an other-benefit message appeal.

Mediating role of moral status

Bootstrap moderated mediation analysis (Process Model 14; Hayes, 2013) was performed to examine the mediating role of moral status in the relationship between charity responses at Time 1 and donation intention at Time 2. The indirect effect of charity responses at Time 1 on donation intention at Time 2 as mediated by moral status was significant as explained by moderated mediation index (b = 1.11, SE = .45, 95% CI = .26, 2.05). Following is the moderated mediation model.




Figure 7.7. The moderated mediation model of moral status in the relationship between charity responses at Time 1 and donation intention at Time 2.

7.3.4.6.2. Moral status in the Money-Time condition

Charity responses and moral status

To observe the relationship between the first charity request (1 = Yes, 0 = No) and moral status, an independent sample t-test was performed. The result showed that the participants who complied with the charity request experienced higher moral status ($M = 2.49$, $SD = 3.20$) than those who refused the request ($M = .28$, $SD = 2.58$; $(t(128) = 3.70, p < .001)$).

Moral status, message appeals and donation intention

The moderating role of message appeals (1 = self-benefit, 0 = other-benefit) in the relationship between moral status and donation intention was examined using

Bootstrap moderation analysis (Process Model 1; Hayes, 2013). The results showed that the interplay between moral status and message appeals at Time 2 (1 = self-benefit, 0 = other-benefit) did not influence the donation intention at Time 2 ($b = .17$, $SE = .14$, $p = .24$).

Mediating role of moral status

Bootstrap moderated mediation analyses (Process Model 14; Hayes, 2013) was conducted to inspect the mediating role of moral status. The moderated mediation index ($b = .34$, $SE = .32$, 95% CI = $-.22, 1.09$) disconfirmed the mediating role of moral status in the connection between charity responses at Time 1 and donation intention at Time 2. The following figure depicts the moderated mediation model.




Figure 7.8. The moderated mediation model of moral status in the relationship between charity responses at Time 1 and donation intention at Time 2.

The following table summarises the findings of this study, as well as the confirmations of the developed hypotheses.

Table 7.3. Results of the hypotheses testing Study 3a

Hypotheses	Results
<p>H₁ : Individuals who agree to donate in first charity request demonstrate more donation intention in the second charity request compared with those who reject the first charity request.</p>	<p>Supported <i>(p</i> < .001)</p>
<p>H₄ : After individuals agree to donate based on an other-benefit message at Time 1, a self-benefit message will generate more donation intention than an other-benefit message at Time 2. This effect is stronger when time donation was asked at Time 1 than when money donation was asked at Time 1.</p>	<p>Supported. Time donation at Time 1 (<i>p</i> = .003); Money donation at Time 1 (<i>p</i> = .85)</p>
<p>H₅ : After individuals refuse to donate based on an other-benefit message at Time 1, an other-benefit message will generate more donation intention than a self-benefit message at Time 2. This effect is stronger when time donation was asked at Time 1 than when money donation was asked at Time 1.</p>	<p>Not supported. Time donation at Time 1 (<i>p</i> = .12); Money donation at Time 1 (<i>p</i> = .87)</p>

<p>H₆ : Charity responses to an <i>other-benefit</i> message at Time 1 influence the perceived moral credit. Compliance to a charity request based on an other-benefit message is associated with a higher moral credit while a rejection is related to a lower moral credit. This effect is stronger when time donation was asked at Time 1 than when money donation was asked at Time 1.</p>	<p>Supported. Time-Money (mean difference = 2.59, $p < .001$); Money-Time (mean difference = 2.43, $p < .001$)</p>
<p>H₇ : The relationship between moral credit and donation intention in the subsequent charity request is moderated by message appeals in the second charity request (self vs. other benefit). Moral credit increases donation intention at Time 2 only when a self-benefit message appeal is used, not an other-benefit message.</p>	<p>Not supported for Time-Money ($p = .26$); and Money-Time ($p = .30$);</p>
<p>H₈ : Moral credit mediates the relationship between charity responses at Time 1 and donation intention at Time 2. The mediation is moderated by message appeals at Time 2.</p>	<p>Not supported for Time-Money (CI = -.28, 1.28); and Money-Time (CI = -.33, 1.26)</p>

<p>H₉ : Charity responses to an <i>other-benefit</i> message at Time 1 influence the perceived moral distress. Compliance to a charity request is associated with a lower moral distress while a rejection is related to a higher moral distress. This effect is stronger when time donation was asked at Time 1 than when money donation was asked at Time 1.</p>	<p>Supported. Time-Money ($p < .001$); Money-Time ($p = .48$)</p>
<p>H₁₀ : The relationship between moral distress and donation intention in the subsequent charity request is moderated by message appeals in the second charity request (self vs. other benefit). Moral distress decreases donation intention at Time 2 only when a self-benefit message appeal is used, not an other-benefit message.</p>	<p>Supported for Time-Money ($p = .01$). Not supported for Money-Time ($p = .30$)</p>
<p>H₁₁ : Moral distress mediates the relationship between charity responses to first charity request and donation intention in the second charity request. The mediation is moderated by message appeals at Time 2.</p>	<p>Supported for Time-Money (CI = .22, 1.74). Not supported for Money-Time (CI = -.40, .07)</p>

<p>H₁₂ : Charity responses to an <i>other-benefit</i> message at Time 1 influence the perceived moral status. Compliance to a charity request based on an other-benefit message is associated with a higher moral status while a rejection is related to a lower moral status. This effect is stronger when time donation was asked at Time 1 than when money donation was asked at Time 1.</p>	<p>Supported. Time-Money (mean difference = 4.42, $p < .001$); Money-Time (mean difference = 2.20, $p < .001$)</p>
<p>H₁₃ : The relationship between moral status and donation intention at Time 2 is moderated by message appeals at Time 2 (self vs. other benefit). Moral status increases donation intention at Time 2 only when a self-benefit message appeal is used, not an other-benefit message.</p>	<p>Supported for Time-Money ($p = .01$). Not supported for Money-Time ($p = .30$).</p>
<p>H₁₄ : Moral status mediates the relationship between charity responses to first charity request and donation intention in the second charity request. The mediation is moderated by message appeals at Time 2.</p>	<p>Supported for Time-Money (CI = .26, 2.05). Not supported for Money-Time (CI = -.22, 1.09)</p>

7.4. Discussion

Examining only donation behaviour at Time 1, this study found that hesitation to donate time (62.5%) is higher than to donate money (37.5%) among the participants. This is in line with the reasoning by Reed et al. (2016), suggesting that people are more reluctant to give time than money because of psychological costs of giving time is deemed higher than money. Time as a resource is considered as more limited than money since once the times are lost, they cannot be replaced. Consequently, people are more selective in spending their time than money.

Consistent with study 2, this study found that regardless of message appeals used in the charity events, participants' donation behaviour were consistent. That is, people who agreed to donate at Time 1 subsequently donated more at Time 2 than those who refused to donate at Time 1. Moral consistency effect was also found both when the participants are in Time-Money and Money-Time order, such that donation types do not interrupt the effect. However, when the different message appeals at Time 2 were included in the analysis, a moral balancing effect is observed in the participants' donation behaviour. As in Study 2, this study found that when participants complied with the charity request at Time 1, they donated more on self-benefit compared with other-benefit at Time 2. The moral consistency and moral balancing effects did not disappear even when there was a 24-hour time gap between Time 1 and Time 2.

As predicted, the moral balancing effect occurred only when the participants are in the Time-Money condition, not in the Money-Time condition. Time donation request instead of money donation request leads people to be more connected with

other people and to be primed with the concept of morality (Mogilner, 2010; Reed et al., 2007). Thus, a rejection or a compliance to a time donation request generates stronger moral balancing effects than a money donation request. This result is supported by the level of perceived emotional states after the participants respond to time or money donation request. In particular, people perceived their moral credit and moral status were augmented when they agree to make a time donation, not money donation. Likewise, when people refuse to make a donation, their level of moral distress was increased. This effect was weaker when the charity asks for a monetary donation. Thus, this study contributes to moral balancing theory by proposing the role of donation types (i.e., Time vs. Money) in the moral balancing framework.

An interplay between the first charity responses and message appeals in the second charity request significantly affected donation intention, which confirmed that prior moral behaviour licenses egoistic helping as a less moral behaviour. Different charitable message appeals (i.e., helping either to benefit oneself or others) then plays an important role in balancing the moral self-image of individuals. If so, this raises a question, “Does egoistic helping can trigger moral balancing effect?” More specifically, “Do individuals who performed egoistic helping tend to perform altruistic helping afterwards?” Study 3b was conducted in an attempt to answer these questions. Study 3b would use egoistic message appeal at Time 1. It is expected that the results would contribute to moral balancing, charitable message appeals and donation types literature.

7.5. Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter has presented the results of study 3a, which are mainly consistent with study 2. Overall, these results contribute to an understanding of moral balancing mechanism in prosocial context, in particular when the charity decisions were taken in two different points of time and with different types of donation.

Chapter 8 – Study 3b

8.1. Introduction

The objective of the study was to address the question that emerged in Study 3a regarding the possibility to use self-benefit message appeals at Time 1 to induce moral balancing effects (i.e., moral licensing and moral cleansing). It was expected that responses to a charity request based on a self-benefit appeal (i.e., Yes vs. No) would produce an inverse effect as an other-benefit message does. Although both altruistic and egoistic helping can be seen as prosocial behaviours, they are driven by distinct motivations of the prosocial actors. For instance, while altruistic helping is considered as the outcome of positive emotions such as empathy or sympathy (Batson et al., 1981), egoistic helping is driven by the desire to reduce one's negative emotions such as personal distress (Eisenberg et al., 1989) or guilt (Basil, Ridgway, & Basil, 2008; Chang, 2014). People acknowledge that altruistic helping is normatively more accepted as a moral act than egoistic helping (Aquino et al., 2009; White & Peloza, 2009) since altruistic helping focuses on reducing others' hardships, while egoistic helping is to satisfy self-interest.

The moral licensing effect occurs when individuals refuse to engage in egoistic helping. Conducting egoistic helping is considered a less moral deed since it contradicts common social norms (White & Peloza, 2009), and may downgrade one's moral self-image. Thus, declining egoistic helping would frame an individual

as a moral person, which is confirmed by social norms. According to moral licensing theory, if the individual was requested to engage in a subsequent prosocial behaviour, the individual who is already in a high moral position would have a higher tendency to perform egoistic helping, as opposed to altruistic helping. In one of their experiments, Monin and Miller (2001) found that participants who disagree with a negative behaviour (e.g., sexist statement) later are more likely to discriminate against women compared with those who do not express disagreement about a sexist statement. This leads to moral licensing hypothesis:

H_{4b} : After individuals refuse to donate time based on a *self-benefit* message in the first charity request, a self-benefit message will generate more money donation intention than an other-benefit message in the second charity request.

In an opposite direction with moral licensing, moral cleansing theory states that after committing an immoral behaviour, an individual attempts to restore moral self-image by performing a moral action (Mazar & Zhong, 2010; Sachdeva et al., 2009). Because egoistic helping is relatively less moral than altruistic helping (Burger & Caldwell, 2003), the effort to achieve positive moral image is more effective if an individual performs an altruistic rather than an egoistic helping after a moral transgression. Consequently, individuals tend to engage in altruistic helping after committing egoistic helping. In relation to this argument, the next moral cleansing hypothesis is:

H_{5b} : After individuals agree to donate time based on a *self-benefit* message in the first charity request, an other-benefit message will generate more money donation intention than a self-benefit message in the second charity request.

Responses to a self-benefit charitable message affect moral states (i.e., moral credit, moral distress and moral status) of individuals. In particular, this study predicted that rejecting as compared to complying with a self-benefit charitable message would lead to high moral credit and moral status, but low moral distress. As in the previous studies, this study also proposed that moral credit, moral distress and moral status mediate the relationship between charity responses at Time 1 and donation intention at Time 2. The mediation is moderated by message appeals at Time 2.

8.2. Methods

8.2.1. Design and participants

Two hundred and ninety eight participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) took part in the study. The participants were compensated 2.00 USD for contributing to the study. They were randomly distributed in a 2 (donation order: Time-Money vs. Money-Time) x 2 (Time 2 message appeals: self-benefit vs. other-benefit) between participant experimental design. The average age of participants was 35.9 years old (SD = 10.58), 120 were females (40%).

8.2.2. Stimuli and procedure

As in Study 3a, the participants were exposed to two charity advertisements from American Cancer Society for time donation and Make-A-Wish America for monetary donation. The participants were divided into two groups, where the first group saw Time-Money donation order while the other group saw Money-Time donation order. There was a 24-hour time gap between the first (i.e., Time 1) and the second charity advertisements (i.e., Time 2). At Time 1, the participants were asked to respond to the advertisement by indicating their inclination to make donation in a binary scale (Yes or No). The self-benefit message appeals used in this Study is identical to the ones that have been used in Study 3a. Later, the participants answered questions regarding potential mediators (i.e., moral credit and moral distress), and were reminded about the second part of the study. The participants were sent an email of instructions and a link to the second part of the study within it 24-hour after the first part.

In the second part of the study, the participants were randomly divided into two groups, a group saw a charity advertisement based on a self-benefit message appeal and the other group saw other-benefit message appeals advertisement. The message appeals, both self and other appeals are identical to Study 3a. Next, they answered questions regarding willingness to donate to charity. After the participants answered the demographic and manipulation check questions, they were debriefed and thanked.

8.2.3. Measures

Dependent variable. Donation intention was measured by a scale adapted from White and Peloza (2009), consisting of two items on a nine-point scale (1 = very unlikely, and 9 = very likely). Sample question included “How likely would you be to make a monetary donation to Make-A-Wish America?”

Manipulation check. Manipulation check questions were identical to the previous studies. The participants were instructed to rate each message using four items on 9-point scales adapted from White and Peloza (2009). The indexes of perceived appeals were calculated by reversing the scores of the first two items and averaging the total score of other-benefit and self-benefit appeals. The higher the score of the index, the message is more egoistic.

8.3. Results

8.3.1. Data cleaning

As in previous studies, there was no missing data. Out of 500 participants in the first part of the study, only 310 participants responded to the second part, or resulted in 38% attrition rate. However, twelve participants were excluded from the analysis because nine participants failed in attentive check questions and three participants indicated they have personal problems with the charities.

8.3.2. Descriptive statistics

The normality assumption for all continuous variables were examined, including the assessment of skewness, kurtosis and graphical displays of histogram and QQ plots. The results showed no normality violation as Shapiro-Wilk test for normality indicated that the continuous variables are within an accepted range of -1.—and 1.00 for skewness and kurtosis as suggested by Field (2013). The values of the central measurements are illustrated in the following tables.

Table 8.1. Study 3b: Means and standard deviation of the continuous variables in Time-Money condition.

Charity responses at Time 1	Moral Credit	Moral Distress	Moral Status	Message appeals at Time 2	Donation Intention at Time 2
Yes (N = 87)	6.16 (1.93)	1.51 (1.06)	4.65 (2.18)	Self-benefit	6.24 (2.37)
	5.54 (2.47)	1.89 (1.74)	3.65 (2.90)	Other-benefit	6.24 (2.14)
No (N = 63)	2.86 (2.15)	3.04 (2.20)	-.18 (3.57)	Self-benefit	4.00 (2.51)
	2.97 (2.26)	2.26 (1.91)	.71 (2.73)	Other-benefit	4.00 (2.90)

Figures in the bracket are standard deviations

Table 8.2. Study 3b: Means and standard deviation of the continuous variables in Money-Time condition.

Charity responses at Time 1	Moral Credit	Moral Distress	Moral Status	Message appeals at Time 2	Donation Intention at Time 2
Yes (N = 86)	5.58 (2.37)	2.45 (2.18)	3.13 (3.76)	Self-benefit	5.98 (2.05)
	5.11 (1.89)	2.25 (1.76)	2.86 (2.61)	Other-benefit	6.04 (2.21)
No (N = 62)	2.79 (2.48)	3.27 (2.73)	-.47 (4.20)	Self-benefit	3.89 (2.61)
	2.91 (2.27)	2.18 (1.82)	.73 (2.87)	Other-benefit	3.26 (2.14)

Figures in the bracket are standard deviations

8.3.3. Manipulation checks

The manipulation check procedure was conducted to two charity advertisements from American Cancer Society (i.e., time donation) and Make-A-Wish America (i.e., money donation). *First*, the participants who saw the American Cancer Society advertisement rated the self-benefit message ($M = 5.51$, $SD = 2.45$) was more egoistic than the other-benefit message ($M = 2.27$, $SD = 1.34$); $t(146) 9.90$, $p < .001$. *Second*, the participants who responded to the Make-A-Wish America indicated that the self-benefit message ($M = 4.49$, $SD = 2.07$) was more egoistic than the other-benefit message ($M = 2.09$, $SD = 1.21$); $t(148) 8.73$, $p < .001$. These results revealed that the manipulation conducted in this study was successful.

8.3.4. Hypotheses testing

8.3.4.1. Preliminary analysis

As in the previous studies, age and gender were included as control variables in the analysis since prior studies found that age (Matsumoto et al., 2016) and gender (Espinosa & Kovářík, 2015) affect prosocial actions. However, since age and gender did not affect the data pattern and the hypotheses testing results, the variable were not included in the main analyses.

A chi-square test of independence was examined to inspect the connection between different donation type at Time 1 (Time vs. Money) and charity responses at Time 1 (Yes vs. No). The goal was to see whether donation type at Time 1 relates to how people respond to the charity request based on a self-benefit message appeal. The results demonstrated that there is no significant relationship between donation type at Time 1 and charity responses at Time 1, $\chi^2 = (1, N = 298) = .00, p = 1.00$.

8.3.4.2. Moral consistency hypothesis

One hundred and seventy-three participants (58%) complied with the charity request at Time 1, while 125 (42%) participants declined the request. Later, to see whether the participants are consistent in their donation behaviour across two charity requests, an independent t-test was examined. The results exhibited that after the participants agreed to make donation at Time 1, their inclinations to donate at Time 2 ($M = 6.12, SD = 2.18$) was higher than those who disagreed to make donation at Time 1 ($M = 3.78, SD = 2.55$); $t(296) 8.54, p < .001$. Consistent with previous

studies, these results confirms the moral consistency in the participants prosocial behaviours.

In order to see whether moral consistency pattern is constant in different donation order (i.e., Time-Money and Money-Time), an independent sample t-test was conducted in each donation order groups. In the Time-Money group, the participants who agreed to make donation at Time 1 gave more at Time 2 ($M = 6.24$, $SD = 2.25$) than those who rejected the charity request at Time 1 ($M = 4.00$, $SD = 2.72$); $t(148) 5.51, p < .001$. Similarly, in the Money-Time group, the participants who complied with the charity request at Time 1 showed more willingness to donate ($M = 6.00$, $SD = 2.11$) compared with those who declined the charity request at Time 1 ($M = 3.55$, $SD = 2.36$); $t(146) 6.65, p < .001$. The moral consistency effects were revealed in both Money-Time and Time-Money donation orders.

8.3.4.3. Moral balancing hypotheses

A three-way ANOVA test was conducted with donation intention at Time 2 as the dependent variable. Three independent variables are donation order (Time-Money vs. Money-Time), charity responses at Time 1 (Yes vs. No) and message appeals at Time 2 (self-benefit vs. other-benefit). The results showed that there is no interaction among the independent variables in influencing donation intention at Time 2 ($F(1, 290) = .38, p = .54$). The main effect of donation order was not significant ($F(1, 290) = 1.38, p = .24$) as well as the main effect of message appeals at Time 2 ($F(1, 290) = .26, p = .61$). However, the main effect of charity responses at Time 1 was significant ($F(1, 290) = 70.55, p < .001$).

None of the two-way interaction effects between the independent variables affects the dependent variable. Two-way interaction effects between donation order and charity responses at Time 1 ($F(1, 290) = .11, p = .73$), between donation order and message appeals at Time 2 ($F(1, 290) = .26, p = .61$), and between charity responses at Time 1 and message appeals at Time 2 ($F(1, 290) = .39, p = .53$) did not influence the donation intention at Time 2. To investigate the relationship between charity responses at Time 1 and donation intention at Time 2, separate analyses were conducted for different donation order (Time-Money vs. Money-Time).

8.3.4.2.1. Two-way interaction of the *Time-Money* order at Time 1

A two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the moderating role of message appeals at Time 2 in the relationship between charity responses at Time 1 and donation intention at Time 2. The analysis was conducted in the Time-Money condition, when the participants saw time donation request at Time 1 and money request at Time 2. The results demonstrated a significant main effect of charity responses at Time 1 ($F(1, 146) = 29.54, p < .001$) toward donation intention at Time 2. In contrast, the main effect of message appeals at Time 2 was not significant ($F(1, 146) = .00, p = .99$), as well as interaction effect of charity responses at Time 1 and message appeals at Time 2 ($F(1, 146) = .00, p = .99$). Therefore, the moderating role of message appeals at Time 2 in the connection between charity responses at Time 1 and donation intention at Time 2 was not found when the participants are in Time-Money condition.




Figure 8.1. The interaction effect of charity responses to time donation at Time 1 and message appeals at Time 2 on money donation intention at Time 2.

A series of independent sample t-test was performed to test the moral balancing hypotheses in Time-Money condition. *First*, after the participants complied with charity request at Time 1 (i.e., “Yes” group), there was no significant difference in their donation intention at Time 2 between those in self-benefit ($M = 6.24, SD = 2.37$) and other-benefit message groups ($M = 6.24, SD = 2.14$); ($t(85) = -.01, p = .99$). *Second*, after the participants refused charity request at Time 1 (i.e., “No” group), there is no difference in their donation intention at Time 2 between those who refused charity request at Time 1 and those who saw self-benefit ($M = 4.00, SD = 2.61$) and other-benefit message appeals ($M = 4.00, SD = 2.14$); ($t(60) =$

1.04, $p = 1.00$). Thus, none of moral balancing hypotheses was confirmed when the participants are in Time-Money donation order condition.

8.3.4.2.2. Two-way interaction of the *Money-Time* order at Time 1

The results a two-way ANOVA revealed that the main effect of charity responses at Time 1 was significant ($F(1, 144) = 42.54, p < .001$). However, both the main effect of message appeals at Time 2 ($F(1, 144) = .58, p = .45$), and the interaction of charity responses at Time 1 and message appeals at Time 2 toward donation intention at Time 2 ($F(1, 144) = .85, p = .36$) were not significant. In other words, the moderating role of message appeals at Time 2 in the link between charity responses at Time 1 and donation intention at Time 2 was not confirmed when the participants are in Money-Time condition.

To examine moral balancing hypotheses in the Money-Time condition, independent sample t-tests were conducted. *First*, after complied with charity request at Time 1 (i.e., “Yes” group), there was no significant difference in donation intention at Time 2 between those who saw self-benefit ($M = 5.98, SD = 2.05$) and other-benefit message ($M = 6.04, SD = 2.21$); ($t(84) = -.13, p = .90$). *Second*, the results found no significant difference in donation intention at Time 2 between those who saw self-benefit ($M = 3.89, SD = 2.61$) and other-benefit message ($M = 3.26, SD = 2.14$); ($t(60) = 1.04, p = .30$) after previously refused to donate at Time 1 (i.e., “No” group). Therefore, when the participants are in Money-Time condition, no moral balancing hypotheses were approved.




Figure 8.2. The interaction effect of charity responses to money donation at Time 1 and message appeals at Time 2 on time donation intention at Time 2.

8.3.4.3. Moral credit hypotheses

8.3.4.3.1. Moral credit in the Time-Money condition

Charity responses and moral credit

An independent t-test was conducted to inspect the association between charity responses at Time 1 (1 = Yes, 0 = No) and moral credit. The participants who complied with the charity request showed a greater moral credit ($M = 5.87$, $SD = 2.20$) than those who refused the request ($M = 2.92$, $SD = 2.19$; $t(148) = 8.08$, p

< .001). Moral credit is higher after the participants agreed to make a time donation based on a self-benefit message at Time 1 compared with when they declined the charity request.

Moral credit, message appeals and donation intention

Bootstrap moderation analysis (Process Model 1; Hayes, 2013) was conducted to inspect the moderating role of message appeals (1 = self-benefit, 0 = other-benefit) in the relationship between moral credit and donation intention. The result showed that the interaction of moral credit and message appeals at Time 2 ($b = .05$, $SE = .16$, $p = .73$) did not predict the intention to donate money at Time 2. This indicates that message appeals at Time 2 did not moderate the link between moral credit and donation intention at Time 2.

The mediating role of moral credit

Bootstrap moderated mediation analyses (Process Model 14; Hayes, 2013) was conducted. Charity responses at Time 1 (1 = Yes, 0 = No) was the independent variable, moral credit was the mediator, message appeals at Time 2 was the moderator (1 = self-benefit, 0 = other-benefit) and the intention to donate at Time 2 was the dependent variable. The indirect effect of charity responses at Time 1 on monetary donation intention at Time 2 as mediated by moral credit was not significant as indicated by moderated mediation index ($b = .02$, $SE = .45$, 95% CI = $-.84, .93$). The figure below describes the moderated mediation model.




Figure 8.3. The moderated mediation model of moral credit in the relationship between charity responses at Time 1 and donation intention at Time 2.

8.3.4.3.2. Moral credit in the Money-Time condition

Charity responses and moral credit

To examine the relationship between the charity responses at Time 1 (1 = Yes, 0 = No) and moral credit, an independent sample t-test was conducted. The result showed that when the participants agree to donate, their perceived moral credit (M = 5.37, SD = 2.17) was higher than when they refuse to donate (M = 2.86, SD = 2.35; $t(146) = 6.72, p < .001$). The participants experienced higher moral credit after they complied with a charity request based on a self-benefit message compared with after they refuse the request.

Moral credit, message appeals and donation intention

Bootstrap moderation analysis (Process Model 1; Hayes, 2013) was conducted to observe the moderating role of message appeals (1 = self-benefit, 0 = other-benefit) in the relationship between moral credit and donation intention. The result showed that the interaction between moral credit and message appeal at Time 2 ($b = .15$, $SE = .16$, $p = .35$) did not predict the donation intention at Time 2.




Figure 8.4. The moderated mediation model of moral distress in the relationship between charity responses at Time 1 and donation intention at Time 2.

Mediating role of moral credit

Bootstrap moderated mediation analyses (Process Model 14; Hayes, 2013) was conducted. Charity responses at Time 1 (1 = Yes, 0 = No) was the independent variable, moral credit was the mediator, message appeals at Time 2 was the

moderator (1 = self-benefit, 0 = other-benefit) and the intention to donate at Time 2 was the dependent variable. The indirect effect of charity responses at Time 1 on donation intention at Time 2 as mediated by moral distress was not significant ($b = .46$, $SE = .39$, 95% CI = $-.26, 1.27$).

7.3.4.4. Moral distress hypotheses

7.3.4.4.1. Moral distress in the Time-Money condition

Charity responses and moral distress

An independent sample t-test was conducted to examine the association between the first charity request (1 = Yes, 0 = No) and moral distress. The participants who complied with the charity request showed a lower moral distress ($M = 1.69$, $SD = 1.43$) than those who refused the request ($M = 2.59$, $SD = 2.06$; $(t(148) = -3.18, p = .002)$).

Moral distress, message appeals and donation intention

Bootstrap moderation analysis (Process Model 1; Hayes, 2013) was performed to inspect the moderating role of message appeals (1 = self-benefit, 0 = other-benefit) in the association between moral distress and donation intention. The interaction between moral distress and message appeal at Time 2 ($b = -.49$, $SE = .25$, $p = .05$) affected the donation intention at Time 2. Simple slope analysis showed that when moral distress was high, other-benefit message appeals generated more donation intention than self-benefit message appeals. In contrast, when moral

distress is low, self-benefit appeals generated more donation intention than other-benefit appeals.

Mediating role of moral distress

Bootstrap moderated mediation analyses (Process Model 14; Hayes, 2013) was conducted to examine the mediating role of moral distress in the relationship between charity responses to the first charity request (1 = Yes, 0 = No) and donation intention in the second charity request. The indirect effect of charity responses at Time 1 on donation intention at Time 2 as mediated by moral distress was not significant ($b = .24$, $SE = .25$, 95% CI = $-.13, .86$). The following figure depicts the moderated mediation model.




Figure 8.5. The moderated mediation model of moral distress in the relationship between charity responses at Time 1 and donation intention at Time 2.

7.3.4.4.1. Moral distress in the Money-Time condition

Charity responses and moral distress

An independent sample t-test was conducted to examine the association between the first charity request (1 = Yes, 0 = No) and moral distress. There is no significant difference between participants who complied with the charity request ($M = 2.36$, $SD = 1.95$) and those who rejected the charity request in terms of their level of moral distress ($M = 2.67$, $SD = 2.32$; $t(146) = -.87$, $p = .39$).

Moral distress, message appeals and donation intention

Bootstrap moderation analysis (Process Model 1; Hayes, 2013) was conducted to examine the moderating role of message appeals (1 = self-benefit, 0 = other-benefit) in the relationship between moral distress and donation intention. The moderating role of message appeals at Time 2 was not significant in the relationship between moral distress and donation intention at Time 2 ($b = -.23$, $SE = .21$, $p = .27$).

The mediating role of moral distress

Bootstrap moderated mediation analyses (Process Model 14; Hayes, 2013) was conducted to examine the mediating role of moral distress in the relationship between charity responses at Time 1 (1 = Yes, 0 = No) and donation intention at Time 2. The moderated mediation index ($b = -.04$, $SE = .10$, 95% CI = $-.40$, $.07$) demonstrated that the mediating role of moral distress in the relationship between

charity responses at Time 1 and donation intention at Time 2 did not exist. The following figure portrays the moderated mediation model.




Figure 8.6. The moderated mediation model of moral distress in the relationship between charity responses at Time 1 and donation intention at Time 2.

8.3.4.5. Moral status hypotheses

8.3.4.5.1. Moral status in the Time-Money condition

Charity responses and moral status

To observe the relationship between the first charity request (1 = Yes, 0 = No) and moral status, an independent sample t-test was performed. The result showed that the participants who complied with the charity request experienced higher moral status ($M = 4.18$, $SD = 2.58$) than those who refused the request ($M = .33$, $SD = 3.11$; $(t(148) = 4.18, p < .001)$).

Moral status, message appeals and donation intention

The moderating role of message appeals (1 = self-benefit, 0 = other-benefit) in the link between moral status and donation intention was examined using Bootstrap moderation analysis (Process Model 1; Hayes, 2013). The results showed that the interplay between moral status and message appeals at Time 2 (1 = self-benefit, 0 = other-benefit) did not influence the donation intention at Time 2 ($b = .10$, $SE = .13$, $p = .44$).

Mediating role of moral status

Bootstrap moderated mediation analyses (Process Model 14; Hayes, 2013) was conducted to inspect the mediating role of moral status. The moderated mediation index ($b = .27$, $SE = .48$, 95% CI = $-.65, 1.25$) showed that the mediating role of moral status in the connection between charity responses at Time 1 and donation intention at Time 2 was not significant.




Figure 8.7. The moderated mediation model of moral status in the relationship between charity responses at Time 1 and donation intention at Time 2.

8.3.4.5.2. Moral status in the Money-Time condition

Charity responses and moral status

The association between the first charity request (1 = Yes, 0 = No) and moral status was examined by conducting an independent sample t-test. The participants who complied with the charity request showed a higher moral status ($M = 3.01$, $SD = 3.29$) than those who refused the request ($M = .19$, $SD = 3.56$; $t(146) = 4.98$, $p < .001$).

Moral status, message appeals and donation intention

Bootstrap moderation analysis (Process Model 1; Hayes, 2013) was performed to examine the moderating role of message appeals (1 = self-benefit, 0 = other-benefit) in the relationship between moral distress and donation intention. The results revealed that there was no moderating role of message appeals at Time 2 in the link between moral status and donation intention at Time 2 ($b = .10$, $SE = .12$, $p = .40$).

Mediating role of moral status

Bootstrap moderated mediation analyses (Process Model 14; Hayes, 2013) was conducted to inspect the mediating role of moral status. The indirect effect of charity responses at Time 1 on donation intention at Time 2 as mediated by moral status was not significant as informed by moderated mediation index ($b = .40$, $SE = .36$, 95% CI = $-.22, 1.19$). Following is the moderated mediation model.




Figure 8.8. The moderated mediation model of moral status in the relationship between charity responses at Time 1 and donation intention at Time 2.

The following table outlines the findings of this study, as well as the confirmations of the developed hypotheses.

Table 8.3. Results of the hypotheses testing Study 3b

Hypotheses	Results
H ₁ : Individuals who agree to donate in first charity request demonstrate more donation intention in the second charity request compared with those who reject the first charity request.	Supported ($p < .001$)

<p>H_{4b} : After individuals refuse to donate based on a self-benefit message at Time 1, a self-benefit message will generate more donation intention than an other-benefit message at Time 2. This effect is stronger when time donation was asked at Time 1 than when money donation was asked at Time 1.</p>	<p>Not supported. Time-Money ($p = 1.00$). Money-Time ($p = 30$).</p>
<p>H_{5b} : After individuals agree to donate based on a self-benefit message at Time 1, an other-benefit message will generate more donation intention than a self-benefit message at Time 2. This effect is stronger when time donation was asked at Time 1 than when money donation was asked at Time 1.</p>	<p>Not supported. Time-Money ($p = .99$). Money-Time ($p = 90$).</p>
<p>H₆ : Charity responses to a <i>self-benefit</i> message at Time 1 influence the perceived moral credit. Rejection to a charity request based on a self-benefit message is associated with a higher moral credit while a compliance is related to a lower moral credit. This effect is stronger when time donation was asked at Time 1 than when money donation was asked at Time 1.</p>	<p>Not supported. Time-Money (Yes > No, $p < .001$). Money-Time (Yes > No, $p < .001$).</p>

<p>H₇ : The relationship between moral credit and donation intention at Time 2 is moderated by message appeals at Time 2 (self vs. other benefit). Moral credit increases donation intention at Time 2 only when a self-benefit message appeal is used, not an other-benefit message.</p>	<p>Not supported. Time-Money ($p = .73$). Money-Time ($p = .35$).</p>
<p>H₈ : Moral credit mediates the relationship between charity responses at Time 1 and donation intention at Time 2. The mediation is moderated by message appeals at Time 2.</p>	<p>Not supported. Time-Money (CI = -.84, .93). Money-Time (CI = -.26, 1.27).</p>
<p>H₉ : Charity responses to a <i>self-benefit</i> message at Time 1 influence the perceived moral distress. Compliance to a charity request based on a self-benefit message is associated with a higher moral distress while a rejection is related to a lower moral distress. This effect is stronger when time donation was asked at Time 1 than when money donation was asked at Time 1.</p>	<p>Not supported. Time-Money (Yes < No, $p = .002$). Money-Time ($p = .39$).</p>
<p>H₁₀ : The relationship between moral distress and donation intention in the subsequent charity request is moderated by message appeals in the second charity request (self vs. other benefit). Moral distress decreases donation intention at Time 2 only when a self-benefit message appeal is used, not an other-benefit message.</p>	<p>Supported for Time-Money ($p = .05$). Not supported for Money-Time ($p = .27$).</p>

<p>H₁₁ : Moral distress mediates the relationship between charity responses at Time 1 and donation intention at Time 2. The mediation is moderated by message appeals at Time 2.</p>	<p>Not supported for Time-Money (CI = -.13, .86) and Money-Time (CI = -.40, .07).</p>
<p>H₁₂ : Charity responses to a <i>self-benefit</i> message at Time 1 influence the perceived moral status. Compliance to a charity request based on a self-benefit message is associated with a lower moral status while a rejection is related to a higher moral status. This effect is stronger when time donation was asked at Time 1 than when money donation was asked at Time 1.</p>	<p>Not supported. Time-Money (Yes > No, $p < .001$). Not supported for Money-Time (Yes > No, $p < .001$).</p>
<p>H₁₃ : The relationship between moral status and donation intention at Time 2 is moderated by message appeals at Time 2 (self vs. other benefit). Moral status increases donation intention at Time 2 when a self-benefit message appeal is used, not an other-benefit message.</p>	<p>Not supported for Time-Money ($p = .44$) and Money-Time ($p = .40$).</p>
<p>H₁₄ : Moral status mediates the relationship between charity responses at Time 1 and donation intention at Time 2. The mediation is moderated by message appeals at Time 2.</p>	<p>Not supported for Time-Money (CI = -.65, 1.25), and Money-Time (CI = -.22, 1.19).</p>

8.4. Discussion

Consistent with Study 2 and 3a, this study found moral consistency effect in donating behaviour of individuals. That is, when people agree to make donation at Time 1 based on a self-benefit message, they are more likely to make another donation at Time 2. Regardless of what type of message appeals used by the charities at Time 1, either self-benefit (Study 3b) or other-benefit (Study 2 and Study 3a), the responses received at Time 2 are constant. This supports the argument that inclinations to avoid dissonance and attempt to preserve self-identity as a moral person after conducting a prosocial action at Time 1 lead the individual to commit another prosocial behaviour at Time 2 (Jones & Koenig, 2018). This moral consistency effect appears when people saw Time-Money and Money-Time order.

The moral balancing effects, both moral licensing and moral cleansing were not found in this study. A possible explanation for the absence of moral balancing effects because the self-benefit message is deemed as a blend of altruistic and egoistic components. Although the self-benefit messages successfully emphasised the egoistic reasons for giving as indicated by manipulation check procedure, the messages were still asking the participants to help other people. The participants might perceive that the content of the messages is not entirely selfish because of their helping actions induced by the messages. This possible mixture feelings may distract participants from the benefits of giving (Feiler et al., 2012), which eventually makes it difficult to predict the effect of the first charity responses onto the second ones.

In support to the aforementioned reasoning, the level of moral states produced by responses to either a self-benefit or an other-benefit message did not vary from each other. For instance, this study expected that moral status was decreased after the participants agree to donate on egoistic reasons since egoistic helping is not approved by social norm (White & Peloza, 2009). Nonetheless, although the participants rated the self-benefit message was more egoistic than the other-benefit message, high moral status was achieved after the participants complied with the charity request based on a self-benefit message. A compliance to a self-benefit message then produced the similar level of moral status as what an other-benefit message did in Study 3a. One may assume that the act of helping, regardless of the motives behind the action, affect the generated moral states as well as a subsequent prosocial decision.

8.5. Conclusion

This study has discussed the association between two prosocial decisions if the initial decision is framed as an egoistic helping. Most of the procedure and materials used in this study are similar to the ones in Study 3a. However, with a different message appeal used at Time 1, the results gained in this study are mostly different from Study 3a. The following chapter is the discussion of the whole studies.

Chapter 9 –Discussion

9.1. Introduction

This chapter summarises the findings of all studies. Following that, it provides theoretical contributions as well as practical contributions of the study. Next, it presents the limitations of the study and provides directions for future research. Lastly, it presents the conclusion of the study.

9.2. Overview of the findings

After a consumer donates to a charity, will s/he keep showing generosity if s/he is asked for a second donation or will s/he become less benevolent? Prior research in moral self-regulation area answers the question by presenting conditions under which people behave either morally consistent or inconsistent (i.e., balancing) in two consecutive moral decisions (Blanken et al., 2015; Mullen & Monin, 2016). The present research tackles this question by distinguishing between the prosocial actions and the motivations behind the actions (i.e., help others or help oneself). In a laboratory (Study 1) and online experiments (Study 2 and 3), this study demonstrates that people have an inclination to be consistent in consecutive prosocial decisions, that is, conducting a prosocial decision leads to another

prosocial decision. However, the motivations to conduct prosocial actions shifts from altruistic to egoistic.

The tendency to shift prosocial motivations is related to the types of donation is asked by the charity. In Study 3a, it was revealed that asking people to make time donation as compared to money donation increases the predisposition to make an inconsistent moral decision afterwards. This effect, however, disappears when people are asked to respond to a self-benefit message appeal in the initial prosocial request (Study 3b).

9.3. Theoretical contributions

9.3.1. Message appeals in moral balancing framework

This study contributes to moral balance theory by introducing charitable message appeals as determinants of a moral balancing effect. Whilst prior studies on moral balancing effects in prosocial context predominantly focus on the dichotomy of helping versus not helping as a result of moral balancing effect, the current study verifies that moral balancing occurs even within two consecutive helping acts. In general, the present study shows a consistency principle in donation behaviour. However, the findings show that after people agree to make a donation (i.e., being altruistic), the following donation is motivated more by egoistic than altruistic motives. Thus, moral balancing effects do not apply to the behaviour, whether help or not helping others, but to the motivation to perform the helping behaviour, whether the helping behaviour is motivated by altruistic or egoistic reasons.




Figure 9.1. The interaction effect of charity responses to time donation at Time 1 and message appeals at Time 2 on money donation intention at Time 2.

By demonstrating the role of different message appeals in moral balancing framework, the present study confirms the reasoning from Cornelissen et al. (2013) that focusing on the benefits of giving leads to moral balancing. Cornelissen et al. (2013) argue that consequentialist moral philosophy produces an assessment of the consequences of a prosocial action whether to fulfil the interest of oneself or others, which eventually licenses a compromise between both interests. Therefore, being exposed by self or other-benefit appeals, people become inconsistent (balancing) in a subsequent prosocial decision. The present study extends Cornelissen et al. (2013) work in two ways. *First*, instead of using moral event recall task, this study used

sequential donation procedure where a consumer responds to two consecutive charitable requests. *Second*, this study proposed donation types (i.e., Time vs. Money) as a moderating factor that influences the effectiveness of message appeals in moral balancing framework.

9.3.2. Differences between the present study and previous findings

It is noticeable that engaging in prosocial behaviours after an initial less moral behaviour is an effort to elevate one's moral position to the desired level. For instance, the present study argues that altruistic helping is performed to eliminate the negative emotion (i.e., moral distress). This theoretical implication is different from the one that is provided by Chang (2014) who contends that egoistic helping is an effort to diminish a negative feeling (i.e., guilt). It seems that the theoretical framework by Chang (2014) holds a consistency principle where prior less moral behaviour which generates guilt, is followed by another less moral behaviour (i.e., egoistic donation). Thus, it opposes this study's theoretical framework.

However, there are differences between the current study and the study by Chang (2014). *First*, the self-benefit message in Chang's study specifically highlights the anticipated happiness if the individual makes a donation. The self-benefit then functions as an antidote for the feeling of guilt that has been manipulated earlier. Whereas, the self-benefit message in the present research focuses on general egoistic helping rewards, such as a free medical check-up for donating blood or making someone feel needed. *Second*, in Chang's study, the

feeling of guilt was aroused through an advertising stimulus, not produced by the behaviour of the participants. For example, in Chang's Study 2, in the high guilt condition, the ads conveys a story about a low-income student who donates to a charity out of her scholarship money. In the present study, egoistic helping was preceded by the participants' previous moral decision (i.e., complying with a charity request). One may assume that the desire to balance one's moral position is heightened when the prior moral related behaviour is concrete rather than abstract (Conway & Peetz, 2012).

9.3.4. The roles of moral distress and moral status

Moral distress has been employed in prior studies to explain how moral balancing effects work. That is, high perceived moral distress after a less moral behaviour can increase donation since being generous may repair one's moral image (M. Gollwitzer & Melzer, 2012). The present study found evidence that this is not always the case. Moral distress was indeed increased by a negative response to a charity request at Time 1, and later increased donation at Time 2 but only when the charity used an other-benefit, not a self-benefit message appeal (Study 2 and 3a). This demonstrates that individuals acknowledge that altruistic helping works better in enhancing moral position than egoistic helping.

Similarly, moral status increased donation only when the charity used a self-benefit not an other-benefit message. The individuals perceived that when their moral status is increased after an initial helping behaviour, altruistic helping is unnecessary while egoistic helping is more relevant because it can balance their

moral position. The mediating effects of moral distress and moral status occurred only when the participants were asked for time donation at Time 1 and monetary donation at Time 2, not vice versa (Study 3a). Therefore, the present study contributes to moral state literature, particularly in the context of sequential moral decisions by introducing different message appeals in determining moral-related decisions.




Figure 9.2. The mediating role of moral status and moral distress

9.4. Practical contributions

9.4.1. The importance of the current donors

The number of participants who complied with the first charity request are consistently higher than those who rejected the charity request as exhibited across the second and the third study. Furthermore, this group of donors give significantly

higher donations in a subsequent charity event than those who rejected the first charity request. Given the importance of this group in supporting charities financially, the communication built between charities and the group should be maintained carefully. This study recommends that instead of sending consistent message appeals sequentially to the current donors (i.e., other-benefit appeal followed by another other-benefit appeals), charities should consider sending self-benefit message appeals after other-benefit message appeals, since the usage of different message appeals would increase total donations.

Prior research has labelled moral licensing as a negative side of moral balancing effects. Effron and Conway (2015) metaphorically describe moral licensing as a process that changes virtuous people into villains, in line with prior moral balancing research which suggests that charities receive less or no donations as a consequence of moral licensing effect (Conway & Peetz, 2012; Cornelissen et al., 2013; Jordan et al., 2011). However, the current study suggests that even though individuals are affected by moral licensing mechanism, they can positively contribute to society. It demonstrates that by conveying the right charitable message appeal to the donors, the charities may receive increased donations, as well as avoid donor attrition.

9.4.2. Combinations of message appeals

The present study examined sixteen combinations of message appeal effectiveness in Study 3a and 3b. Among all combinations (see Table 9.1.), the best combination in terms of total donation in the second charity event was when the participants agreed to make donation based on an other-benefit message at Time 1

and later saw a self-benefit message at Time 2. This highest total donation was achieved when the participants were asked for a time donation at Time 1 and a monetary donation at Time 2. Whereas, the lowest intention to donate at Time 2 was when the participants rejected to make an altruistic donation at Time 1 and responded to a self-benefit message appeal at Time 2 (see Table 9.1.). The lowest combination was gained when the participants were in the Money-Time condition.

Table 9.1. Study 3a and 3b: Means donation intention

		Message appeals at Time 2			
		Self-benefit		Other-benefit	
		Time donation	Money donation	Time donation	Money donation
Charity responses to <i>self-benefit</i> message at Time 1	Yes	5.98	6.24	6.04	6.24
	No	3.89	4.00	3.26	4.00
Charity responses to <i>other-benefit</i> message at Time 1	Yes	5.63	6.74	5.53	5.33
	No	2.90	3.75	3.03	4.68

To illustrate, a charity receives positive responses from donors after the charity conveys a message that focuses on the benefits of the people in need, which is deemed as an altruistic message. After donors decided to help others based on an altruistic reason, the donors' moral status is elevated because they believe that they have done a moral behaviour. In the second request, the charity would generate more donation intention if it sends a self-benefit message, compared with an altruistic one.

The message may emphasise emotional benefits, such as warm glow, happiness and guilt reduction, or non-emotional benefits such as a shopping voucher, free souvenirs or tax deduction.

9.5. Limitations and directions for future research

Besides the practical and theoretical contributions by this research, it has several limitations that possibly can be addressed by future research in a relevant field of studies, in particular the ones that related to moral balancing effects and prosocial behaviours. The limitations and future research opportunities are discussed below.

9.5.1. Database ownership

The practical implications of this study only apply to charities that possess a database of prior donation behaviour history. Future research may use other information rather than donation history to predict donation behaviour, such as luxury product consumption, food choice or social media usage histories. Prior research has found evidence that moral balancing effects apply not only in a same domain but in different domains as well (Blanken et al., 2015; Khan & Dhar, 2006; Mazar & Zhong, 2010). Based on those findings, future research may investigate how prior consumption behaviour affects motivation to engage in prosocial behaviour (Schlegelmilch & Simbrunner, 2018). For example, after purchasing a necessity product (versus a luxury product) people may find that a self-benefit message is more appealing than an other-benefit message because egoistic helping can balance their moral position after previously managed to hold themselves from

purchasing a luxury product that is considered as a hedonic behaviour (Kivetz & Simonson, 2002).

9.5.2. Mixed message appeals

Since charities may use self-benefit and other-benefit message appeals altogether, it is motivating to see its role in moral balancing mechanism. Feiler et al. (2012) argue that mixing the two conflicting charitable message appeals actually reduces the willingness to donate because it creates psychological reactance due to the increasing individual's awareness that the charity's persuasion attempt is taking place. However, the impact of the mixed appeals in a subsequent donation behaviour remains under research. Do mixed message appeals lead to more of egoistic than altruistic helping afterwards because donors tend to overestimate their altruistic behaviour and later licenses themselves to commit a less moral behaviour (e.g., egoistic helping)? Or else, does it lead to altruistic rather than egoistic helping because individuals may experience negative imbalance of their moral self-image and then attempt to restore it by conducting a moral behaviour (e.g., altruistic helping)? Given that individuals are capable of selecting specific memories of past behaviour to allow themselves to act with their desired goals (May & Irmak, 2014), there is a possibility that consumers may selectively use their prior im(moral) behaviour to justify their current goals (Merritt et al., 2012).

9.5.3. Possible field experiment

Although this research has employed experimental design, which is considered as an appropriate design in attempting to answer the research questions, the design comes with limitations. *First*, artificial situations created by experimental

research are highly controlled and do not represent daily life experiences of the participants. *Second*, like most of experiment studies, this study uses convenient sample of respondents rather than the one that may describe variation in the population (Shadish, 2002). To tackle these limitations, a future research may use a field or natural experiment design with the main goal to increase the ecological validity of the research results.

9.5.4. Types of donations

This research uses different types of donation (e.g., blood, time and monetary donations) sequentially in Study 2 and 3. In addition, it uses different charity for each type of donation (i.e., American Red Cross, American Cancer Society and Make-A-Wish America) as the charity requesters. The aim of using different types of donations and charity institutions is to expand the external validity of the findings across different charity contexts. As a result, Study 2 and 3a showed consistent findings, especially in terms of the combination of message types that can be used by charities consecutively. However, in real life, it is possible that a donor encounters charity requests from the same charity, which may ask for either the same or different donation types. For example, American Red Cross encourages donors to donate not only blood but also money and time as well. It is then interesting to see how donors respond to the same charity that asks for different types of donation sequentially, as well as how donors respond to the same type of donation asked by the same or different charities.

The present study has anticipated the effects of initial charity responses (i.e., Yes vs. No) to the following one. In particular, there are different effects of charity

responses to money donation and time donation to the subsequent prosocial decision. As discussed, responses to time as compared to money donation request generated stronger moral balancing effects since activating the concept time enhancing the morality of the donors. Future research may investigate the impact of public accountability and types of donation to the following prosocial behaviour. For instance, Kristofferson, White, and Peloza (2013) argue that initial private as opposed to public moral behaviour generates greater subsequent helping behaviour. Since activating the concept of time instead of money leads to morality concern, volunteering in public may facilitate a greater reputational benefit than giving money in public. As a consequence, the volunteer may respond more negatively to a subsequent charity request than those who give money or who did not make donation.

9.6. Conclusion

This research has investigated the moderating role of message appeals in the relationship between moral balancing effects and donation intention. Moral balancing effects were induced by recalling im(moral) behaviours (Study 1), responses to charity (Study 2) and responses to different message appeals to charity (Study 3). The results showed moral balancing effects in the research model. To conclude, the current research has made its theoretical as well as practical contributions.

10. References

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11. Appendices

APPENDIX A: Measures

1. Donation Intention

Adapted from: White, K., & Peloza, J. (2009). Self-benefit versus other-benefit marketing appeals: Their effectiveness in generating charitable support. *Journal of Marketing*, 73(4), 109-124

- a) How likely would you be to make a monetary donation to the Make-A-Wish America?
- b) How likely would you be to make a monetary donation to the Make-A-Wish America?

2. Manipulation check message appeals

Adapted from: White, K., & Peloza, J. (2009). Self-benefit versus other-benefit marketing appeals: Their effectiveness in generating charitable support. *Journal of Marketing*, 73(4), 109-124

- a) Think about the charity advertisement, to what degree is that an egoistic appeal (i.e., focused on benefiting yourself)?

- b) Think about the charity advertisement, to what degree is that appeal associated with looking out for your own interests?
- c) Think about the charity advertisement, to what degree is that an altruistic appeal (i.e., focused on benefiting others)?
- d) Think about the charity advertisement, to what degree is that appeal associated with looking out for the interests of others?

3. Moral Credit

Adapted from: Gollwitzer, M., & Melzer, A. (2012). Macbeth and the joystick: Evidence for moral cleansing after playing a violent video game. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 48(6), 1356-1360.

- a) After making the decision, I feel I earned credit for performing a morally laudable behaviour.
- b) After making the decision, I feel that I earned credit as a moral person.
- c) After making the decision, I feel that I built up my account of moral credits.
- d) After making the decision, I feel that the decision I made added to my moral credit.

4. Moral Distress measures

Adapted from: Lin, S. H. J., Ma, J., & Johnson, R. E. (2016). When ethical leader behavior breaks bad: How ethical leader behavior can turn abusive via ego depletion and moral licensing. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 101*(6), 815.

- a) How guilty did you feel after making the decision?
- b) How exciting was the decision? (reverse coded)
- c) How much did you enjoy the decision? (reverse coded)
- d) Did the decision give you a bad conscience?

APPENDIX B: Cancer Council Australia Advertisement (Study 1)

1. Self-benefit message



Volunteering benefits you!

Volunteering can help you in many ways! Research shows that volunteering makes people feel less lonely and helps people work through personal problems. It is a good way to make friends too. Volunteering also makes you feel better about yourself, increases your self-esteem and makes you feel needed.

<https://twitter.com/cancercounciloz>

Get involved
to be a better version
of yourself!

Register now at
<https://www.cancer.org.au/>



2. Other-benefit message



**Volunteer now,
be there when they need you.**

Cancer is a leading cause of death in Australia – more than 44,000 people died from cancer in 2014. Unfortunately, there are not enough volunteers to help patients. By volunteering, you can make a significant difference in a cancer patient's life, as well as provide support to the patient's caregivers. By donating your time, patients receive love and care when they need it.

<https://twitter.com/cancercounciloz>

Get involved
to be a better version
of yourself!

Register now at
<https://www.cancer.org.au/>



APPENDIX C: American Red Cross Charity Advertisement (Study 2)

1. Self-benefit message

**DONATE
BLOOD
HELP
YOU**

Donating blood is actually helping you!

You'll find personal rewards when you donate blood. You know you stand for something greater than yourself, and you become more caring. You'll carry yourself with more confidence. There are also health benefits such as a reduced risk of cancer and improved cardiovascular health. You'll get a medical check-up and free food too!

Donate blood today
to become a better version
of yourself!

Register at: www.redcross.org

 **American Red Cross**

2. Other-benefit message

**DONATE
BLOOD
SAVE
LIVES**

Every 2 seconds, someone needs blood.

More blood donors are needed in the USA. Right now, someone suffering from anemia is getting a transfusion. A patient undergoing heart surgery is receiving one too. An accident victim with severe injuries is being rushed to the hospital. A cancer patient is receiving needed white blood cells. The list of people who benefit from your blood donations goes on and on.

Donate blood today
make a huge difference
to other's life

Register at: www.redcross.org

 **American Red Cross**

APPENDIX D: American Cancer Society Charity Advertisement (Study 2 - 3)

1. Self-benefit message



Volunteering benefits you!

Volunteering can help you in many ways! Research shows that volunteering makes people feel less lonely and helps people work through personal problems. It is a good way to make friends too. Volunteering also makes you feel better about yourself, increases your self-esteem and makes you feel needed.

<https://twitter.com/AmericanCancer>

Get involved
to be a better version of yourself!

Register now at
<https://www.cancer.org/>



2. Other-benefit message



Volunteer now, be there when they need you.

More than 1,500 Americans die of cancer every day, and millions are receiving treatment now. Unfortunately, there are not enough volunteers to help patients. By volunteering, you can make a significant difference in a cancer patient's life, as well as provide support to the patient's caregivers. By donating your time, patients receive love and care when they need it.

<https://twitter.com/AmericanCancer>

Get involved
to be a better version of yourself!

Register now at
<https://www.cancer.org/>



APPENDIX E: Make-A-Wish America Charity Advertisement (Study 3)

1. Self-benefit message



Children diagnosed with critical illness may have wishes that mean a lot for them. By giving money to Make-A-Wish America, you contribute to grant their wishes. You will also find happiness for yourself, and a good feeling for doing the right thing. Take action, donate money, and feel the positive impact on you!

Find us at:
<https://www.wish.org/>



Make-A-Wish
AMERICA

<https://twitter.com/MakeAWish>

2. Other-benefit message



Children diagnosed with a critical illness may have wishes that mean a lot to them. By donating money, you contribute to grant their wishes and make a significant difference in their lives.

You can put a smile on a child's face today. Take action, donate money, and make a wish come true!

Find us at:
<https://www.wish.org/>



Make-A-Wish
AMERICA

<https://twitter.com/MakeAWish>