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Associations of heavy vehicle driver employment type and payment methods with crash involvement in Australia

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Abstract:	<p>The heavy vehicle industry is characterized by high levels of competition because the relatively ease of entrance into the industry has resulted in the presence of a large number of carriers. Some heavy vehicle companies use third-party drivers to improve profit margins. Previous research has reported mixed findings regarding the relationship between heavy vehicle driver employment type and crash involvement. Moreover, this relationship has been less explored in Australia than in elsewhere. None of these studies included payment methods despite other reports that they influence safety outcomes. The current study assessed the associations of long-distance heavy vehicle driver employment type and payment methods with crash involvement in Australia. It used existing case-control data collected from 1038 long-distance heavy vehicle drivers in New South Wales and Western Australia between November 2008 and November 2011. Cases were 194 drivers who were involved in a police-attended crash during the survey period. Controls were 844 drivers recruited at truck stops, who were not involved in a crash during the previous 12 months. Driver crash involvement was modelled in an unconditional logistic regression framework after adjusting for potential confounding factors. Owner drivers had lower odds of crash involvement than employee drivers. Drivers paid time- or trip-based rates had lower odds of crash involvement than those paid distance-based rates. Payments for loading and unloading times were associated with lower odds of crash involvement than non-payments for these times. Carrying general or dangerous freight was associated with lower odds of crash involvement than driving empty trucks.</p>
Response to Reviewers:	

Highlights

- Owner drivers have lower odds of crash involvement than employee drivers
- Hourly or trip rates are associated with lower odds of crash involvement than distance-based rates
- Paying for the time spent loading and unloading is associated with lower odds of crash involvement than not paying for this time
- Drivers of general or dangerous freight have lower odds of crash involvement than drivers of empty trucks
- The age range 45-64 is associated with lower odds of crash involvement than the age range 24-44

Associations of heavy vehicle driver employment type and payment methods with crash involvement in Australia

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33 **Abstract**

34 The heavy vehicle industry is characterized by high levels of competition because the
35 relatively ease of entrance into the industry has resulted in the presence of a large number of
36 carriers. Some heavy vehicle companies use third-party drivers to improve profit margins.
37 Previous research has reported mixed findings regarding the relationship between heavy
38 vehicle driver employment type and crash involvement. Moreover, this relationship has been
39 less explored in Australia than in elsewhere. None of these studies included payment methods
40 despite other reports that they influence safety outcomes. The current study assessed the
41 associations of long-distance heavy vehicle driver employment type and payment methods with
42 crash involvement in Australia. It used existing case-control data collected from 1038 long-
43 distance heavy vehicle drivers in New South Wales and Western Australia between November
44 2008 and November 2011. Cases were 194 drivers who were involved in a police-attended
45 crash during the survey period. Controls were 844 drivers recruited at truck stops, who were
46 not involved in a crash during the previous 12 months. Driver crash involvement was modelled
47 in an unconditional logistic regression framework after adjusting for potential confounding
48 factors. Owner drivers had lower odds of crash involvement than employee drivers. Drivers
49 paid time- or trip-based rates had lower odds of crash involvement than those paid distance-
50 based rates. Payments for loading and unloading times were associated with lower odds of
51 crash involvement than non-payments for these times. Carrying general or dangerous freight
52 was associated with lower odds of crash involvement than driving empty trucks.

53 **Keywords:** Crash involvement; Employment type; Heavy vehicle; Payment methods.

54

55 **1. Introduction**

56 *1.1. Background*

57 The heavy vehicle industry is a highly competitive sector due to the relative ease of entrance
58 into the industry and the presence of a large number of carriers. Some carriers outsource the
59 driving task to improve profit margins (Belcourt, 2006; Corsi, Fanara, & Jarrell, 1988; Monaco
60 & Redmon, 2012; Quinlan, Johnstone, & Mayhew, 2006; Quinlan & Wright, 2008b). Other
61 reasons that companies use third-party drivers include: (1) to create and expand services in
62 order to meet customer demand without hiring new drivers (Cantor, Celebi, Corsi, & Grimm,
63 2013; George, et al., 2015; Houtman, Klein Hesselink, van den Bossche, Berg, & Heuvel, 2004;
64 Mayhew & Quinlan, 1997) ; (2) to alleviate the complexities of handling many of the processes
65 associated with managing drivers throughout a geographically-dispersed supply chain (Cantor,
66 2016); (3) to have their cargo carried with a specialised technology that the companies do not
67 possess (Belcourt, 2006; Cantor, 2016); (4) to mitigate exposure to safety risks (Cantor, 2016);
68 and (5) to protect themselves against the uncertainty related to insurance and fuel costs
69 (Belcourt, 2006).

70 Nevertheless, the use of third-party drivers may have negative outcomes for the outsourcing
71 companies (Mayhew & Quinlan, 1997) and the drivers themselves (Quinlan, 2001). The
72 subcontracted drivers are often paid based on distance driven or the number of trips completed,
73 and due to competition for work, they may underbid which, combined with performance pay,
74 may divert attention from safety and encourage risky driving behaviours (Hensher & Battellino,
75 1990; Hensher, Battellino, Gee, & Daniels, 1991; Quinlan & Wright, 2008b). Furthermore, the
76 driving task is often subcontracted to smaller operating units with a lower financial capacity
77 (Quinlan & Wright, 2008a) which perform the task outside of the control of the subcontracting
78 company (Miller, Golicic, & Fugate, 2018; Nickerson & Silverman, 2003). Uncertainty in costs
79 is often detrimental to the subcontracted drivers because it may deflate the already set rates or

80 drivers may misprice their services if they do not possess accurate cost information (Peoples
81 & Peteraf, 1995). The presence of many subcontractors may create a more segmented and
82 complex work environment that is not easy to manage, and the outsourcing companies may not
83 consider the consequences of their decisions on safety outcomes (Cantor, 2016). Thus, the
84 cargo may be carried in a supply chain composed of several subcontracting parties. At each
85 level of this chain, the involved party takes part of the profit margins and passes on the tight
86 contract to the next level. At the end of the chain is the least powerful party composed of owner
87 drivers who undergo the adverse effects of the profit dilution in the supply chain (Quinlan,
88 2001).

89 Heavy vehicle drivers in Australia are generally classified as employee drivers, owner
90 drivers and subcontractor drivers (National Transportation Commission, 2012). Employee
91 drivers, as the name indicates, are employed by companies which provide vehicles and support
92 the costs related to their operations. Owner drivers are self-employed businesspersons who
93 possess their own vehicles, fully support the costs of their equipment and fuel and carry freight
94 on a contractual basis either with companies or directly with clients. Subcontractor drivers do
95 not possess any heavy vehicles and are hired by heavy vehicle companies or owner drivers for
96 specific tasks or periods.

97 Mooren, et al. (2014) compared Australian logistics and transport companies with low and
98 high insurance claims. They found that the previous crash history of drivers at the time they
99 were recruited differentiated among these companies. They concluded that examining previous
100 crash histories when recruiting drivers could help improve the safety of operations.
101 Accordingly, there is a need for research to provide strong arguments to managers seeking to
102 understand which type of driver is the safest. Theoretical predictions assert that owner drivers
103 are prone to drive more safely than employee drivers because risky behaviours will put their
104 capital at risk (Nickerson & Silverman, 2003). Conversely, they are under financial pressure to

105 cover both the fixed and variables costs of their activities (Cantor, Celebi, Corsi, & Grimm,
 106 2013; National Truck Insurance, 2016) and may be tempted to engage in hazardous practices.

107 *1.2. Previous research*

108 The contradictory theoretical predictions mentioned earlier have triggered empirical
 109 examinations of crash involvement for the different driver employment types. A summary of
 110 these studies is provided in Table 1. Among those studies that examined the relationship
 111 between the proportion of owner drivers and the company’s crash involvement, Corsi, et al.
 112 (1988) and Britto, Corsi, and Grimm (2010) found a positive relationship, while Dammen
 113 (2005) and Cantor (2014) found a negative relationship and Bruning (1989) did not find any
 114 significant association. Another study which focused on the safety of employee drivers (Cantor,
 115 2016) concluded that employee drivers had poorer safety performance. Those studies which
 116 compared the safety of owner and employee drivers within the same company reported mixed
 117 results, some finding that owner drivers are safer than employee drivers (Hunter & Mangum,
 118 1995) while others found the reverse (Cantor, et al., 2013; Monaco & Redmon, 2012).
 119 Regarding the specific case of Australia, Mayhew and Quinlan (2006) reported mixed safety
 120 outcomes from comparisons between employee and owner drivers.

121 **Table 1**

122 Previous studies relating heavy vehicle driver employment type and crash involvement

Author(s)	Key variables SP: Safety performance ET: Employment type	Sample	Findings
Corsi, et al. (1988)	SP: Number of crashes per vehicle mile ET: Owner driver proxied by the percentage of miles rented	Two-non overlapping US cross-sectional data sets for 998 heavy vehicle (HV) companies in 1977 and 770 HV companies in 1984	The use of owner drivers is associated with higher crash rates
Bruning (1989)	SP: Number of crashes per mile driven ET: Owner driver proxied by the ratio of the rented power units to the total number of power units	Cross-sectional data for 468 US HV companies on profitability for 1980, 1982 and 1984, and crash rates, employment type and other variables for 1984	No significant relationship between the use of owner drivers and crash rates

Hunter and Mangum (1995)	<p><i>SP</i>: Number of fatal and injury crashes per million miles</p> <p><i>ET</i>: Owner operated companies, union companies, non-union companies</p>	Two US non-overlapping cross-sectional data sets for 117 HV companies in 1976 and their 1975 financial information, and 235 HV companies in 1986 and their 1985 financial information	<p>Owner operated companies have higher crash rates than non-union companies for the 1975-1976 data</p> <p>No relationship exists for the 1985-1986 data</p>
Monaco and Williams (2000)	<p><i>SP</i>: Dummy variable for crash involvement, moving violation, logbook violation over the past 12 months</p> <p><i>ET</i>: Binary indicator taking 1 for owner drivers and 0 for employee drivers</p>	1997 cross-sectional survey data from 573 US HV drivers	<p>No difference in terms of crash involvement and logbook violations</p> <p>Owner drivers have more moving violations than employee drivers</p>
Dammen (2005)	<p><i>SP</i>: Crash rate, injury rate</p> <p><i>ET</i>: Owner driver proxied by the ratio of the rented distance to the total distance</p>	516 US HV companies in 1996	The use of owner drivers is associated with lower crash and injury rates
Mayhew and Quinlan (2006)	<p><i>SP</i>: Number of crashes, hours of work</p> <p><i>ET</i>: Self-report of whether the driver is an employee or owner-driver</p>	2000 survey data from 300 long-haul HV drivers in New South Wales, Australia	<p>Mixed results for major crashes</p> <p>Owner drivers have the lowest crash counts over the past 12 months and the highest over the past 5 years</p> <p>Owner drivers drive longer hours than employee drivers</p>
Britto, et al. (2010)	<p><i>SP</i>: Number of crashes, driver safety assessment score index; vehicle safety assessment score index</p> <p><i>ET</i>: Percentage of the owned fleet</p>	Cross-sectional data for 657 US HV companies in 2003 and their 2002 net profit margins	Fleet ownership increases the number of crashes, but improves vehicle safety and does not affect driver safety
Monaco and Redmon (2012)	<p><i>SP</i>: Number of crashes, injuries, and fatalities</p> <p><i>ET</i>: Owner driver proxied by companies having one truck and one driver, and for multiple truck companies by the percentage of the fleet that is trip or term leased</p>	2009 data on 295,814 US HV companies	<p>Companies using owner drivers have fewer crashes, injuries and fatalities than those using employee drivers</p> <p>Mixed results for severe and fatal crashes</p>
Cantor, et al. (2013)	<p><i>SP</i>: Number of crashes, driver and vehicle out-of-service violation rates</p> <p><i>ET</i>: Dummy variable equals 1 for employee drivers and 0 for owner drivers</p>	599,758 US HV drivers having had at least three roadside inspections over 2008-2011	Owner drivers are less involved in crashes but have higher driver- and vehicle out-of-service violation rates than employee drivers
Cantor (2014)	<p><i>SP</i>: Number of crashes, driver and vehicle out-of-service violation rates</p> <p><i>ET</i>: Owner driver proxied by the percentage of the owned fleet</p>	1,380,764 US HV companies	Fleet ownership decreases the number of crashes but increases driver- and vehicle out-of-service violation rates
Cantor (2016)	<i>SP</i> : Number of crashes, proportions of driver and vehicle out-of-service rates	108,780 US HV Companies	The use of employee drivers is associated with poor safety performance

123

124 Most of these empirical studies were conducted at the company level. Company-level data
125 provide evidence of the aggregate safety performance of companies but not of the individual
126 safety performance of drivers. Monaco and Redmon (2012) claim that this type of data cannot
127 provide conclusive evidence that employment type influences safety at the individual level.
128 Importantly, none of the previous studies examined the influence of the payment method
129 despite reports that this affects driver behaviours (Belzer & Sedo, 2018; Mooren, Williamson,
130 & Grzebieta, 2015; O'Neill & Thornthwaite, 2016). Due to the budgetary constraints and
131 reduced profit margins in the subcontracting chain, companies generally transfer their financial
132 risks to drivers through payments based on the number of trips completed or the distance
133 travelled (Mooren, et al., 2015; Quinlan & Wright, 2008b). Thus, drivers in the quest for an
134 acceptable net income are stimulated to engage in risky behaviours such as speeding, drug use
135 to stay awake and hours-of-service violations. The current study was designed to assess the
136 associations of both employment type and payment methods with long-distance heavy vehicle
137 driver crash involvement in Australia.

138 **2. Materials and methods**

139 *2.1. Study design and participants*

140 This study used existing case-control data collected within the framework of an Australian
141 Research Council Linkage Project in the Australian States of New South Wales (NSW) and
142 Western Australia (WA) between November 2008 and November 2011. The project aimed to
143 identify the factors that affect crash involvement for heavy vehicles. The participants were
144 long-distance (≥ 200 kilometres from the base) drivers of heavy vehicles (weight ≥ 12 tonnes)
145 (Stevenson, et al., 2010). Cases were drivers involved in a crash during the survey period while
146 controls were drivers not involved in a crash during the past 12 months. The response rates

147 were 59% for cases and 58% for controls (Sharwood, et al., 2013; Stevenson, et al., 2014) .
148 Each participant was provided with a \$50 retail voucher for the time spent in the survey.

149 Data from this case-control study have previously been used to examine the prevalence of
150 sleepiness and sleep disorders among heavy vehicle drivers in NSW and WA (Sharwood, et
151 al., 2012; Stevenson, et al., 2014), to evaluate the link between the intake of caffeinated
152 substances and crash risk in NSW and WA (Sharwood, et al., 2013), the relationship between
153 sleepiness and sleep disorders and crash risk in NSW and WA (Stevenson, et al., 2014), the
154 connection to driver payment methods and to heavy vehicle driver fatigue and sleepiness
155 (Thompson & Stevenson, 2014), and the assessment of sleep disorders and health factors with
156 crash risk (Meuleners, Fraser, Govorko, & Stevenson, 2015a), and the association between a
157 driver's work environment factors and heavy vehicle crash risk in WA (Meuleners, Fraser,
158 Govorko, & Stevenson, 2015b).

159 2.2. Cases

160 Cases were drivers involved in police-attended crashes during the study period. They were
161 identified at the end of each week from police-reported data. Drivers were excluded if they
162 were seriously injured in the crash or if any fatalities resulted from the crash because it was
163 deemed that the survey would be stressful for these drivers. Seriously injured persons were
164 those hospitalised for at least two weeks or who were in a state of unconsciousness due to the
165 crash (Stevenson, et al., 2014).

166 The research team retrieved contact information (telephone number, mail address) for case
167 drivers from the police records and sent them invitation letters to participate in the study. The
168 letters informed drivers that the research team would contact them by telephone, and that
169 participation was optional and could be declined. The letter identified the study purpose as
170 “*studying the numerous factors related to heavy vehicle crashes*” to “*identify appropriate ways*
171 *to manage heavy vehicle safety in Australia*”.

172 Two weeks after sending the letters, drivers were contacted by telephone, and a 40-minute
173 interview was conducted to complete the survey after a verbal agreement. The unwilling drivers
174 declined their participation by mail or on the phone at the time the research team contacted
175 them. A total of 194 drivers were interviewed in the case group.

176 2.3. Controls

177 Controls were selected by approaching drivers, often during meal or refuelling time, at
178 truck stops in NSW and WA distributed across the routes most frequented by long-distance
179 truck drivers. The purpose of the study was introduced as “*studying truck crashes aiming to*
180 *identify strategies to improve safety in your industry*”.

181 Drivers who consented to participate in the survey provided written agreement, and a face-
182 to-face interview was immediately conducted over the next 30 minutes. Drivers willing to
183 participate in the interview but could not stay for 30 minutes due to job constraints were asked
184 to provide contact details, including telephone numbers. A telephone interview was then
185 scheduled within the following two days. The interviews were conducted between 6 am and
186 midnight and spread over different times, days, weeks and months to capture various travel
187 patterns. A total of 844 drivers were interviewed in the control group.

188 Both case and control interviews were conducted by the same researchers who were trained
189 based on a standardised protocol. The questionnaire included questions on driver
190 demographics, crash involvement history, schedules and work patterns, payment methods, and
191 types of vehicles and loads. Both samples had the same questionnaire except the number of
192 crashes, which was not included for the controls. The participants were informed that the results
193 of the survey would be confidential.

194

195

196

197 2.4. Data description

198 The study included many variables described and summarised in Table 2 among which
199 were driver employment type, payment method for driving time, payment for the time related
200 to non-driving tasks such as loading and unloading, and truck type.

201 Employment type had four categories: employee drivers, owner drivers, subcontractor
202 drivers and other. Employee drivers are full-time company-employed drivers, owner drivers
203 are self-employed business operators, while subcontractor drivers are drivers contracted to
204 work for companies or owner drivers for specific tasks or periods.

205 With regard to payment methods, drivers can be paid per unit of time (hour, day or week)
206 worked which may be supplemented by an overtime pay for any extra hours or days worked
207 when drivers are paid a fixed salary for working a specified number of hours per day or days
208 per week. Alternatively, drivers can be paid based on the amount of work performed
209 (piecework or performance-based payment), for instance, by the number of trips completed
210 between a given origin and destination or the distance driven in kilometres. Performance-based
211 payments, unlike time-based payments, by connecting drivers' earnings to their output
212 encourage unsafe behaviours such as drug use and noncompliance with speed and hour-of-
213 service regulations (Belzer & Sedo, 2018; O'Neill & Thornthwaite, 2016). Payment method in
214 this study had two time-based categories: time-based (flat) rates and single-time pay plus
215 overtime, and two performance-based categories: trip rates and distance-based rates, as well as
216 final category of other. Single-time pay plus overtime is the term used to describe the situation
217 in which drivers are paid a fixed salary for working a specified number of hours per day or
218 days per week, and then receive additional payment for any extra hours or days worked.


219 Payment method for the time related to non-driving tasks had four categories for loading
220 time and unloading time: not paid, same as for driving time, a flat amount and an hourly rate.
221 Nevertheless, the questionnaire did not specify the difference between *same as for driving time*

222 and *hourly rates*. These categories overlap for drivers paid hourly for driving time. Thus,
223 following Kudo and Belzer (2019), the payment for the time related to these non-driving tasks
224 was turned to a binary variable equalling 1 if both loading and unloading times are paid and 0
225 otherwise.

226 Driver's age as a continuous variable was turned to a 3-category variable (24-44; 45-64 and
227 65 and more), following the cut-off values of the World Health Organisation, to test whether
228 the relationship between crash involvement and age is non-linear.

229 Figure 1 (Austroads, 2019) shows the truck configurations in Australia. In this study, the
230 trucks were categorised as rigid trucks (Classes 3 to 5), semitrailers (Classes 6 to 9), B-doubles
231 (Class 10) and road trains (Classes 11 and 12).

232



233

234

Figure 1. Australian truck configurations

235

(Source: Austroads, 2019)

236 Among the variables included in the regression estimation, the case group had 35 (18.0%)
237 missing values distributed among employment type (2.1%), payment methods (4.6%), payment
238 for both loading time and unloading time (11.3%) while the controls had 75 (8.9%) missing
239 values distributed among load type (0.2%), driving experience (0.2%), payment methods
240 (1.4%), payment for both loading time and unloading time (7.0%). The missing values were
241 included in the regression using the multiple imputations method, the state-of-the-art technique
242 to handle missing data (Enders, 2010). It uses the distribution of the observed data to estimate
243 a set of plausible values for the missing observations. The logistic regression was estimated
244 using the multiple imputations by chained equations function (White, Royston, & Wood, 2011)
245 in Stata 15.0.

246 Ethics exemption to use the data in this study was obtained from the Queensland University
247 of Technology Human Research Ethics Committee in September 2018 (Approval number
248 1800000975). Ethics approval for the original data collection was obtained from the University
249 of Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee in January 2008.

250 *2.5. Statistical analysis*

251 Descriptive statistics were calculated for the cases and controls. An unconditional logistic
252 regression then assessed the associations of driver employment type and payment methods with
253 crash involvement while controlling for other confounding factors such as load type.

254 Crash involvement as the dependent variable was represented by a binary variable equalling
255 1 for cases and 0 for controls. The explanatory variables retained for modelling were those
256 related to the dependent variable in a chi-square test with a P-value <0.2 following the practice
257 adopted by Stevenson, et al. (2010) and Thiese, et al. (2015) in their studies of the factors that
258 affect heavy vehicle crashes in Australia and the United States, respectively.

259 Driving experience and driver age (under its continuous form) were not included in the
260 same model because they were highly and significantly correlated (Pearson correlation

261 coefficient $r= 0.68$) at the 95% confidence level. The model including age is presented in the
 262 study because it has the smallest average relative variance increase. The average relative
 263 variance increase in estimations using multiple imputations represents the effects of the loss of
 264 information due to missing data on the variance of the model. The lower the average relative
 265 variance increase, the less are the effects of missing data on the variance of the model (White,
 266 et al., 2011). Truck type was removed from the analysis because there were so few rigid trucks
 267 among the cases that it prevented testing other more relevant variables.

268 **3. Results**

269 All cases and 94.4% (N=841) of controls were men. Cases and controls did not differ
 270 statistically in terms of age (cases: 44.5 years, SD=10.4; controls: 45.3 years, SD=10.5), driving
 271 experience (cases: 16.9 years, SD=11.4; controls: 17.7 years, SD=12.3, N=842), or distance
 272 driven during the past week (cases: 3,771 kms, SD=1,667.2, N=191; controls: 3,774 kms,
 273 SD=1,773.6, N=836). Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for cases and controls for truck
 274 type and the variables included in the logistic regression.

275 **Table 2**

276 Descriptive statistics of truck type and the variables included in the logistic regression

Variable	Cases (N=194)	Controls (N=844)
	(%)	(%)
Employment type in past week		
Employee driver	138 (71.1)	593 (70.2)
Owner driver	20 (10.3)	108 (12.8)
Subcontractor driver	32 (16.5)	115 (13.6)
Other	00 (0.0)	28 (3.4)
Missing values	4 (2.1)	00 (0.0)
Payment method in past week		
Time-based rate	51 (26.3)	224 (26.6)
Single-time pay plus overtime	5 (2.6)	35 (4.1)

Trip rate	50 (25.8)	221 (26.2)
Distance-based rate	79 (40.7)	298 (35.3)
Other	00 (0.0)	54 (6.4)
Missing values	9 (4.6)	12 (1.4)
Payment for time spent loading and unloading in past week		
Yes	96 (49.5)	466 (55.2)
No	76 (39.2)	319 (37.8)
Missing values	22 (11.3)	59 (7.0)
Truck type on the current trip		
Rigid truck	10 (5.1)	67 (7.9)
Semitrailer	87 (44.9)	371 (44.0)
Road train	17 (8.8)	116 (13.7)
B-double	80 (41.2)	290 (34.4)
Load type on the current trip		
General freight or mixed freight	61 (31.4)	292 (34.6)
Livestock and dangerous goods	9 (4.6)	58 (6.9)
Other Goods	38 (19.6)	109 (12.9)
Empty	86 (44.4)	383 (45.4)
Missing values	00 (0.0)	2 (0.2)
Driver age (years)		
24-44	99 (51.0)	412 (48.8)
45-64	90 (46.4)	406 (48.1)
65 and more	5 (2.6)	26 (3.1)

277

278 The logistic regression estimates are presented in Table 3. The unspecified drivers and

279 payment methods were only in controls. Thus, these categories were not included in the

280 regression. The distance-based rate was considered as the reference category because research

281 mostly reported it as the most associated with drivers' poor safety performance (O'Neill &
282 Thornthwaite, 2016; Quinlan & Wright, 2008a). The F-test for the overall model provided a
283 statistic of 24.85 with an associated P-value<0.0001, implying that the models is globally
284 significant at the 99% confidence level.

285

286 **Table 3**

287 Estimates from the logistic regression of crash involvement

Variable	Odds ratio	P-value	95% CI ^x
Employment type in past week			
Employee driver	1.00	-	-
Owner driver	0.50**	0.008	0.30 to 0.83
Subcontractor driver	0.82	0.37	0.54 to 1.26
Pay method in past week			
Time-based rate	0.67*	0.04	0.46 to 0.99
Single-time pay plus overtime	0.44	0.10	0.16 to 1.18
Trip rate	0.56**	0.002	0.39 to 0.80
Distance-based rate	1.00	-	-
Payment for time spent loading and unloading in past week			
Yes	0.50**	<0.001	0.36 to 0.68
No	1.00	-	-
Load type on the current trip			
General freight or mixed freight	0.59**	0.002	0.42 to 0.82
Livestock and dangerous goods	0.45*	0.03	0.21 to 0.95
Other Goods	1.13	0.56	0.73 to 1.75
Empty	1.00	-	-
Driver age			
24-44	1.00	-	-
45-64	0.55**	<0.001	0.42 to 0.73
65 and more	0.46	0.12	0.17 to 1.24

288 **p<0.01, *p<0.05, ^xCI= confidence interval

289

290 Owner drivers had lower odds of crash involvement than employee drivers. Crash
 291 involvement was associated with the payment method; however, with distance-based rates
 292 being associated with higher odds of crash involvement than other payment methods, with the

293 exception of single-time pay plus overtime. Drivers who were paid for the time spent loading
294 and unloading had lower odds of crash involvement than those not paid for this time.

295 **4. Discussion**

296 Previous research has produced mixed evidence regarding the influence of heavy vehicle
297 driver employment type on crash involvement. This study examined this influence along with
298 that of payment method using Australian data. The findings suggest that payment method and
299 employment type are associated with crash involvement.

300 The lower odds of crash involvement for owner drivers than employee drivers is consistent
301 with the findings of Dammen (2005) and Cantor (2014). Owner drivers, as self-business
302 persons, face financial pressure to cover their costs. Nevertheless, they acknowledge that a
303 crash may necessitate the repair of vehicles with significant cost repercussions and time delays
304 (Nickerson & Silverman, 2003). Moreover, the time devoted to repairing vehicles is seen as a
305 loss of money due to the loss of other job opportunities (Cantor, et al., 2013). Thus, they may
306 be less likely to be involved in crashes than employee drivers. Furthermore, employee drivers
307 may be more likely to be involved in crashes than owner drivers if the employing company
308 allocates fewer resources to equipment maintenance and/or stimulates them to drive faster and
309 longer through distance-based payments (Cantor, 2016). The company may also not be able to
310 provide the appropriate equipment needed to carry the cargo safely.

311 The results of this study showed evidence of an association between payment method
312 and crash involvement. Drivers paid time-based rates, trip-based rates or unspecified rates had
313 lower odds of crash involvement than those paid distance-based rates. While time-based
314 payments may be associated with driving longer than advisable, distance-based rates
315 incentivise both faster and longer driving (Quinlan & Wright, 2008a). The lower is the
316 uncertainty of earnings; the lower is the likelihood of crash involvement (Hensher, et al., 1991).
317 This uncertainty is likely to be lower for trip-based rates than distance-based rates. While both

318 types of rates are related to the number of kilometres driven, trip-related earnings appear to be
319 the most predictable because trips are defined between specified origins and destinations. These
320 findings are consistent with previous studies connecting payment methods to crash
321 involvement and other safety outcomes (Belzer & Sedo, 2018; Mooren, et al., 2015; Stevenson,
322 et al., 2014; Viscelli, 2016). In another Australian study, logistics and transport companies with
323 good safety records mostly paid their drivers time-based rates (hourly or weekly) or fixed
324 salaries while companies with poorer safety records mostly paid drivers based on loads carried
325 (Mooren, et al., 2014). The majority of Australian heavy vehicle drivers surveyed between
326 September 2015 and August 2016 strongly believed that payments based on distance travelled
327 implicitly encourage unsafe behaviours (O'Neill & Thornthwaite, 2016). As explained by
328 Williamson and Friswell (2013), drivers work more hours than those simply required to drive
329 non-stop from origin to destination and the total hours worked is influenced by operational
330 factors. Incentive payments (distance-based or trip-based rates) encourage longer hours of
331 working than time-based payment where drivers are paid for all of the hours they work
332 (including the time spent waiting for loading and unloading to occur). In addition, drivers
333 operating under distance-based payments are effectively penalised for taking breaks because
334 these are unpaid time (Belzer & Sedo, 2018). Driving without taking breaks makes drivers
335 vulnerable to fatigue and crash involvement (Chen & Xie, 2014; Chen, Fang, Guo, &
336 Hanowski, 2016; Lenné & Jacobs, 2016). Moreover, distance-based payments can encourage
337 drivers to speed, violate hours-of-service regulations and take drugs to stay awake and drive
338 for longer hours, making them further vulnerable to fatigue and crash risk (Quinlan & Wright,
339 2008a; Williamson, 2007; Williamson, Cooley, Hayes, & O'Neill, 2006; Williamson &
340 Friswell, 2013).

341 The drivers paid for the time associated with the non-driving tasks such as loading and
342 unloading had lower odds of crash involvement than those not paid for this time. Drivers in the

343 current study, as shown in Table 2, were mostly paid distance-based rates (40.7% of cases and
344 35.3% of controls) implying that they only make money when driving. In such situations, the
345 time related to non-driving duties if not paid becomes an opportunity cost because it decreases
346 driving time resulting in lower income for drivers. Drivers are accordingly motivated to drive
347 faster and longer than legally required increasing the risk of fatigued driving and crash risk
348 (Kudo & Belzer, 2019; Office of the Inspector General, 2018; Quinlan & Wright, 2008b).

349 Drivers carrying general or mixed freight, or livestock and dangerous goods had lower odds
350 of crash involvement compared to drivers driving empty trucks. It is more likely that drivers
351 operate vehicles more attentively when transporting freight that requires particular precautions
352 (Cantor, Corsi, Grimm, & Özpolat, 2010). The findings may reflect the need for drivers with
353 empty load vehicles to travel to destinations quickly and consequently speed in order to secure
354 another load. It may also be related to the handling issues of empty trucks like trailer sway,
355 which may increase the risk of rollover crash (Blower, Campbell, & Green, 1993).

356 The lower odds of crash involvement for drivers aged between 45 and 64 years old
357 compared to drivers aged between 24 and 44 years old could be the result of the risk-taking
358 behaviours such as speeding of drivers aged between 24 and 44 years old and their relatively
359 low driving experience compared to others (Cantor, et al., 2010).

360 *4.1. Study limitations and future research*

361 This research has some limitations. It only looked at factors associated with moderate
362 severity crashes because drivers involved in fatal crashes and drivers who were severely injured
363 were excluded. Self-reported data may contain some errors and potential sampling bias. Drivers
364 under time constraints may not have agreed to participate or could have been more preoccupied
365 with finishing the interview rather than by giving candid answers. Controls were selected by
366 approaching drivers at truck stops during mealtimes. This selection process could omit those

367 of them who did not often use truck stops for their meals. Nevertheless, the survey was spread
368 over different times, days, weeks and months to capture various travel patterns.

369 While the payment for the time related to the loading and unloading tasks is connected
370 with lower odds of crash involvement, it is not known whether drivers themselves performed
371 these tasks. The loading and unloading tasks, when performed by the drivers, may constitute a
372 significant source of fatigue irrespective of whether they are paid or not (Williamson, Friswell,
373 & Sadural, 2001).

374 The use of crash involvement as a measure of safety performance has been criticised on
375 the ground that it does not reveal the actual safety performance of a logistics and transport
376 company because the driver may not be at-fault (Beard, 1992; Savage, 1999). The research
377 team did not collect information from police records regarding whether case drivers were at-
378 fault in the crash. Thus, it may be more appropriate to use safety behaviour variables, such as
379 hours-of-service compliance, speeding and vehicle maintenance, because they reflect the
380 efforts of companies more than crash involvement (Miller, et al., 2018; Miller & Saldanha,
381 2016). Case-control studies could be used to examine these behaviours based on driver
382 employment type (Cantor, 2016). Researchers could also explore whether the different types
383 of drivers perceive different advantages for diverse safety violations given the various job
384 constraints they face (Miller, et al., 2018).

385 Other authors have claimed that it is the pay level per se, rather than payment method,
386 which encourages undesired safety behaviours because drivers are in the quest for an
387 acceptable net income (Hensher & Battellino, 1990; Hensher, et al., 1991). A safe payment
388 system should consider the pay level, payment method and other elements, such as the payment
389 for non-driving time (Quinlan & Wright, 2008b). While the influences of payment method and
390 the payment for non-driving time on safety have been analysed in Australia, studies about pay
391 level are missing, despite drivers reporting that low pay rates are a key threat to safety in

392 Australia (O'Neill & Thornthwaite, 2016; Williamson, et al., 2001). Higher pay rates have been
393 reported to improve safety performance in the United States (Belzer, Rodriguez, & Sedo, 2002;
394 Belzer & Sedo, 2018; Britto, et al., 2010; Kraas, 1993; Monaco & Williams, 2000; Rodríguez,
395 Rocha, Khattak, & Belzer, 2003; Rodriguez, Targa, & Belzer, 2006). One US study based on
396 data collected in 1997-1998 showed that drivers were more likely to reduce the amount of
397 driving time when the distance-based pay rate increased (Belzer & Sedo, 2018). The authors
398 concluded that drivers have a target level of earnings, and greater compensation can lead them
399 to be more mindful of safety and drivers who cannot obtain their target revenue without
400 breaching safety regulations will be tempted to do so.

401 There is a need to explore driver pay level and safety outcomes in the Australian heavy
402 vehicle industry to help identify the pay rate levels that are conducive to safety. This could be
403 achieved by examining the factors that affect pay satisfaction. Studies in the heavy vehicle
404 industry mostly identified pay level as among the top factors that affect heavy vehicle driver
405 job satisfaction (Humphreys, 2016; Sersland & Nataraajan, 2015), but pay satisfaction itself is
406 still to be explored. For instance, one of the important, influential factors of pay satisfaction is
407 the gap between the perceived and the actually received amounts (Miceli & Lane, 1990).
408 Drivers who are satisfied with their payment level may be more willing to comply with safety
409 regulations (Fehr & Schmidt, 2000; Milgrom & Roberts, 2002).

410 **5. Conclusions**

411 Due to the high level of competition in the heavy vehicle industry, logistics and transport
412 companies often use drivers other than their employed drivers to increase flexibility and stay
413 competitive. It is, therefore, necessary for company managers to have thorough knowledge
414 about the safety performance of the different types of drivers. Nevertheless, research is
415 inconclusive about the relationship between driver employment type and crash involvement in
416 the industry. Moreover, this issue has been relatively less explored in Australia compared to
417 the United States, and no past studies included payment methods as well, despite reports that
418 they influence safety outcomes.

419 This study used existing Australian case-control data to explore the association of both
420 long-distance heavy vehicle driver employment type and payment methods with crash
421 involvement. The results from an unconditional logistic regression suggested that owner
422 drivers had lower odds of crash involvement than employee drivers. Likewise, drivers
423 receiving hourly or trip rates had lower odds of crash involvement than those paid on distance
424 travelled. Drivers paid for time spent loading and unloading had lower odds of crash
425 involvement than those not paid for this time. Drivers carrying general freight or mixed freight,
426 or livestock and dangerous goods had lower odds of crash involvement than drivers driving
427 empty trucks. Driver's age was also a significant crash influential factor involvement with
428 lower crash involvement for drivers aged between 45 and 64 years old compared to those aged
429 between 24 and 44 years old.

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444 None.

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