Brothers in arms - An experiment on the alliance puzzle
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Description
The generic alliance game considers players in an alliance who fight against an external enemy. After victory, the alliance may break up, and its members may fight against each other over the spoils of the victory. Our experimental analysis of this game shows: In-group solidarity vanishes after the break-up of the alliance. Former ‘brothers in arms’ fight even more vigorously against each other than strangers do. Furthermore, this vigorous internal fighting is anticipated and reduces the ability of the alliance to mobilize the joint fighting effort, compared to a situation in which victorious alliance members share the spoils of victory equally and peacefully
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| ID Code: | 219689 | ||
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| Item Type: | Contribution to Journal (Journal Article) | ||
| Refereed: | Yes | ||
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| Measurements or Duration: | 16 pages | ||
| Keywords: | Alliance, Conflict, Contest, Free-riding, Hold-up problem, In-group solidarity | ||
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.011 | ||
| ISSN: | 0899-8256 | ||
| Pure ID: | 32545156 | ||
| Divisions: | Past > QUT Faculties & Divisions > QUT Business School Current > Schools > School of Economics & Finance |
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| Copyright Owner: | Consult author(s) regarding copyright matters | ||
| Copyright Statement: | This work is covered by copyright. Unless the document is being made available under a Creative Commons Licence, you must assume that re-use is limited to personal use and that permission from the copyright owner must be obtained for all other uses. If the document is available under a Creative Commons License (or other specified license) then refer to the Licence for details of permitted re-use. It is a condition of access that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. If you believe that this work infringes copyright please provide details by email to qut.copyright@qut.edu.au | ||
| Deposited On: | 06 Nov 2021 11:35 | ||
| Last Modified: | 26 Jun 2024 17:50 |
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