Inequality aversion and government health expenditure
|
Accepted Version
(PDF 666kB)
138221612. Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives 4.0. |
Description
This paper explores a behavioural mechanism through which income inequality may be associated with population health. We consider a model with heterogeneous agents in which agents' preferences are characterized by income inequality aversion. Our analysis shows that spending on health-producing goods is inversely related to the agents’ degree of inequality aversion. A Veblenesque mechanism drives this relation: inequality averse poor agents wish to enjoy consumption levels closer to the average consumption levels in the economy but can only do so by reducing their expenditures on health. This leads to adverse outcomes for individuals and adverse political economy implications for health. In the political economy context, agents characterized by high inequality aversion vote for lower levels of government health spending. To specifically test this mechanism, we construct empirical measures of inequality aversion. Then, using these measures for a panel of 147 countries spanning 2008–2019, we find a significant negative impact of inequality aversion on allocations of public spending for healthcare. These results remain robust to different model specifications.
Impact and interest:
Citation counts are sourced monthly from Scopus and Web of Science® citation databases.
These databases contain citations from different subsets of available publications and different time periods and thus the citation count from each is usually different. Some works are not in either database and no count is displayed. Scopus includes citations from articles published in 1996 onwards, and Web of Science® generally from 1980 onwards.
Citations counts from the Google Scholar™ indexing service can be viewed at the linked Google Scholar™ search.
Full-text downloads:
Full-text downloads displays the total number of times this work’s files (e.g., a PDF) have been downloaded from QUT ePrints as well as the number of downloads in the previous 365 days. The count includes downloads for all files if a work has more than one.
ID Code: | 240844 | ||
---|---|---|---|
Item Type: | Contribution to Journal (Journal Article) | ||
Refereed: | Yes | ||
ORCID iD: |
|
||
Additional Information: | Acknowledgements: We thank discussants and seminar participants at the 3rd Ariel Conference on Political Economy of Public Policy (September 2022) for thoughtful criticisms and suggestions. The work of Honghong Wei was sponsored by the Shanghai Pujiang Program under Grant 21PJC059. | ||
Measurements or Duration: | 21 pages | ||
DOI: | 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2023.102425 | ||
ISSN: | 0176-2680 | ||
Pure ID: | 138221612 | ||
Divisions: | Current > QUT Faculties and Divisions > Faculty of Business & Law Current > Schools > School of Economics & Finance |
||
Copyright Owner: | 2023 Elsevier B.V. | ||
Copyright Statement: | This work is covered by copyright. Unless the document is being made available under a Creative Commons Licence, you must assume that re-use is limited to personal use and that permission from the copyright owner must be obtained for all other uses. If the document is available under a Creative Commons License (or other specified license) then refer to the Licence for details of permitted re-use. It is a condition of access that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. If you believe that this work infringes copyright please provide details by email to qut.copyright@qut.edu.au | ||
Deposited On: | 27 Jun 2023 04:05 | ||
Last Modified: | 21 Jun 2024 17:46 |
Export: EndNote | Dublin Core | BibTeX
Repository Staff Only: item control page