Access Control:Allocating resources to selfish agents

, , , & (2011) Access Control:Allocating resources to selfish agents. IEEE ComSoc MMTC E-Letter, 6(4), pp. 18-21.

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Description

The ultimate goal of an authorisation system is to allocate each user the level of access they need to complete their job - no more and no less. This proves to be challenging in an organisational setting because on one hand employees need enough access to perform their tasks, while on the other hand more access will bring about an increasing risk of misuse - either intentionally, where an employee uses the access for personal benefit, or unintentionally through carelessness, losing the information or being socially engineered to give access to an adversary. With the goal of developing a more dynamic authorisation model, we have adopted a game theoretic framework to reason about the factors that may affect users’ likelihood to misuse a permission at the time of an access decision. Game theory provides a useful but previously ignored perspective in authorisation theory: the notion of the user as a self-interested player who selects among a range of possible actions depending on their pay-offs.

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ID Code: 41314
Item Type: Contribution to Journal (Journal Article)
Refereed: No
ORCID iD:
Dulleck, Uweorcid.org/0000-0002-0953-5963
Dawson, Edorcid.org/0000-0002-1932-1061
Measurements or Duration: 4 pages
Keywords: access control, authorization, game theory, information security, insider problem
Pure ID: 32101958
Divisions: Past > QUT Faculties & Divisions > QUT Business School
Past > Institutes > Institute for Future Environments
Past > QUT Faculties & Divisions > Science & Engineering Faculty
Current > Schools > School of Economics & Finance
Copyright Owner: Copyright 2011 IEEE COMSOC MMTC E-Letter
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Deposited On: 14 Apr 2011 23:12
Last Modified: 02 Mar 2024 06:20